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Introduction: Georges Sorel’s Study on Vico in
French and European Context
Somewhere between late nineteenth century critics of bourgeois modernity,
such as Friedrich Nietzsche, and exalted twentieth century militarists, such as
Ernst Jünger and Benito Mussolini, is to be found Georges Sorel (1847–1922)—
at least according to the usual narratives of the period’s intellectual history. The
commonly accepted image of Sorel is that of a theorist of violence, a philo-
sophical irrationalist, and a precursor of fascism.1 Sorel’s work is taken as the
paradigmatic representation of that late nineteenth century “crisis of reason”
which anticipated and prepared theway for the tragedies of the first half of the
twentieth century.2 It is, however, sufficient to scratch but the surface of this
widely accepted image to see how it is disproportionately based on the reading
of only one of Sorel’s works, the 1908 Reflections on Violence.
1 See, amongst many such views, above all the works of Zeev Sternhell, such as Zeev Stern-
hell, Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France, trans. David Maisel, 2nd ed. (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 68–81; Zeev Sternhell, Maia Asheri, and Mario Szna-
jder, The Birth of Fascist Ideology. From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution, trans. David
Maisel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 36–91; Jan-Werner Müller, “Myth,
Law and Order: Schmitt and Benjamin Read Reflections on Violence,” History of European
Ideas 29 (2003): 459–473; George Douglas Howard Cole, A History of Socialist Thought. The
Second International 1889–1914, vol. 3 (London: Macmillan, 1956), 382–387. Alternative and
more nuanced readings of Sorel in English are available in Jeremy Jennings, Georges Sorel.
The Character and Development of His Thought (Hong Kong: Palgrave Macmillan, 1985); John
Stanley, The Sociology of Virtue. The Political and Social Theories of Georges Sorel (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1981). See also the 1998 special issue of The European
Legacy in memoriam John Stanley, including an essay from Stanley himself on Sorel and
Vico, together with important work by Steven Vincent, Jeremy Jennings, Shlomo Sand, and
Cécile Laborde. Among the older generation of English-language scholarship, JamesMeisel’s
Genesis of Georges Sorel (Ann Arbor, MI: George Wahr, 1951) ought to be mentioned, while
H. Stuart Hughes’ synthetic treatment inConsciousness and Society (NewYork:Vintage Books,
1958), 90–95 and 161–182, is also still valuable. Isaiah Berlin’s 1971 essay on Sorel for all its
limits, also still ranks as among the best short treatments: Berlin, Against the Current. As for
the French historiography, the journal Mil neuf cent. Revue d’histoire intellectuelle (previously
Cahiers Georges Sorel) is key: it is not only a space of scholarly reflection on Sorel, but also
where previously unpublished material often appears. See the recent issue “Sorel méconnu,”
Mil neuf cent 32 (2014). For a recent account of ColdWar Anglophone reception of Sorel, see
Eric Brandom, “Violence in Translation: Georges Sorel, Liberalism and Totalitarianism from
Weimar toWoodstock.”History of Political Thought 38, no. 4 (2017): 733–763.
2 See for example John Burrow, The Crisis of Reason. European Thought 1848–1914 (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 142.
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Beyond this relativelywell-known though oftenmisinterpreted text, the vast
majority of Sorel’swritings remainunknownandunread, particularly byAnglo-
phone scholars. It is thus the unfortunate, though unsurprising, result of this
scholarly neglect that Sorel should be reduced to the hollow image of an apoc-
alyptic prophet, and that, almost a century after his death, he remains un
méconnu célèbre, a thinker much talked about in passing references but sel-
dom effectively engaged with and understood.3 A more realistic understand-
ing of Sorel opens the way for re-evaluation of the intellectual history of the
years around 1900 as more than a station on the via dolorosa of reason that
the first half of the twentieth century usually constitutes in liberal historiogra-
phy.
The “Study onVico,” here published for the first time inEnglish translation, is
a remarkable antidote against this consolidated historiographical image. This
text introduces the reader to fundamental, yet regularly unacknowledged or
underplayed, concerns and contexts of Sorel’s work as a whole. Seen from
the perspective of his study on Vico, Sorel does not appear as a philosophi-
cal irrationalist and an apologist of violence for its own sake, but instead as an
epistemologist of the social sciences and as a Marxist theorist of considerable
insight and originality. The sustained reflection on the possibility of Marxism
as a social science, a key theme not only of the study on Vico but also of Sorel’s
careermore generally, gives us the elements required for developing a new and
more historically accurate view of the “metaphysician of revolutionary syndi-
calism,” as Jean Jaurès once labelled him.
Beyond this re-interpretation of Sorel’s work, the “Study on Vico” is of inter-
est for at least two further, more general, reasons. First, it sheds new light on
important aspects of French intellectual life in the fin de siècle, in particular
regarding the insularity and self-sufficiency of the French intellectual space
and the interplay between dominant and heterodox approaches to the concep-
tualization of the then emerging social sciences. One of the most perplexing
features of the dominant historiographical image of Sorel is that it portrays him
as a sui generis thinker, difficult to label, whose relation with the intellectual
traditions surrounding him is either denied or investigated very selectively—
mostly in terms of a poorly conceptualized Bergsonism.4 It is easy to see how
this image cannot but portray only half of the truth.
3 Michel Charzat, “Avant-propos,” in Cahiers de l’Herne—Georges Sorel, ed. Michel Charzat
(Paris: Editions de l’Herne, 1986), 9.
4 See for exampleMark Antliff, Avant-Garde Fascism:TheMobilization of Myth, Art, andCulture
inFrance 1909–1939 (Durham,NC:DukeUniversity Press, 2007), 4. For amorehistorically accu-
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It is, in fact, precisely his polemicalmode of intellectual production,marked
by constant critical engagement with those with whom he disagreed the most,
which singles him out as the eccezionale normale of French intellectual life of
the period: as the exception which can be used to understand the norm. As we
shall see in this introduction, the “Study on Vico” emerges from a multiplic-
ity of debates and networks of ideas in which Sorel was immersed and which
guided him in the development of his own positions. Ranging from the French
debate on themethodology of the social sciences to the Europe-wide reflection
around the basic tenets of Marxian analysis, these various contexts of produc-
tion of the “Study on Vico” not only help us understand the text, but, crucially,
can in their turn be illuminated by it.
Second, Sorel’s engagement with Vico presages in provocative ways major
themes of interwar Marxist thought. Though Sorel lacks, partly for chronolog-
ical reasons, a theory of alienation, his entire reflection on Marxism is based
on an anti-deterministic historical ontology cast in terms of collective human
agency. If we take seriously the Italian sources from which Sorel’s interest in
Vico originated—the remnants of amid-19th century ItalianHegelian tradition
and the philosophical forefathers of Antonio Gramsci—and if we look at how
some of Vico’s ideas shaped Sorel’s understanding of Marxism as a theory of
collective historical subjectivity, we may be brought to consider the possibility
of an important pre-war precedent in the tradition of thought normally known
as humanist Marxism. The present text will shed light on the above points by
looking both to biographical elements and to the wider landscape of French
and European intellectual life of the period.
Despite the fact that Sorel was an omnivorous reader and wrote, not always
with equal insight, on an impressively large number of topics ranging from
Biblical exegesis to physics, from philosophy to history, the “Study on Vico”
is not merely the result of intellectual curiosity for the 18th century Italian
philosopher. It emerges from a complex context that can be accounted for in
terms of essentially three elements. First, it is linked to epistemological ques-
tions, questions to which Sorel had been dedicating energy for some time, and
which found answers in some of Vico’s ideas. Second is the particular situa-
tion of Marxism in France in the 1890s, which both allowed and forced Sorel
to attempt an operation of theoretical reinvention—what we here call “Sore-
lian revisionism.” Third, a network of international contacts allowed Sorel to
benefit from the decisive intermediation of Italian historicist Marxists. These




not only led Sorel to the discovery of Michelet’s translations of Vico, but also
conditioned his understanding of the significance of Vichian ideas for Marx-
ism.5
Much of the focus and the analytical depth of this introduction will be con-
centrated on these three immediate contexts of the “Study on Vico”. Nonethe-
less, we also add a wider biographical sketch of Sorel. This is not only to show
the centrality and significance of the work here translated to Sorel’s wider tra-
jectory, but also to present, albeit synthetically, a different portrait of a writer
too often seen as amere precursor of certain interwar intellectual and political
tendencies.
1 The Early Years of Georges Sorel
It is easy, when dealing with Sorel, to reduce biography to bibliography, to see
the man as mere thinker and to study him purely through the many writings
and letters he left behind. And yet, when he published his first work in 1886,
Sorel was already 38.6 At the time, he was living in Perpignan, working as an
engineer for the French state. Six years later he would resign from his job and
quit the Pyrenean city to move, with his partner Marie, to Boulogne-sur-Seine,
near Paris, in order to become a full-time intellectual. He was 45 years of age.
Hewas born in 1847 inCherbourg, into themiddle class branchof a relatively
important Normand Catholic family.7 His father was a small businessman and
his mother the daughter of the mayor of the nearby town of Barfleur. Sorel’s
rising social trajectory, like that of his brothers, is linked with the French state
and its educational institutions. A gifted student, Georges studied at the local
5 As Sorel reveals in the “StudyonVico,” hewas readingVico’sworks in theFrench translationby
Michelet, whose complete works were published between 1893 and 1898 by Flammarion. The
volume on Vico—number 27 in the 40-volume collection—included “in addition to the New
Science, Vico’s autobiography, the treatise on the ancient wisdom of Italy and some minor
works.” See Jules Michelet,Oeuvres complétes: Vico, ed. Gabriel Monod, vol. 27, 40 vols. (Paris:
Flammarion, 1894).
6 Georges Sorel, “Sur les applications de la psychophysique,”Revue philosophique de la France
et de l’ étranger 22 (October 1886): 363–375.
7 The historian and future president of the French Senate Albert Sorel, Georges’ cousin, came
from a wealthier branch of the family. As for the religious upbringing, though Georges even-
tually lost his faith, as late as 1872 he still spoke as a member of the Roman Church, as can
be evinced by his letter to the bishop of Orléans, Monseigneur Félix Dupanloup. See Patrice
Rolland, “Georges Sorel, la science et la religion,”Mil neuf cent 22 (2004): 207–215.
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Collège de Cherbourg, where he won a number of prizes in mathematics, and
where he earned a double qualification, both scientific (baccalauréat ès sci-
ences) and humanistic (baccaluréat ès lettres). Some time after the completion
of Georges’ schooling, the family moved from Cherbourg to Paris. Apparently,
this move was decided in order to secure more business opportunities in the
capital. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suppose that it was a different kind of
investment in the family’s future that the parents were after: moving to Paris
meant allowing the three childrenGeorges, Anatole, and Ernest to pursue their
education in some of the country’s most important schools.
In 1864, Georges is at the Collège Imperial Rollin, taking preparatory classes
for the entrance exam at the École Polytechnique, which he will successfully
pass in the following year, on his first attempt.8 With the exception of some
mediocre grades in French literature and German, his education at the École
was a success: ranked 10th out of 133 pupils at the end of the two years, he
could, in virtue of this positioning, choose a specialization of his liking, and
ended up entering the École des Ponts et Chaussées, where he completed his
studies in 1870. Upon graduation, he entered his post as a military engineer for
the French state. His first working year—adecisive one in French history—was
spent in the newly acquired Corsica. When he returned to the French main-
land in July 1871 everything had changed: France had lost the war with Prussia,
the empire of Napoleon III had collapsed, a republic had been proclaimed,
and a short-lived Parisian commune had been repressed with large amounts of
bloodshed. Though he would come back to some of these events—especially
the Commune—in his later writings, there are no records of how he experi-
enced them as they were occurring.
He spent most of the 1870s in southern France, first near Toulouse (Albi),
and then closer to the Italian border (Draguignan, Gap). In 1876 he embarked
for Mostaganem, 100 kilometres north of Oran, in colonial Algeria. In 1879 he
moved to Perpignan, in the Pyrenees region, where he would spend the next
13 years, the last ones of his life as an engineer of the Ponts et Chaussées, and
where he would begin writing and publishing.9
This first half of Sorel’s life is shrouded in relative obscurity, especially
when compared to the amount of sources and works which pertain to the
second half, which he spent as an increasingly public intellectual.10 Nonethe-
8 Also Ernest and Anatole will end up in the École Polytechnique.
9 Most of this biographical sketch is derived from Pierre Andreu, Notre maître, M. Sorel
(Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1953).
10 A notable exception is Alice Ingold, “Penser à l’épreuve des conflits. Georges Sorel ingé-
nieur hydraulique à Perpignan,”Mil neuf cent 32 (2014): 11–52.
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less, a few elements of his intellectual and political formation can be deduced
and must be highlighted. It is clear that both his education—at the École
Polytechnique first and then at the Ponts et Chausées—and his 23 years of
work as an engineer were important in determining the preferences and sen-
sitivities that Sorel matured over the years and which informed his written
work.
And yet, they are often misunderstood. In his Road to Serfdom, for example,
Hayek locates Sorel in a technocratic, anti-liberal, and hyper-rationalistic tra-
dition of thought that, because it aspires to rule through science, is at the root
of totalitarian regimes.11 It seems tempting to accept such a narrative, espe-
cially if we think of the great French dirigiste tradition, which, starting with
positivism,was embodied in institutions like the ÉcolePolytechnique—an insti-
tutionwhichHayek described as the “source of the scientistic hubris,” claiming
that it was the locus of elaboration of “themost fantastic plans for the reorgani-
zation of society,” continuously spawning social reformers throughout the 19th
century, all the way “down to Georges Sorel.”12 The greatest state-coordinated
plan of economic development of the French 19th century, the plan Freycinet,
after all originated from a former polytechnicien, the then minister of public
works Charles de Freycinet.
And yet, the historical record is less straightforward. To start with, we should
recognize that Hayek’s strict dichotomy between liberalism and technocracy is
polemical and strategicmore than historical. The history of the Saint-Simonian
movement as well as the economic policies of the Second Empire show their
compatibility. It was, after all, Michel Chevalier, a former polytechnicien and
a Saint-Simonian, who managed to secure the anti-protectionist commercial
treaty with England in 1860. Moreover, even accepting the centrality of the
École Polytechnique and the École des Ponts et Chausées to a French tradition
of technocratic governance, one must be reminded that institutions are not to
be conceptualised as isolatedmonoliths, impervious to outside influences and
11 Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom [1944] (Abingdon: Routledge, 2001), 161.
12 Friedrich Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science. Studies on the Abuse of Reason (Glen-
coe, IL: The Free Press, 1955), 113. Isaiah Berlin casts Sorel in a similar mould, although as
in revolt, finally, against the smooth, scientifically administered world. For a different and
more historical approach to the Saint-Simonians more generally, see Robert Carlisle, The
Proffered Crown. Saint-Simonianism and the Doctrine of Hope (Baltimore: John Hopkins,
1987); more recently, and dealing in particular with Algeria, Osama Abi-Mershed, Apos-
tles of Modernity. Saint Simonians and the CivilizingMission in Algeria (Standord: Stanford
University Press, 2010). Theodore Porter offers a broad critique of a simplistic technocratic
framing in hisTrust in numbers. The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science andPublic Life (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), especially in chapter 6.
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internally uniform: if we lookat Sorel’s teacher of political economyat the Ponts
et Chaussées, we find, for example, a leading French liberal economist, Joseph
Garnier.13 Most importantly, however, one cannot assume that an individual is
always the unmediated product of the institutions in which he develops. Cer-
tainly, Sorel was not.
In fact, a convincing case can be made that one of Sorel’s deepest and most
persisting political inclinations—an often undetected political liberalism—
was based on a rejection of the sort of technocracy which he encountered
during his education in these institutions.14 The constant attacks on Auguste
Comte and thepositivists, defined in the Reflections onViolence as the represen-
tatives of “mediocrity, pride andpedantry,” are only one small piece of evidence
for this.15 Or should one recall the critique, again articulated in the Reflections,
of utopias, whosemain problem is precisely that of being “an intellectual prod-
uct” and merely “the work of theorists”?16 There are countless examples of
Sorel’s fierce objections to various forms of technocratic rule by experts, which
he associatedwith political centralismand individual oppression, and towhich
he objected on epistemological as well as political grounds.
In the 1889 Procès de Socrate, written while still in Perpignan, Sorel outlines
a connection between a monistic and excessively rationalistic way of thinking
about science and certain forms of political community: to a Socratic concep-
tion of rationality, in other words, corresponds a Socratic conception of poli-
tics. Drawing parallels between early protestants, Jesuit missionaries, and the
French revolutionaries of 1793, Sorel argues that what unites these diverse his-
torical examples is their “ecclesiastical” conception of the state, in which “the
citizen can only aspire to one type of liberty, the liberty of the good.”17 A few
pages later, Sorel explicitly connects this ecclesiastical conception of the state
to Jules Ferry’s laws on public education, which in 1881 and 1882 had instituted
a free, compulsory, and secular education system in France. Sorel’s reflections
on these laws is deeply pessimistic, and the only glimmer of hope rests, for him,
on the inefficiencies of democratic institutions. But if the project of national
13 See the Annuaire du ministére de l’agriculture, du commerce et des travaux publics pour
l’année 1867, 135 and Annuaire du ministére de l’agriculture, du commerce et des travaux
publics pour l’année 1868, 185. Both list Garnier as full professor. Archive de l’École des
Ponts et Chaussées, cotes 1972.
14 For a generally convincing case for Sorel as a conservative liberal, see Marco Gervasoni,
Georges Sorel: Una biografia intellettuale (Milano: Unicopli, 1997).
15 Georges Sorel, Reflections onViolence [1908], ed. Jeremy Jennings (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), 134.
16 Ibid., 28.
17 Georges Sorel, Le procès de Socrate (Paris: Alcan, 1889), 7.
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education were to be successful, “France would become a branch of the old
missions in Paraguay, a truly Socratic state.”18
Examples of this kind couldbemultiplied, fromhis readingof theBolsheviks
and Lenin as federalists, to the constant hostility to the French revolutionary
tradition, read through the anti-centralist lenses of Tocqueville.19 The impor-
tance of federalism and anti-statism to Sorel’s political identity are, indeed, in
stark contrast to his education and upbringing and, it is worth underlining, are
often underpinned by a pluralist epistemology. Without being excessively bio-
graphical, these political and intellectual inclinations could be interpreted as
a rejection of the heritage of institutions such as the École Polytechnique and
the École des Ponts et Chausées, as well as of the Republican state which he
served until 1892. The very early retirement, at the age of 45, suggests a degree
of uneasiness vis à vis the institutions in which he spent the first part of his
life—yet his desire to retain the customarily awarded légion d’honneur, which
hewore even into anarchist bookshops, gives evidenceof a certain kindof pride
in his work.
2 The Epistemology of the Social Sciences
The most important legacy inherited by Sorel from his first 40 years of life
was his interest in questions of epistemology and philosophy of science. With
the exception of some historical works, the first years of Sorel’s production
are dominated by interventions in debates regarding experimental psychol-
ogy, epistemology, the status of mathematical propositions, and so on. As we
shall explain better in the following paragraphs, this conceptual terrain, this
interrogation on the epistemic status of scientific assertions, is a key feature of
European intellectual life in the fin de siècle. It is mostly from this angle that
Sorel readVico, in an attempt to articulate aMarxist approach to social science
both in terms of practice and in terms of method. This aspect of Sorel’s produc-
tion, i.e. the reflection upon the epistemology and methodology of social and
natural science, is of crucial importance, not only because it is a decisive con-
text to understanding the “Study on Vico,” but also because it is one of Sorel’s
most constant theoretical concerns, from his writings of the 1880s to the last
book he published, the 1921 Utilité du Pragmatisme. And yet, it is an aspect
which is regularly underplayed and obfuscated in the dominant historiograph-
ical treatments of Sorel.
18 Ibid., 9.
19 Letter to Agostino Lanzillo, 8/10/1918 Cher camarade … Georges Sorel ad Agostino Lanzillo
1909–1921, ed. Franco Germinario (Brescia: Fondazione Micheletti, 1994), 248.
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Take for example Zeev Sternhell’s Birth of Fascist Ideology, whose famous
opening chapter contains what is probably the most influential portrait of
Georges Sorel in the last half century. Sternhell’s portrait is dominated by a
specific interpretation of some passages in the Reflections on Violence, which
amount to the “theory that heroicmyths and violencewere creative of morality
and virtue.”20 This supposed connection between violence, myth, andmorality
is the basis of his interpretation of virtually the entirety of Sorel’s work, which
constitutes, in Sternhell’s narrative, the decisive point of contact between
Marxism and what will become fascism. Deviations from this idée fixe are
treated, with some help from autobiographical snippets, as unimportant, and
Sorel’s complex intellectual trajectory is rendered as something which “despite
appearances … was perfectly coherent and followed a strict political logic.”21
Even accepting the importance of this conceptual triad of myth, morality,
and violence as a conceptual trinity, giving it so central a role in a reconstruc-
tion of Sorel’s intellectual activity engenders a blindness to context, nuance,
and complexity. It results, moreover, in a flat misreading or occlusion of sub-
stantial elements of Sorel’s intellectual and political life. This is particularly
evident if we look to the connection between social science and Marxism in
Sorel’s work. Though this connection emerges very evidently from the sources,
Sternhell’s view of Sorel as essentially a moralist forces him to gloss over it and
to obscure it. Thus, we read that “Sorel took up Marxism with such enthusi-
asm and stuck to it so faithfully … because he perceived in it a moral content.”
The abundant epistemological and scientific language of Sorel’s Marxist works
is portrayed as accidental, as the exuberance of a new convert to “scientific”
socialism.22
However, the opposite of this view is true. It was the concern for the episte-
mology of the sciences, both natural and social, which led Sorel to Marxism,
and not the “scientific” ambitions of Marxism which forced him to engage
on the otherwise uninteresting terrain of epistemology. Most of Sorel’s early
Marxist texts, though peppered with references to Marx, constitute in fact the
continuation of an epistemological reflection which he had begun some time
before encountering the German thinker. Marx and Vico, in other words, were
of interest to Sorel chiefly—though not exclusively—because they constituted
20 Sternhell, Asheri, and Sznajder, The Birth of Fascist Ideology. From Cultural Rebellion to
Political Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 37.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 40. It should be added that la morale was a key object of enquiry for late 19th cen-
tury French social thinkers, and that therefore it is profoundly mistaken to pit it in such
an antithetical manner to science.
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possible answers to some conceptual difficulties of a reflection on the limits
and methods of both natural and social science, which he had been develop-
ing since the late 1880s.23
The interest in Marxism, thus, was not dictated by a “moral content” which
Sorel perceived in it, but instead by a problem “of philosophical order,” as he
himself wrote in an 1893 letter to the Revue philosophique in which he pub-
licly announced his embracement of Marxism.24The place inwhich this public
statement is made is significant: not a political publication, but an academic
and scientific one. The marginality of moral and political argumentations in
what is Sorel’s first public defence of Marxism is striking, and it is noteworthy
that this defence takes place predominantly on the terrain of scientific enquiry.
To be for or againstMarx’s ideas, writes Sorel, is “purely a question of doctrine,”
and more precisely it boils down to whether “exchange contains an element
capable of being incorporated in a rational science, as K. Marx holds, or is it
a phenomenon escaping all possible scientific categories, as Aristotle seems
to think.”25 The predominance of scientific and epistemological concerns over
political and moral ones is self-evident, and it reveals the fact that Sorel’s first
years as a Marxist were mostly dedicated to the construction of a convinc-
ing Marxist position in the French debate on natural and social science. As he
wrote in his first letter to Benedetto Croce, the task was to show that “socialism
is worthy of belonging to the modern scientific movement.”26
This emphasis on science—and in particular on the possibility of a science
of economics—is typical of a period marked, in France as elsewhere, by the
centrality of epistemological debates of this kind, on the legitimacy, method-
ology, and scope of scientific claims. Though often dismissed as a moment of
“crisis” or even “destruction” of rationality, the so called belle époquewas also a
period of intellectual effervescence in which established philosophical under-
standings of scientific rationality in terms of laws, prediction, and determinism
were subjected to critique and contestation.27 It was through participation in
23 See for example Georges Sorel, “Le calcul des probabilités et l’experiénce,” Revue philo-
sophique de la France et de l’ étranger, XXIII (January 1887): 50–66; Georges Sorel, “De la
cause en physique,” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’ étranger, XXVI (November
1888): 464–480.
24 Georges Sorel, “Science et socialisme,” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’ étranger
XXXV (May 1893): 511.
25 Ibid., 509, 511.
26 Letter to Benedetto Croce, 20/12/1895, in Georges Sorel, “Lettere Di Georges Sorel a Bene-
detto Croce,”La Critica 25 (1927): 38.
27 For standards accounts of the period in terms of irrationalism see John Burrow, The Cri-
sis of Reason. European Thought 1848–1914 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000)
introduction 11
these kinds of debates that Sorel began to enter the main streams of French
intellectual life, and this is not at all surprising if we remember that he was
a gifted mathematician and an engineer by training and profession. His cen-
tral theoretical project in the period between the late 1880s until 1894 was the
development of an overarching epistemological scheme capable at the same
time of vindicating the validity of scientific claims to truth and of opening up
a space for the possibility of creative human agency. It is necessary to briefly
dwell on this early Sorelian epistemology for it furnished to Sorel the concep-
tual problems to which Marx and Vico will represent answers.
Far from being an assault on reason, Sorel’s early epistemological writings
are riven by a large contradiction reflecting rather well some of the hesita-
tions of the period: they search for a philosophy of science capable of rep-
resenting more accurately the complexities of actual scientific practice, and,
simultaneously, are concerned with the risk of relativizing or undermining
scientific knowledge. Thus, on the one hand these texts outline an activist
epistemology in which the importance to science of man-made conceptual
instruments—something which Sorel first calls schemas and subsequently
expressive supports—is repeatedly underlined and which draws him towards
a proto-sociology of science and towards an awareness of the historicity of sci-
entific claims to truth. On the other hand, however, they insist on the ability
of science to make claims about the world, rejecting epistemological conven-
tionalism—“the old mistake of universal consensus”—and holding on to a
view of “rational science” based on scientific realism, determinism, and causal
necessities.28
The resulting epistemology—formulatedmost comprehensively in the 1894
essay L’ancienne et la nouvelle métaphysique—was unsurprisingly dualistic. It
and Georg Lukacs, The Destruction of Reason [1954] (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities
Press, 1981). For a more historically sensitive reconstruction see Eugenio Garin, “Note sul
pensiero del novecento: ‘Rinascita dell’idealismo’, polemica antipositivistica e ‘ragioni’
dell’irrazionale,”Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 33 (1978): 209–223; 308–325; 398–404.
28 Georges Sorel, D’Aristote à Marx [1894] (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1935), 217. The text from
which the citation comes is the “Ancienne et nouvelle métaphysique,” which was origi-
nally published in three installments—between March and June 1894—in the Ére nou-
velle. Citations in this introduction come from the 1935 integral re-publication of the text
under the title D’Aristote à Marx. While in this period Sorel always maintains a concep-
tion of scientific explanation in terms of causal laws, he oscillates quite a bit on the issue of
determinism. In some passages, he commits to scientific realism and postulates an onto-
logical determinism of the natural world. In other passages, he seems to suggest a merely
experimental determinism, constructed in highly specific experimental conditions and
not necessarily reflecting the actual structure of the natural world.
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postulated a distinction between amilieu artificiel in which humans freely cre-
ate “sequences whose ordering is our decision” and a milieu cosmique or milieu
naturel governed by necessary relations of cause and effect.29 The experimen-
tal moment acted as the conjunction between these two realms of freedom
and necessity: only in experimental practice could the freely created tools of
humans interrogate nature and reveal the laws and causes which governed
it.
While this scheme offered some conceptual plausibility when applied to
the natural sciences—in particular distinguishing between two very different
projects, predictive capacity and systematic or rational knowledge—serious
problems emerged in the attempt to use it to study social phenomena.30 The
very idea of a science of society could not but show the limits of this early
Sorelian dualism: if the social world, the milieu artificiel, is conceptualized as
marked most profoundly by the fact of creative agency, then it follows that
explaining it in strictly speaking scientific terms—i.e. in terms of laws and
necessities—is very difficult, if not an outright conceptual impossibility. As
soon as Sorel began to reflect seriously on the epistemology of the social sci-
ences, this difficulty emerged.
Thus, for example, in an 1892 study of Proudhon concerned in part with the
question of the science of economics, Sorel, after having characterized labour
as a specifically human type of creative agency, proceeded to suggest that a sci-
ence of economics is only plausible once this creative aspect has been removed
from the picture. This can be done through taking production holistically, not
from the perspective of the individual producer but from that of social pro-
duction: “products, seen from the perspective of the social being, are capable
of being measured.”31 A few years later Sorel couched the same argument in
Marxist references, arguing that the only possibility for social science was the
removal of the creative aspect and the isolation of supposed deterministic rela-
tion between variables:
29 Ibid., 264.
30 If Sorel’s solutions to the problem of objectivity in the social sciences were in some
respects idiosyncratic, they were less so than might at first appear to be the case, and cer-
tainly the problem he confronted was a widely shared one in European intellectual life of
the period between the late 1880s and the early 1920s. Sorel’s difficulties and hesitations
should be inserted into a wider problematic encompassing Durkheim, Dilthey, and Max
Weber. The classic and still useful formulation of this is Henry Stuart Hughes, Conscious-
ness and Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1958).
31 Georges Sorel, “Essai sur la philosophie de Proudhon,”Revue philosophique de la France et
de l’ étranger 33–34 (June–July 1892): 628.
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… one does not try to establish under what influences the contracting
parties operate, what are the representations directing the development
of their thoughts; in a word, all the psychological apparatus disappears.
We take a relation, that of capital and usury, excluding every individual
phenomenon and we ask what this relation is, rationally. To answer this
question, we do not need to take into account people, with their pas-
sions and incidents; we only have to imagine a machine-like support [un
support machinal] capable of producing the original effect that we are
examining.32
But though this anti-individualistic, quasi-structuralist, and anti-psychological
direction was the one which Sorel tried to pursue in the early 1890s, strong
tendencies going in the opposite direction kept surfacing in his writings, ten-
dencies which insisted not so much on methodological individualism as on
the importance of creative agency and collective psychology, andwhich greatly
complicated the attempt to offer causal explanations.33
This indecision surfaced very evidently in Sorel’s involvement in the impor-
tant debate on the methodological bases of sociology which was occurring at
the time between Gabriel Tarde and Émile Durkheim. In this debate between
Tarde’s theory of imitation—which explained social behaviour in terms of
imitative interaction amongst individuals—and Durkheim’s notion of social
fact—which contended that the object of sociology was precisely that which
could not be explained in terms of individual behaviour—Sorel sided force-
fully with the latter’s methodological holism. This is coherent with Sorel’s long-
standing opposition to epistemological individualism, and we should not be
surprised to see him accusing Tarde of “anti-scientific tendencies.”34
Andyet,whenDurkheim’s 1894 articles in theRevuephilosophiquewerepub-
lished a year later, as the Régles de la méthode sociologique, Sorel’s long review
expressed only a very qualified approval and formulated an extremely interest-
ing series of objections.35 To start with, Sorel remarked that sociology cannot
32 Sorel, D’Aristote à Marx, 233.
33 In the above-cited essay on Proudhon, for example, Sorel defines human labour as pur-
posive action, concluding that “… work, from the perspective of economics, is a moral
phenomenon, and thus incapable of being included in any equation containing material
quantities”. Sorel, “Essai sur la philosophie de Proudhon,” 627.
34 Georges Sorel, “Les théories penales de MM. Durkheim et Tarde,” Archivio di psichiatria,
scienze penali, ed antropologia criminale 16 (1895): 221.
35 In his biography of Durkheim,Marcel Fournier claims that “TheDurkheimwho interested
Sorel was, for political reasons, not so much the author of the Rules as that of The Division
of Labour in Society” Marcel Fournier, Émile Durkheim. A Biography, trans. David Macey
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be an experimental science, but has to limit itself to observation. Secondly, the
objects which it observes are statistically constructed types, what Sorel called
“typemoyen” or “état moyen.”36 Moreover, Sorel was left uneasy by Durkheim’s
unwillingness to either affirm or deny social determinism. This was problem-
atic to him, because he still held to the view that a legitimately scientific expla-
nation depends on the presence of determinism: “Physics and chemistry donot
imply a loosening of the deterministic chain: their laws either hold or do not
hold and apply to each individual [case]. But how can we talk of causes (simi-
lar to those of physics) in sociology where the elements connected are fictions
devoid of individual reality?”37 Sorel’s conclusionwas thatDurkheimian sociol-
ogy could not aspire to become a real social science, precisely because it could
not establish sufficiently strong causal connections and thus produce explana-
tions in terms of law.
Against these shortcomings of Durkheimian sociology, Sorel offered two
alternative and mutually exclusive ideals of social science. On the one hand,
there was the kind of Marxist answer we have seen above. If Durkheimian
sociology were capable of examining what Marx shows to be the essence of
the social world, i.e. the “system of production and exchange,” then it could
become scientific, because economics is a sphere in which determinism holds
and can be thus explained in terms of laws.38 On the other hand, however,
Sorel underlined the inability of sociology to understand historical transforma-
tion, and pitted against Durkheim a very different Marxism, based not on the
laws of economics but on class struggle. Thanks to this doctrine, for Sorel, “we
can follow the real historical process, whereas the one described by our author
[Durkheim] is merely schematic and logical. Thanks to the theory of classes,
socialists do not connect ends to imaginary entities … but to real humans col-
lected in groups.”39
The theory of class struggle, in other words, creates a conceptual space for
human agency. It allows the social scientist to penetrate into “what is strik-
ing in the human milieu, that is to say action considered from the perspective
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 185.While it is true that Sorel did identify
immediatelyDurkheimaswhatwemay call a theorist of theRepublic, the opposite is true.
In this period more of an epistemologist than a political activist, Sorel was much more
interested in Durkheim’s methodological assertions than in his analysis of organic and
mechanic solidarity: the vast majority of Sorel’s review engages with Durkheim’s Régles
on the level of the methodology of the social sciences.





of the agent.”40 According to Sorel this gives us a way of “recognising what is
truly human in sociology; we can correctly define the active groups … their
movements must be described through psychological qualifications and every
analogy drawn from physics can only lead us to errors.”41 This new role for
psychology—which when “put in its proper place” can “equip sociology with
explanations”—should be underlined because it is pitted against the kind of
explanations offered by the natural sciences, i.e. causal ones.42 The point is not
merely that Sorel here, rather than looking for pockets of determinism in the
social world, chose to focus precisely on what is by definition non-determined,
human agency. It is also that this choice of focus implies a completely differ-
ent account of what a social scientific explanation is, making explanations in
terms of laws inappropriate. To a different kind of social scientific explanation
must, accordingly, correspond a different ontology of the social, based not on
deterministic causal relations but on agency:
If we were to operate like M. Durkheim and adopt a terminology bor-
rowed from physics, we would need, after having recognised the relevant
[social] groups, their tendencies, the general features of theirmovements,
to determine their mass, their density, and their tension. There is a much
better way of proceeding. Institutions do not have a mysterious origin:
they are humanworks. ‘Social relations’ saysMarx ‘are as much produced
by men as linen, flax, etc’43
The review of Durkheim’s Régles was published in April 1895, a year and a
half before the publication of the “Study on Vico.” But the conceptual question
to which Vico provided the answer, as we can see, had already been formu-
lated. Torn between an understanding of the social world as constituted most
essentially by human creative agency and a conception of science based on
determinism, Sorel’s epistemology had reached a point of crisis. The choice to
adopt an ontology of the social based on agency, making of collectivities and
their creative capacity the heart of the social world and of their conflicts the
engine of historical transformation, meant that any conception of social sci-
ence based on law and causal relations was to be abandoned. But then in what




43 Ibid., 168. The citation comes fromMarx’s Poverty of Philosophy.
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For this, a different epistemological criterion was needed, and in Vico’s
verum ipsum factum Sorel found precisely what he was looking for: it furnished
Sorel with a type of knowledge which could allow him to deal with a social
world whose essence was creative agency. Hence the repeated insistence, in
the “Study on Vico,” on the connection between the human creation of his-
tory and the fact that this is what allows us to understand it. The idea that
knowledge consists not in the representation of a reality independent from
the scientific observer but instead in the understanding of the productions of a
creative subject’s activity, allowed Sorel to resolve, in this historicist and subjec-
tivist direction, his epistemological indecisions.44 The objects of social scien-
tific knowledge were not deterministic causal relations but, instead, the ways
in which humans create ideas, institutions, cultures, classes, and so on. Thanks
to what Sorel called Vico’s “ideogenetic” law, we have a way of connecting any
historical object to its creative subject, be this subject a class, an individual, or
whatever else. This process always remains fully immanent, rooted in historic-
ity andhumanagency: “Inpassing fromempiricism to reasonedunderstanding,
from practice to science” writes Sorel in the text “we move only within an his-
torical order founded on human ideas,” before adding that “understood in this
way, the New Science is a history of human ideas.”
To be sure, Sorel is deeply, and at times painfully, aware of the relativistic
implications of this full commitment to historicity. Once this Vichian stance is
accepted, it means that everything has to be conceived as an historically sit-
uated human production: science, ethics, and law hence become dangerously
pluralistic. This awareness surfaces most clearly in Sorel’s rejection of Vico’s
transcendental solution to this problem of relativism, i.e. the notion of a cycli-
cal history.
Thus ideal history has perished…However, the ethical problem forwhich
it was thought to be such a [809] simple and satisfying solution remains
…Critique of the idea of divinity has shaken the foundations of all knowl-
edge that drew its certitude from the ancient idea of “God in nature.” Sci-
ence no longer seems, today, safe from contingency … Nothing is served
by denying the difficulties that result from these new principles, but this
is not a reason to revive famously incorrect doctrines. The notion of ideal
44 For philosophical clarifications on this understanding of knowledge see the still useful Isa-
iah Berlin, “Vico’s Concept of Knowledge,” in Against the Current. Essays in the History of
Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 140–150;
Benedetto Croce, La filosofia di Giambattista Vico (Bari: Laterza, 1922).
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history was quite useful, but it is false. We will not return to it to give an
illusory solution to an ethical problem that is so serious and immediate.
This abandonment of a transcendent objectivity in favour of an immanent
plurality is typical of large strands of 19th century philosophy: one finds it in
variousHegelianisms, in different formsof pragmatism, inNietzsche, aswell as,
of course, in Karl Marx.45 This is why it is incorrect to interpret, as some com-
mentators have, Sorel’s insistence on the human “creation” of history as a form
of technological determinism.46 Though Sorel does indeed insist on the mate-
rial and practical origin of human ideas, this material origin is still marked by
the essential openness of human agency. It is more correct to speak, as Jeremy
Jennings does, of the effect of Vico’s verum ipsum factum in terms of “a funda-
mental revision of our conception of the ties that connected science to reality,”
even if strictly speaking the Vichian principle ultimately demands an abolition
of this dualism of science and reality.47
3 FrenchMarxism in the 1890s
This historical theory of knowledgenot only chimedwith someof Sorel’s earlier
epistemological intuitions, but fully transformed his understanding of science.
It is not a coincidence that in the years following its discovery Sorel should be
busy with a deep theoretical reconfiguration of Marxism along these histori-
cist lines, abandoning the notion of Marxism as an ahistorical scheme of social
development and increasingly seeing the doctrine as a form of proletarian self-
consciousness. This theoretical reconfiguration—which furnished the basis of
Sorelian syndicalism in the new century—is what we call in this introduction
“Sorelian revisionism.”
But if there were, as we have shown, important theoretical reasons for this
epistemological break in Sorel’s thought, we should not underestimate the
more concrete intellectual circumstances in which Sorel operated. As we have
said, Sorel approachedVico as a social theorist attempting to articulate aMarx-
45 See Leszek Kolakowski, “Karl Marx and the classical definition of truth,” in The Two Eyes
of Spinoza andOther Essays on Philosophers (South Bends, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2004),
173–195.
46 Anne-SophieMenasseyre, “Sorel Lecteur deVico,” inGeorges Sorel, Étude surVico et autres
textes, ed. Anne-Sophie Menasseyre (Paris: Champion, 2007), 7–73.
47 Jeremy Jennings, “Sorel, Vico, and Marx,” in Vico and Marx. Affinities and Contrasts, ed.
Giorgio Tagliacozzo (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983), 331.
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ist position in the field of the social sciences. This positioning implied precise
constraints and opportunities, andwe can say that the operation of theoretical
redescription of Marxism which Sorel began with the “Study on Vico” can be
accounted for also in terms of the marginality of Marxism in the France of the
fin de siècle.
This political and intellectual marginality had political and ideological
explanations. Whereas in Germany there was the SPD—a large, organized,
powerful mass party ideologically committed to Marxism—in France the so-
cialist front was smaller, more fragmented, and often engaged in factional
infighting.48 To this political fragmentation corresponded an ideological frag-
mentation. Whereas the German workers’ movement could, mostly thanks to
the ability of the SPD to finance publishing houses and publications, rely on a
single codified Marxist doctrine, in France ideological competition abounded.
Pre-existing national traditions of socialist reflection, positivism, anarchism,
and above all French republicanism all contended with Marxism for the alle-
giance of the working class and the progressive bourgeois intellectuals.
The main space of implantation of Marxism in France was the only Marx-
ist party in the hexagon, Jules Guesde’s Parti Ouvrier, tellingly renamed Parti
Ouvrier Français (POF) in the preparation for the 1893 general election. Cru-
cially, one of the key features of the POF was its relative neglect of the theoreti-
cal development of Marxism, an ideology which it understood predominantly
in political and electoral terms. Michelle Perrot goes as far as speaking of the
“complete absenceof Guesdist contributions to research in all the fields of what
we call human sciences.”49 The deeply political nature of Guesdist Marxism
needs to be underlined: likemost otherMarxist parties in the period of the Sec-
ond International, the Guesdists understood Marxism mostly as a language of
political mobilization and as a rhetorical weapon directed not just against the
bourgeoisie but also against competing socialist ideological options.50 There-
fore, rather than theoretical poverty, we should speak of disinterest in the elab-
48 Ina very summaryoverviewof French socialism in theperiod,ClaudeWillard lists asmany
as five distinct tendencies: anarchists, Guesdists, Allemanists, Broussists, and Blanquists.
See ClaudeWillard, Socialisme et communisme Français (Paris: Colin, 1978), 45–78.
49 Michelle Perrot, “Les guesdistes: controverses sur l’ introduction du marxisme en France,”
Annales: Économies, sociétés, civilisations 22 (1967): 705.
50 Daniel Lindenberg, Lemarxisme introuvable (Paris: UGE, 1979), 76–77. Robert Stuartmakes
a similar, though more forceful, argument, suggesting that the insistence on the theoreti-
cal inconsistence of Guesdism should be seen as an instance of “scholarly intellectualism”
and that Marxism ought to be understood more as a language of class than as a contri-
bution to social science. See Robert Stuart, Marxism at work. Ideology, class, and French
socialism during the Third Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 28.
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oration of a more theoretically sophisticated form of Marxism. Simply put, the
party did political work and in the 1890s French intellectuals, especially aca-
demics, had hardly begun to embrace Marxism.51
This brief contextualisation allows us to understand better the possibilities
which Sorel could exploit. Ideological competition made the struggle of ideas
relevant, and the disinterest of Guesdists towards theory made this task even
more urgent. Most importantly, however, the absence of a large party implied
conditions of relative freedom for intellectuals interested in the development
of Marxist theory. Though lacking the resources which a party like the SPD
could offer to their German counterparts, French Marxists could deepen their
understanding of theory free from the stringent demands of electoral propa-
ganda.
Take, for example, the only two journals of Marxist theory in the France
of the time, the short-lived Ére nouvelle and its successor Le Devenir social,
publications in which Sorel was heavily involved. Clearly, as explicitly Marx-
ist periodicals, they entertained friendly relations with the POF, as can be seen
not only by the translations of many classic texts of European Marxism of the
time—Engels, Marx, Plekhanov—but also by the regular contribution of key
POF figures such as Gabriel Deville and Paul Lafargue. And yet, these were not
party journals. Had they been so, the central role played by complete outsiders
like Sorel and Diamandy would have been unthinkable.52 Furthermore, and
most decisively, the terrain of engagement chosen by these publications was
onewhich the POF had chosen largely to ignore: that of high culture. If we look,
for example, at the strenuous activity of militant book reviewing of these pub-
lications we see the clear attempt to develop aMarxist point of view on the key
French debates of the time: the polemical targets of both books reviews and
longer essays are figures such as Durkheim, Tarde, Brunetière, Pierre Janet, and
Gustave de Molinari.
These opportunities granted to Sorel the space to tackle Marxism in a cre-
ative and original manner. But we should also pay attention to the constraints
which pushed Sorel towards his work of theoretical revision. As we have said,
51 See Christophe Prochasson, “Sur la reception dumarxisme en France; le cas Andler (1890–
1920),” Revue de synthèse 110, no. 1 (1989): 85–108. And for a more recent contextualiza-
tion the second chapter especially of Julian Wright, Socialism and the Experience of Time
(Oxford, 2017).
52 Georges Diamandy, founder of the Ére nouvelle, was at the time a student in Paris, recently
arrived from Romania, and a member of the Étudiants Socialistes Révolutionnaires Inter-
nationalistes. The publication emerged thus from a radical student milieu and not from
the POF. Diamandy certainly had relations with the POF, but he was not a party member.
See Lindenberg, Le marxisme introuvable, 152–153.
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although the details of Marx’s work were relatively unknown in France, there
still was a strong idea of what Marxism was. This was to a large extent based
on Guesdism and tookMarxism tomean a form of historical determinism that
understood the social world on the basis of economics and had a conflictual
view of society at its core.
Hence, according to the liberal Léon Say, the admirers of KarlMarx held that
“his greatest discovery has been that of the historical law of revolution” which
consisted in claiming that “history has always been marked by class struggles
basedoneconomic interests and thatwhathappened in thepastwill reproduce
itself in the future.”53 These accusations of idolatry of conflict and historical
and economic determinism, it should be remarked, were also directed atMarx-
ism by fellow socialists: for example, according to Gustave Rouanet, director
of the Revue socialiste elected to the chamber of deputies in 1893, the theory
consisted in a “simplistic” materialism masked “under the guise of scientific
rigour.”54 More articulately, Rouanet gave the following account of Marxism:
Purely materialist, last evolution of the German historico-fatalistic
school, which was a reaction to French 18th century philosophy, Marx’s
thought is essentially anti-French …We do not believe that the fatalistic
understanding of historical evolution which emerges from Marx’s theo-
ries is entirely correct.Webelieve thatMarx has not taken sufficiently into
consideration some factors of [historical] evolution. This will not prevent
us, however, from praising his brilliant penetration of contemporary eco-
nomic facts …55
The cultural nationalism—identifying Marxism as essentially a German the-
ory and thus as “anti-French”—shouldnot gounnoticed.The familiar picture of
Marxismas a formof “historical fatalism”whose analysis of social development
is exclusively and one-sidedly based on economics is corroborated by the sug-
gestion of a certainGermanbarbarismand a love for violence. In describing the
Hegelian origins of Marxist dialectics, Rouanet offers a quasi-Darwinist picture
in which “strong, victorious people are the missionaries of the ‘Idea’ ” and in
which “war is the great judge” of history.56 This nationalistic element is relevant
because beyond the general charges of economic and historical determinism
53 Léon Say, Contre le socialisme (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1896), 40.
54 Gustave Rouanet, “Le matérialisme économique de Marx et le socialisme Français (1),”La




often rested more precise accusations concerning Marxism’s inability to grasp
aspects of historical development—such as le droit or la morale—which were
seen to be specifically “French” or tied to the national culture.
This deterministic understanding of Marxismwas shared not only by adver-
saries of Marxists on the right and on the left, but also, importantly, by many
Marxists. To an extent, this was not a French specificity, but reflected a wider
European tendency, ultimately determined by the German leadership of the
movement. But in France, Marx’s materialism was almost unfailingly inter-
preted in these deterministic terms. As Anne-Sophie Menasseyre points out,
a significant context to Sorel’s engagement with Vico was represented by the
debate over “materialism” and “idealism” between Jean Jaurès and the Marxist
Paul Lafargue.While it may be an exaggeration to refer to it as the “true polem-
ical horizon” of Sorel’s intervention, the debate is still important, for it illus-
trates how Sorel’s polemical targets included many Marxists. For what should
be underlined, more than Sorel’s obvious rejection of Jauressian idealism, is
the implicit critique of what Menasseyre calls Lafargue’s “monist determin-
ism.”57 As early as 1884 Lafargue had been producing synthetic explanations
of the basics of Marxist theory in the form of pamphlets entitled Le matéri-
alisme économique de K. Marx, material meant for wide distribution in which
Lafargue outlined a deterministic Marxism and mentioned Vico.58 Sorel could
hardly have felt it wise to openly criticize Lafargue, an important figure in
French Marxism, whose long essay on Campanella appeared in 1895 in the
pages of the Devenir social.59 However, he was certainly aware of Lafargue’s
57 Menasseyre, 33, 36. Menasseyre suggests that Sorel opposes to Lafargue’s “monist deter-
minism” a “pluralist determinism,” which is an awkward expression. What Sorel is doing
in the “Study on Vico” is, more radically, a breaking of the links between scientific ex-
planation and determinism. This kind of operation is, in fact, described accurately in
Menasseyre, 37.
58 The work was divided in three parts, dealing with methodology (i.e. idealism and mate-
rialism), natural history, and human history. Paul Lafargue, Le matérialisme économique
de K. Marx. L’ idéalisme et le matérialisme dans l’histoire (Paris: Henry Oriol, 1884); Paul
Lafargue, Le matérialisme économique de K. Marx. Le milieu naturel: Théorie darwinienne
(Paris: HenryOriol, 1884); Paul Lafargue, Lematérialisme économique deK.Marx. Lemilieu
artificiel: Théorie de la lutte de classe (Paris: Henry Oriol, 1884). Though Vico is only men-
tioned once in these pamphlets, the Neapolitan was an interest of Lafargue.When in 1909
he expanded his theoretical work onMarxism, Lafargue included a muchmore thorough
discussion of Vico. See Paul Lafargue, Le déterminisme économique de K.Marx. Recherches
sur l’origine et l’ évolution des idées de justice, du bien, de l’ame, et de dieu (Paris: Giard et
Brière, 1909). Notice how in 1884 he spoke of “matérialisme économique” and in 1909 of
“déterminisme économique.” On Lafargue, see Leslie Derfler, Paul Lafargue and the Flow-
ering of French Socialism 1882–1911 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
59 In private, however, Sorel’s criticismof Lafarguewas unrestrained. In a letter toCroce from
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determinism, especially since his 1884 pamphlets had been republished in the
Ére nouvelle in the summer of 1893.60 Certainly, Lafargue, with his simplistic
deployment of the categories of “artificial” and “natural” milieu, was a target
for Sorel.61
We can see how the conditions of French intellectual life of the time shaped
Sorel’s project of “showing that socialism is worthy of belonging to the mod-
ern scientific movement.” In order to be successful, this kind of demonstration
required, to start with, the targeting of an audience which was neglected by
the POF: the academic and intellectual one which was interested in questions
of historical theory and social scientific methodology. But more importantly,
it required a rather substantial theoretical redescription. The task in short was
that of offering to a specifically French public aMarxismwhich did not profess
historical determinism,which could offer convincing explanations of phenom-
ena like morality and law without reducing them to epiphenomena.
This operation of theoretical redescription, it needs to be repeated, targeted
not only non-Marxists, but also the ways in which Marxists themselves under-
stood the theory. Sorel’s use of Vico, in other words, was a self-conscious attack
on prevalent French interpretations of Marxism, expressed not only in Lafar-
gue’s deterministic use of Vico, but also, for example, in Jules Guesde’s pre-
sentation of the class struggle as the “great law” of social development which
will disappear only with the advent of socialism.62 Sorel insteadmaintained, as
Antonio Labriola had written in the Devenir social, that historical materialism
implied a broader perspective than Albert Schäffle’s famous “question of the
belly.”63
January 1896, he thanks Croce for his article on Campanella, but informs him that it can-
not be published, since it clashes too obviously with Lafargue’s own work on the Italian
friar. He adds “I began suspecting, reading what M. Lafargue said about Church Fathers …
that his article was thework of an incompetentman; but I did not believe that he could be
as incompetent as you establish in such an irrefutable manner.” Sorel to Croce, 14/1/1896,
Sorel, “Lettere di Georges Sorel a Benedetto Croce,” 39.
60 Paul Lafargue, “Le matérialisme économique de K. Marx,” L’ére nouvelle 1 (1893): 46–58;
125–138; 240–252.
61 It is also the case that Jules Michelet’s edition of Vico had recently been re-issued as
part of a larger collected works of the French historian. Although Sorel does not make
much of this explicitly, Michelet was among those adopted by the Third Republic as
legitimating figures to the point of banalization. See Camille Creyghton, ‘Commemorat-
ing Jules Michelet, 1876, 1882, 1898: The Productivity of Banality’, French History, 2019.
doi.org/10.1093/fh/crz022.
62 Jules Guesde, Quatre ans de lutte de class à la chambre: 1893–1898 (Paris: Jacques, 1901),
210–211.
63 Antonio Labriola, “Enmémoire duManifeste du parti communiste,”Devenir social 1 (1895):
244.
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When seen from this perspective, many aspects of the “Study on Vico”
become clearer. To start with, Sorel dedicates large sections of the work to his-
torical analyses of the origins of law and ethics. Take, for example, section VIII,
in which Sorel accompanies Vico in an overview of the evolution of criminal
law; or the conclusion of the study in which class struggle is described as one
“for the conquest of rights,” i.e. as a struggle for the imposition of new ethical
and juridical principles on society; or again, section IV in which he sketches
the method followed by Vico for an historical study of law and complements
this material with citations from Engels. In all of these instances what Sorel
is trying to do is to offer to his readers examples of a Marxist approach to the
study of history and society which does not reduce everything to a narrowly
understood economics and which is capable of offering nuanced materialis-
tic accounts of complex phenomena such as law and ethics—a Marxism that
would be materialist, rather than economistic. As highlighted above, all forms
of transcendental explanation are ruled out, even when, as in the case of Vico’s
storia ideale, they would nicely solve the problem of justifying the normativ-
ity of juridical and ethical systems. The method Sorel attempts to follow is
materialistic in the sense that it forces us to look for the “origins of our meta-
physical constructions in the more or less empirical constructions of social
life.”64
Sorel’s attack on determinism cannot however be reduced to these illustra-
tions of the capability of Marxian analysis to offer complex and subtle accounts
of phenomena such asmorality and law. There is, in the “Study onVico,” amore
fundamental and theoretically rich line of attack against determinism, which
ultimately derives from the shift to verum ipsum factum and towards a concep-
tualisation of social scientific explanation different from causal explanation.
There is, to start with, an open denial of historical progress: “Historical move-
ment is not one homogenous development. It is not even possible to say, as
in physics, that causes have immediate effects. There is a great complexity of
changes acting on one another, and one of the most considerable objects of
sociology is the study of decelerations and accelerations.”
But even more profoundly, it should be appreciated how Sorel introduces
a very large degree of complexity into the simplistic scheme of economic base
and ideological superstructurewithwhichMarxismwas at the time associated.
Thoughmaterial conditions are of course tied to intellectual production and to
64 Durkheim’s 1912 The elementary forms of religious life is a useful point of comparison here,
in its arguments for the social origins of temporality, categories, and conceptual thought
more generally.
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pensée réfléchie, there is a crucial mediation—human agency. This process of
transfiguration of material conditions into ideas is to be accounted for, accord-
ing to Sorel, in terms of laws of psychology. However, these laws are far less
straightforward thanVico supposed them to be, and though some of Vico’s psy-
chological types remain valid for Sorel, the order of their succession is to be
completely abandoned:
Psychological evolutions are sequences with their own existence and
autonomy, arising in any era, mixing in society in the most confused way.
Rather than a homogenous bloc, we have an interlacing of evolutions,
which cannot be brought under any general definition because at any
given instant we find them at all moments in their development. But
economic conditions, social relations, all the historical complexes act on
these evolutions to favour certain developments.
The plurality of terms through which Sorel describes material conditions
should be underlined: “economic conditions, social relations, all the historical
complexes.” Not only did Sorel refuse to reducematerial condition to economic
ones—think of the complexity introduced by what Sorel calls Vico’s “second
ideogenetic law,” the familial origin of moral ideas—but he also offered no the-
ory capable of hierarchically organizing the various elements which constitute
a given “historical complex.” The picture is very far away from the image of eco-
nomic and historical determinism with which Marxism was associated at the
time. Progress is far from automatic, and psychology and human agency are
at the centre of the historical process. But the laws of psychology offer little
general guidance on how to deal with this historical material. Finally, though
material factors remain decisive, they comprise a vast variety of phenomena
and elements, with Sorel offering no criterion capable of determining a gen-
eral scheme according to which their relation ought to be construed. In other
words, in the Sorelian scheme it is not possible to speak of economic deter-
mination, not even in the last instance. He offers an architecture of the social
world in which there is no final instance at all.
From what has been said above, we can begin to see how Sorel’s “Study on
Vico” presages important themes for later Marxist theorists. Sorel’s psychology
is drawn fromThéodule Ribot rather than Sigmund Freud, but the problems he
confronts in integrating it with Marxism are surprisingly similar. The problem
of totality that so vexedwhat can at least provisionally be calledWesternMarx-
ism, andwhich shaped in a broadway the reading of Vico byGyörgi Lukacs and
Theodore Adorno, for instance, has already to some degree been put aside by
Sorel. By dissolving Vico’s totalizing ideal history, Sorel recognized the danger
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of hypostatizing themaking and knowing subject inVico, a danger that, asMar-
tin Jay has argued, constantly dogged later 20th centuryMarxists in the form of
the all-knowing revolutionary party.65
If for Vico thismaking and therefore knowing subject was tripled—God, the
nations, the scholar—for Sorel itwas doubled—the scholar and the institution.
It is legitimate to ask after the cost in terms of analytic capacity to Sorel’sMarx-
ism of this de-totalization, but it should be clear that the materialist approach
to history he first sketched out in the “Study on Vico” covers much ground to
which later Marxists would return, and without much of what Sorel at least
would likely have regarded as their Hegelian metaphysical baggage.66
4 Italian Connections
The “Study on Vico” represents Sorel’s first substantial attempt at revision of
Marxism. As we have shown, this revision results in part from long stand-
ing conceptual difficulties in Sorel’s epistemological thought and in part from
the desire to articulate a Marxism capable of overcoming common and at
least sometimes legitimate objections of economic and historical determinism
against it. It is in this work that we find the embryonic versions of ideas which
Sorel will articulate with greater length and precision in the following years,
and which will constitute the core of his revision of Marxism. The importance
of the Vichian principle of verum ipsum factum to Sorel’s historicist turn is evi-
dent. However, there is a crucial mediation between Sorel and Vico.
Both Sorel’s reading of Vico and his subsequent revision of Marxism have to
be made sense of in terms of the protracted relation which Sorel entertained
with two Italian historicist thinkers, Benedetto Croce and Antonio Labriola.
65 Broadly, see Martin Jay, Marxism & Totality. The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to
Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); for a tighter focus on Vico, see
his “Vico andWestern Marxism” [1978] reprinted in Martin Jay, Fin de siècle Socialism and
Other Essays (London: Routledge, 1988).
66 Whether Sorel is still to be considered a Marxist at all having apparently given up on the
explanatory power of the totalizing logic of capitalism, or if he would be better assigned
to the somewhat controversial category of post-Marxist, is not a question the present
historical introduction can adjudicate. The most rigorous critical work on Sorel from a
Marxist rather than a historical point of view is Patrick Gaud, De la valeur-travail à la
guerre en Europe (Paris: Harmattan, 2010). Perhaps the most exciting recent attempt to
enroll Sorel in a revolutionary, as opposed to a Marxist, tradition alongside Frantz Fanon
and Enrique Dussel is George Ciccariello-Maher, Decolonizing Dialectics (Durham, NC:
Duke, 2017).
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ThoughCroce remained Sorel’s lifelong correspondent, while Labriola not only
died in 1904, but also fell outwith Sorel before dying, it is in fact the latterwhose
influence is here more decisive.
First contact with the two Italians was established by Sorel when he was
collaborating with the Devenir social, a publication which—much like the Ére
nouvelle—was marked by a very international authorship, also in part due to
the limitations of the French Marxism of the time. It was likely Sorel who con-
tacted Labriola, commissioning a piece for the Devenir in 1895.67 Labriola then
wrote to Croce, encouraging him to both subscribe and contribute to the pub-
lication.68 Eventually, in December 1895, Sorel wrote to Croce and, after having
reassured him that this letter came with the approval of Labriola, specified
some of the more general editorial guidelines for a possible contribution.69
Over the course of the following years, the three thinkers were deeply involved
with eachother andwith a commonproject of theoretical clarificationof Marx-
ism, dictated, on both side of the Alps, by a common dissatisfaction with the
dominant understandings of Marx’s theory in the two countries.
Labriola appears particularly important for two reasons: first because he
had long tried to blend the ideas of Vico and Marx, and second because of
his profound influence on Sorel’s attempt at theoretical revision of Marxism.
A militant socialist and a university professor, already since the late 1880s
Labriola had been lecturing in the University of Rome on Marxism and his-
torical materialism. Arguably the last member of the mid-19th century gener-
ation of Neapolitan Hegelians, Labriola’s engagement with Marxism had been
always marked by his desire to distinguish it from various forms of positivism
67 Labriola, “En mémoire du Manifeste du parti communiste.” On Labriola and this text,
see Roberto Dainotto, “Historical materialism as new humanism: Antonio Labriola’s ‘In
memoria del Manifesto dei comunisti’,” Annali d’Italianistica 26 (2008): 265–282. For a
perceptive treatment of this Italian tradition that includes Sorel, althoughwithmuch less
care, seeEdmund Jacobitti,RevolutionaryHumanismandHistoricism inModern Italy (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983). More generally, see Paul Piccone, Italian Marx-
ism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1983) and Richard Bellamy, Italian Social
Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), especially chapter four. The main essays from Labriola
discussed here were translated into English in the early years of the 20th century, and are
now easily available online. Unfortunately, these translations are not always reliable.
68 Labriola to Croce, 8/12/1894, in Antonio Labriola, Carteggio, ed. Stefano Miccolis, vol. 3
(Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2003), 486. Although the recent volume of work on Croce does not
match his importance, see in addition to the works cited above David Roberts, Benedetto
Croce and the Uses of Historicism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987).
Although its focus is political and essentially defensive, an invaluable study is Fabio Fer-
nando Rizi, Benedetto Croce and Italian Fascism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2003). Hughes’ Consciousness and Society, cited above, remains a good place to start.
69 Sorel to Croce, 20/12/1895 in Sorel, “Lettere di Georges Sorel a Benedetto Croce,” 38.
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whichwere alive in Italy andwhichwere important in the theoretical reflection
of parts of the Italian socialist movement.
As he wrote to Engels in 1894: “With the excuse of being all anti-metaphysi-
cal, nowadays Darwin, positivism, Spencer, sociology, socialism… become one
and the same thing.”70 When seen from this angle, Labriola’s long-standing
interest in Vico becomes important. As early as 1887, for example, he had ded-
icated an entire course in the University of Rome to Vico, presented as the
“precursor” of Marx.71 In 1895, after having published the above-mentioned
essay on the Communist Manifesto in the Devenir social, he wrote in an upbeat
mood toCroce, telling him that hemightwant towrite a newpiece onMarxism,
whose provisional title would have been “From Vico to Morgan.”72
This attempt to blend Marxism with ideas from Hegel and Vico was the
defining trait of Labriola’s work. In a private letter to Engels, he even suggested
replacing the word “dialectic” with the more Vichian “genetic method,” since
this would have left intact “the empirical nature of each specific [historical]
formation” as well as, of course, marking the distinction betweenMarxism and
different forms of scientism.73 As is to be expected fromaMarxism constructed
in opposition to late 19th century positivism, Labriola’s materialismo storico
was essentially an anti-deterministic reading of Marx, which sought to replace
the idea of any kind of pre-established laws of historical development with
an understanding of Marxism as a theory of human agency, as a filosofia della
prassi.
Now, if we look at Labriola’s Marxism, a few main elements emerge. Firstly,
though it had been brewing since at least the 1880s, Labriola’s key theoretical
statements all emerged during the period of interaction with Sorel, between
1895 and 1898.74 Secondly, its three main tenets—rejection of historical deter-
70 Labriola to Engels, 13/6/1894, in Labriola, Carteggio, 3:413.
71 The sketch of Labriola’s University of Rome courses from 1887 to 1894 can be found in a let-
ter he wrote to Croce on 8/12/1894, in Antonio Labriola, Lettere a Benedetto Croce (Napoli:
Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici, 1975), 60.
72 Labriola to Croce, 20/5/1895, in Labriola, 72.
73 Labriola to Engels, 13/6/1894 in Labriola, Carteggio, 3:412.
74 The three texts are the abovementioned essay in the Devenir social, the volume Anto-
nio Labriola, Del materialismo storico. Delucidazione preliminare (Roma: Loescher, 1896);
Antonio Labriola, Discorrendo di socialismo e filosofia. Lettere a Georges Sorel (Roma:
Loescher, 1898). In both the drafting and the publishing of these works, Croce and Sorel
were decisive—the last of the three works consists, in fact, in a series of fictional letters
to Sorel. For a more thorough discussion of the Sorel-Labriola connection, see Tommaso
Giordani, “RedefiningHistoricalMaterialism in the Peripheries of Marxism: Georges Sorel
and Antonio Labriola between France, Italy, andGermany,” in Decentering European Intel-
lectual Space, eds. Maria Jalava, Stefan Nygard, and Johan Strang (Leiden: Brill, 2018),
88–113.
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minism, rejectionof economicism, and rejectionof theunderstandingof Marx-
ism as a social science—are also the central tenets of Sorel’s revisionism.
Thus, Labriola’s idea that progress is “always contingent” and “does not hang
over human affairs as a destiny, a fate, or as a law” resonates with Sorel’s rejec-
tionnot only of storia ideale, but also of all forms of transcendental explanation
of history to be found inVico.75 To Labriola’s belief that “attributing preponder-
ance or decisive action to the economic factor” is a misinterpretation of Marx-
ism, a “semi-doctrine,” a “mistake” and a “doctrinal error,” corresponds Sorel’s
problematisation of the base/superstructure relation outlined in the previous
section.76 That Sorel readVico through Labriola can be confirmed by looking at
the short review which he dedicated to the Italian’s DelMaterialismo Storico in
the Devenir social in the late summer of 1896, a mere month before publishing
the first instalment of the “Study on Vico” in October of the same year.77
The issues emphasized in Sorel’s review are the by now familiar ones: rejec-
tion of historical determinism—“progress resembles a zig zagmovementmore
than a regular march following a law”—and of economic determinism.78
“Many people,” writes Sorel, “believed that Marx’s doctrine consisted in simply
affirming the decisive action of the economic factor. This manner of reason-
ing is clearly opposed to the fundamental principle of historical materialism,
according to which history forms a unitary complex.”79 What’s more, in this
review we see a combination of Vico, Marx, and Labriola which allows Sorel to
formulate for the first time his new social ontology of human agency:
The conception is materialist in the sense that it does not allow the
introduction of any ideological explanation … Things are considered as
purely human works, without any intervention on behalf of Providence,
or progress, or any formal law regulating [historical] evolution, or teleol-
ogy: these are all idealistic factors. One applies in the strictest senseVico’s
rule: ‘The social world is the work of humans’, a rule which the author of
the New Science combined with a theory of Providence and which Marx
has developed in a rigorous manner.80
75 Antonio Labriola, Essais sur la conceptionmatérialiste de l’histoire, 2nd ed. (Paris: Giard et
Brière, 1902), 148. Though we are citing from the second edition, the first French edition
of this collection dates back to 1897.
76 Ibid., 154–155.





The point is not simply that Sorel read Vico through Labriola. Much more
radically, the argument advanced here is that the philosophical backbone of
Sorelian revisionism can be understood only in terms of Sorel’s combined read-
ing of Marx, Labriola, and Vico. Sorelian revisionism consists in the conse-
quences of a social ontology based on free agency: the rejection of historical
and economic determinism, and the reconceptualization of Marxism—and
of every form of human thought—as itself an historical product, a form of
proletarian self-consciousness. As we have shown, this approach to Marxism
not only resolved some conceptual difficulties inherent in Sorel’s epistemology
but also responded to the constraints and opportunities to which a theoreti-
cal Marxist was subjected in the France of the time. In Labriola Sorel found
the approach and ideas he needed to develop a theoretically more ambitious
Marxism, capable of attempting a dialogue with French social thought.
The dependency of Sorelian revisionism on the ideas of Labriola can be
ascertained by examining Sorel’s revisionist texts from late 1897 and 1898 and
noticing not only the acknowledgment of his debts to Labriola and Croce,
but also the fundamental continuity of the arguments deployed, a continuity
so strong that it sometimes resembles a paraphrase of Labriola. For exam-
ple, in an article published in the revisionist Sozialistische Monatshefte, Sorel
writes:
Nor do I believe that it is in conformitywith aMarxist spirit to decompose
facts into various elements: economic ones first, subsequently juridical
and political ones … It is in the form that the distinction can be established,
but only for our intellectual necessities; in history, as well as in reason,
we have unity; but in order to carry on a scientific study, it is necessary to
establish classifications.81
This argument against economic determinism essentially suggests that a
sphere of economics exists only in themethodological distinctions of the social
scientist, but that in historical reality economic activity is always influenced by
moral, juridical, cultural, and political factors: it is exactly the same argument
made by Labriola.82 Examples of this kind could be multiplied. And while it is
true that it is only from 1897 onwards that the label “revisionist” begins to have
81 Georges Sorel, “Betrachtungen über die materialistische Geschichtauffassung,” Sozial-
istische Monatshefte 2 (1898), 316–322; 367–375; 428–432. The citation comes from the
reworked version printed in Georges Sorel, Saggi di critica del marxismo (Palermo: San-
dron, 1903), 42.
82 See Labriola, Essais sur la conception matérialiste de l’histoire, 156–160.
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a meaning, and that it is only after the opening of the Bernstein controversy
that Sorel acts self-consciously as a revisionist and speaks of a “return toMarx,”
it is also true that the Marxism he articulates in this revisionist period is the
same one sketched already in the “Study on Vico.”
That Sorel’s redescription of Marxism predates the opening of the revision-
ist controversy and that it heavily relies on Labriola can also be ascertained
by noticing the great effort made by Sorel to introduce Labriola in France. Not
only did Sorel open the pages of the Devenir social to the Italian theorist, pub-
lishing his work and that of Croce as well as reviewing Labriola’s Italian work
for French readers. More decisively, he pushed for a translation of Labriola’s
main theoretical works. Sorel wrote a preface for the volume, insisting on the
usual points, namely that French understandings of Marxism were way off the
mark, and that Labriola shows how Marxism is very distant from notions of
historical and economic determinism. The complexity of the relation between
economic base and superstructure, stated as amere fact in the “Study on Vico,”
is now given theoretical dignity, as Sorel argues that “the mediations that hold
between the economic infrastructure and the superior products are variable and
cannot be expressed by any general formula.”83
Sorel’s operation of implantation of Italian materialismo storico in France
failed. Labriolawas spectacularlymisreadbyFrench social thinkers. BothÉmile
Durkheim and Charles Andler reviewed Labriola’s book, and both read it as a
statement of classical Marxist economic determinism, despite some very clear
indications in the opposite direction present both in the book and in Sorel’s
preface.84 To Andler, for example, it was still a question of “this history of eco-
nomics, to whichMarxism reduces social history.”85 The interpretative grid that
French social thought had placed on Marx’s work was too rigid, and neither
French critic was willing—or possibly able—to see how Labriola was in fact
going in a completely different direction.86 Sorel’s own readingof Vico, together
with other factors, would ultimately take him in yet another direction,which—
though not fully subsumable under Labriola’s humanist Marxism, remained
83 Georges Sorel, “Préface [1896],” in Essais sur la conception matérialiste de l’histoire, by
Antonio Labriola, 1st ed. (Paris: Giard et Brière, 1897).
84 Charles Andler, “La conception matérialiste de l’histoire d’après M. Antonio Labriola,”
Revue de métaphysique et de morale 5 (1897): 644–658; Émile Durkheim, “La conception
matérialiste de l’histoire,” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’ étranger XLIV (1897):
645–651.
85 Andler, “La conception matérialiste de l’histoire d’après M. Antonio Labriola,” 652.
86 On this misreading, see André Tosel, “L’ impensé de la sociologie française, ou Labriola lu
par Durkheim,”La pensée, no. 243 (1985): 98–113.
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nonetheless in continuity with the Italian’s perspective. Yet the first moves of
Sorel’s syndicalism and of his later and more famous writings on social myth
are to be found in the “Study on Vico.”
5 The “Politics” of the Institution
It is worth offering some clarifications on these last two claims. What kind of
politics derived from Sorel’s anti-deterministic reading of Marxism? And what
is the relationship between Sorel’s later syndicalism and the revisionism of the
late 1890s?
As for the first question, it is necessary to stress an important conceptual
pointwhich, though largely implicit inwhat has been said so far, does not get an
explicit formulation in the “StudyonVico.” If we removehistorical determinism
in all of its guises and if we at the same time reject thenotionof a structural eco-
nomic determination of socio-historical configurations, what remains as the
substance of history and as the explanation of historical change? Conceptu-
ally, the answer is clear: human agency, or, as Sorel formulated it in his critique
of Durkheim, “action considered from the perspective of the agent.” But this
ontology of the social based on human agency remains extremely vague and is
susceptible of many possible theoretical—let alone political—declensions.
Sorel, as should be clear, never conceived of human agency in individualis-
tic terms, but always in collective ones: history is made by groups and not by
individuals.Moreover, he never gave to the notion of free agency a promethean
reading: even if humanagency is ontologically free, this does notmean that pat-
terns, structures, and contingent configurations donot limit the range of action
of historical actors.87 In other words, he never conceptualised the freedom of
human agency in terms of a complete power of re-invention that historical
agents would possess vis à vis their situation. Menmake their own history, that
is, and not only not in circumstances of their choosing, but withinmaterial and
embodied social reality.
87 Sorel, for example, goes as far as saying that in given circumstances a certain histori-
cal complex might develop as if it were completely determined by a given factor, and
might even appear as ruled by laws of necessity. This is the case, for example, of capitalist
economies in conditions of freemarket, inwhichwehave relations “which resemble those
of the physical sciences.” But this determinism is, so to speak, historically contingent:
nothing prevents capitalism from going in new and unpredicted directions. See Georges
Sorel, “Necessità e fatalismo nel marxismo” [1898], in his Saggi di critica del marxismo
(Palermo: Sandron, 1903), 78.
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These clarifications point to a notion which is crucial for Sorel, both the-
oretically and politically: the notion of “institution.” It is only through this
notion that Sorel can arrive at a satisfying conceptualization of how human
agency deploys itself through history, one capable of safeguarding its creativ-
ity without however transcending into pure voluntarism. Seen from a theo-
retical perspective, institutions are the loci in which the interactions between
different historical factors—materiality, consciousness, ideology,morality, eco-
nomics, and so on—are concretely mediated, connected, and reshaped by
human agents.
But institutions have amore interesting political role to play.What is implicit
in Sorel’s view of history and society is the idea that historical transformations
arise from collective subjects, groups who are self-conscious of their histori-
cal identity, who are grounded in the conditions of their historical existence,
and who have the opportunity of effecting a decisive historical intervention.
But how do these historical subjects emerge? The answer lies in the notion of
institutions, which provide both the collective dimension and the necessary
historical grounding for a new historical subjectivity to emerge. They are the
spaces in which new historical subjectivities ripen and develop. It follows that
the one goal of Marxist politics must be the institutional development of the
proletariat into historical maturity, and that Marxism, in its Sorelian variant,
becomes essentially a theory of class.88 This emphasis on class development—
this politics of proletarian subjectivity—is the logical consequence of a revi-
sion of Marxism in which historical and economic determinism are rejected,
and it constituted the most enduring and fundamental trait of Sorel’s politics
since the mid-1890s. For Sorel, however, this maturation of the proletariat as
a class cannot be approached exclusively under the rubric of a disembodied,
hopelessly intangible “consciousness.” Consciousness must always be thought
of in connection to material and social life, and thus cannot exist outside of
institutions.89
This gives us a more precise idea of the kind of politics which Sorel pur-
sued starting from the late 1890s, and which began to appear in rather explicit
form in what is arguably his first syndicalist text, the 1898 “Avenir socialiste
88 It is not a coincidence that the title chosen by Sorel for a collection of hisMarxist writings
published a few years before his death was Matériaux pour une théorie du proletariat—
Materials for a theory of the proletariat.
89 Though this is not the place to pursue this point, the term “institution” was widely used in
Frenchhistorical and social sciencewriting of the period. Durkheimian sociology adopted
it as the name for the kind of object studied by sociologists.
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des syndicats.”90 In the analysis of trade unions (syndicats) offered in this text,
Sorel is extremely clear on the fact that their function should not merely be
that of organising economic conflict against the bourgeoisie. Important as that
may be, confining unions to this passive role of resistance means “opposing a
formidable barrier to the development of the proletariat; it means delivering it
to the overwhelming influence of bourgeois demagogues; it means preventing
it from elaborating new principles of right matching its mode of life; it means,
in a word, refusing to the proletariat the possibility of becoming a class for
itself.”91 Unions are instead invested with an active role: they are the institu-
tions in which the proletariat tests, harbours, and develops new forms of social
life. These new social relations can be, for example, juridical, but are by no
means limited to this legal dimension.92 They include new principles of polit-
ical organisation, new modes of production, and even new kinds of kinds of
sexual and sentimental arrangements. Unions are, in short, a socialist society
gradually developing inside the context of bourgeois capitalism:
[Unions]will thus eventuallymanage to deprive of all life old social forms
… leaving themonly to administer repulsive functions of surveillance and
repression. At that point, a new society will have emerged, based on com-
pletely new elements and on purely proletarian principles.93
But what does a politics of class development concretely look like? Two polit-
ical imperatives derive from this commitment to institutional development:
a certain understanding of the revolutionary process and a call for class sep-
aration. As for the first point, it is important to notice the type of transition
to socialism which this vision presupposes: a slow, gradual, longue durée pro-
cess of historical transformation in which new forms of human sociability
begin emerging already in the context of the old bourgeois order. This grad-
ualist understanding of the road to socialism has clear political implications,
because it amounts to an uncompromising rejection of insurrectionary solu-
tions. Already in the “Study on Vico” Sorel had warned that the socialist rev-
olution would not be “a war of extermination … baying for the destruction
90 Georges Sorel, “L’avenir socialiste des syndicats,” L’humanité nouvelle 2 (1898): 294–307;
432–445.
91 Ibid., 435.
92 When the legal principle of collective bargaining is recognized, Sorel argues, we have a
juridical victory for the proletariat, who has created “a system of new rights … through
struggles and countless difficulties.” Ibid., 433.
93 Ibid., 441.
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of worldly things and breaking abruptly with the past.” In the “Avenir,” this
anti-insurrectionist stance is confirmed. The socialist struggle, writes Sorel,
“is not a struggle to conquer the positions occupied by the bourgeois and
revel in the spoils; it is a struggle to empty the bourgeois political organism
of all life and to transfer everything useful it contained into a proletarian
political organism, forged gradually through the development of the prole-
tariat.”94
Though aversion to revolutionary insurrection was typical of late 19th cen-
turyMarxism, itmust be underlined how, for Sorel, it is deeply connected to the
rejection of economic determinism and, more generally, to his understanding
of the social world as a complex and essentially unstable web of interactions
between social spheres which can be separated only artificially. In other words,
if the transition to socialism, as any large historical transformation, is a ques-
tion of slowly developing new social relations within new institutions, then
it appears clear that no seizure of power, no insurrection, no coup d’état can
ever yield a transformation of this magnitude. Neither a Marxist Zusammen-
bruch of capitalism nor anarchist insurrection are, for Sorel plausible at this
point.
A second way in which Sorel gave more substance to what we have called
the politics of proletarian subjectivity is the injunction to class separatism.
The “Avenir” contains a large section dedicated to the damage that bourgeois
intellectuals do to the working class movement, exploiting the “superstitious
respect which the people instinctively have for science.”95 The argument out-
lined in the text touches upon the infantilization which working people have
to suffer at the hands of bourgeois socialist leaders and ends up insisting on
the usual point, namely that tutelage is antithetical to class development: “if
the worker accepts the leadership of people alien to the productive community,
he will always remain incapable of self-government.”96
This, again, is completely in line with the theory of proletarian institutional
development: new social forms are developed in new institutions, but in order
to be new, these institutions must be grounded in a substantially new histor-
ical experience, which is that of productive activity in modern capitalist fac-
tories. The argument against class collaboration, in other words, is not really
one about political expediency, but touches a much deeper level of Sorel’s rea-





the entire work of class development, and hence the entirety of the socialist
project, is at risk. Hence the closing words of the “Avenir,” which exhort unions
to “remain exclusively working class.”97
It must be added, however, that the connection between a theoretico-phil-
osophical position and a political one is never straightforward, and in this case
appears particularly loose. Though a number of “political” positions can be said
to derive from Sorelian revisionism, the extent to which these positions can
genuinely be called political is debatable, in that they remain at a high level
of generality and are not specific enough to commit Sorel to a choice between
actually existing political options.
Take, for example, the insistence on class separation, which onewould think
would commit Sorel to anti-parliamentarianism and isolationism. And yet, in
the pages of the “Avenir” we read that the proletariat “must enter the strug-
gle under the present conditions of political organisation, in order to obtain
social legislation favourable to its development”—an endorsement of parlia-
mentary reformism.98Reformismandparliamentarismare, in fact, thepolitical
options which Sorel will support until 1902, believing that the most effective
way to ensure the institutional development of the proletariat is that of secur-
ing, through parliamentary means, reforms which can grant to the proletariat
greater resources to build its autonomous institutions.
The point being made here is not that there is a contradiction between
the politics of institutional development and Sorel’s reformism: it is the exact
opposite, namely that there is no contradiction. As Marco Gervasoni convinc-
ingly argues:
Sorel did [in the late 1890s] theorize an original position on the ques-
tion of the relationship between the workers’ movement and democracy.
If proletarian institutions could participate and claim as their own the
social reforms put forward by governments, they still needed to remain
independent from political influences; they were allowed sympathizers
in Parliament, but they could not unite stably and structurally with the
parties that operated in Parliament, or, even worse, accept the direction
of the State under any form.99
Thepointwhich is beingmade is that Sorel’s politically vague and theoretically-
informed commitment to proletarian institutional development is politically
97 Ibid., 445.
98 Ibid., 444.
99 Gervasoni, Sorel, 163.
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underdetermined. It is compatiblewith a vast rangeof mutually exclusive polit-
ical options, from parliamentarism to more contentious stances. The concrete
direction in which the imperative of proletarian class development is pur-
sued depends on a series of judgements and evaluations which are eminently
contingent and, above all, political. Synthetically, they can be reduced to the
following set of questions. Is it possible to engage in parliamentarism and elec-
toralism without compromising the autonomy of proletarian institutions? Is
a purely instrumental involvement in the democratic state possible, or is it
a practice which inevitably leads to the abandonment of the politics of pro-
letarian institutional development? Is, in short, democracy compatible with
revolutionary institution building or are the two antithetical?
The different answers which Sorel gave to these questions determine two
different phases of his political life and explain the change from the reformism
of the late 1890s to the revolutionary syndicalism which he embraced from
1902. In the late 1890s, the answers are overwhelmingly positive: we see Sorel
siding with Jean Jaurès against Jules Guesde, accusing the old guard of the
Parti Ouvrier of abstract dogmatism, and suggesting that “workers are much
more interested in practical reforms than they are in theories,” i.e. prefer the
small victories of the parliamentary wing to the doctrinal dogmatism of the
Guesdists.100 Beginning after 1902, the answers are negative, and bring Sorel to
believe that the greatest danger to the workers’ movement is represented pre-
cisely by the democratic involvement which he had championed a few years
earlier.
The reasons for this shift on the question of the compatibility between par-
liamentarism and socialism have to do with a disillusionment with the repub-
lican victory in the political crisis which followed the Dreyfus affair as well as,
more importantly, with a completely new analysis of welfare capitalism.101 But
for our present purposes they are somewhat beside the point. What matters is
that the shift was eminently political and did not touch the bases of Sorelian
revisionism. Parliamentary reformism and revolutionary syndicalism were, in
other words, two possible political declensions of Sorel’s vague commitment to
proletarian institutional development, both equally compatible with the revi-
sion of Marxism operated by Sorel in the mid-1890s. Though theoretically rich
and original, Sorelian revisionism remained politically underdetermined and
substantially unaltered after its first formulation.
100 Georges Sorel, “L’evoluzione del socialismo in Francia,”La riforma sociale 9 (1899): 518.
101 Georges Sorel, Insegnamenti sociali dell’economia contemporanea. Degenerazione capital-
ista e degenerazione socialista (Palermo: Sandron, 1907).
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6 Violence andMyth
The Reflections on Violence was a book chiefly concerned with the existential
threat Sorel thought parliamentarism and social legislation posed to the class
identity of the proletariat. The core of Sorel’s proposal in this text—what he
calls grève prolétarienne—is neither a desperate ode to violence nor an ill-
conceived insurrectionary strategy. It is, instead, a mildly violent and highly
ideological practice of social conflict which for Sorel could potentially overturn
the rising tide of welfare capitalism, an economic environment which falsified
the standardMarxist analysis of capitalist development in termsof social polar-
ization.102 Socialism itself could come not through violence, but only through
a process of proletarian institutional development. What violence could yield
was restoration of the class structure, confinement of the bourgeoisie to their
“role as producers,” and return to a capitalist society marked by class enmity.
Those conditions were desirable because they permitted genuinely proletarian
institutions to thrive and expand.103
Whatmarks theReflections onViolencemost decisively, however, is the atten-
tion given to the capacity of a specific kind of violence to reconfigure the ide-
ological field. The principal way in which, for Sorel, violence can “restore the
class structure” is by acting upon collective consciousness, both bourgeois and
proletarian. The text of the Reflections is punctuated by constant allusions to
the “educational” or “ideological” function that violence can have. But in order
to be able to perform this function, violence requires an additional element: it
must be understood, experienced, and narrated through the lenses of a social
myth.
Togetherwith violence,myth is the termmost associated to Sorel.Myth took
on theoretical dignity in the pages of the Reflections andwas decisive to nation-
alist readings of Sorel during the interwar. In the final pages of his 1923 Crisis of
Parliamentary Democracy, Carl Schmitt discusses the notion and quotes Ben-
ito Mussolini’s speech in Naples from the year before to show that Sorel was
wrong. Though myths are important, the proletarian general strike is an out-
102 Sorel was of course not the only one who understood the challenges that new economic
developments, along with newmodes of governance of these developments, posed to the
standard Marxian analysis. His reasoning on these issues should be contextualised in the
wider framework of the crisis of Marxism of the turn of the century. See Eduard Bernstein,
The preconditions of socialism [1898], ed. and trans. Henry Tudor (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), as well as the more comprehensive Henry Tudor and J.M. Tudor,
eds., Marxism and Social Democracy. The Revisionist Debate 1896–1898, trans. Henry Tudor
and J.M. Tudor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
103 Sorel, Reflections on Violence, 78.
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dated one, since when myths “occur in the modern period, the stronger myth
is national.”104 In his speech in the San Carlo Opera Theatre, Benito Mussolini
had, amere three days before theMarch onRome, indeed spokenon the impor-
tance of myths:
We have created our ownmyth. That myth is a faith, it is a passion. It isn’t
necessary that it be a reality. It is a reality by virtue of the fact that it is a
fist, that it is a hope, that it is a faith, that it is courage. Our myth is the
nation, our myth is the greatness of the nation!105
The Sorelian influence is evident. In the “Letter to Daniel Halévy” that serves
as an introduction to the Reflections, Sorel had, in 1907, written that “myths are
not descriptions of things, but expressions of will.”106 Many chapters later, he
had insisted that “itmatters littlewhether the general strike is a partial reality or
simply a product of the popular imagination.”107The examples of myths offered
by Sorel—ranging from the glory of the Napoleonic Grande Armée to the tran-
scendental significance attributed by the first Christians to their martyrdom—
further make it clear that there is no necessary connection betweenmyths and
the proletariat. Myths occur throughout history and are not exclusive to the
proletariat.
If we add that for Sorel “people who are living in this world of myths are
secure from all refutation,” we can see how the Sorelian myth came to be
understood as a deeply held conviction or dream thatwas invulnerable to ratio-
nal examination.108 Factoring in Mussolini’s effective political adaptations, we
understand how the Sorelian notion of myth could be seen as an early draft of
fascist or totalitarian propaganda. Disdain for parliamentary democracy, pref-
erence for emotive language, enthusiasm for violence—here is Sorel as proto-
fascist.109
104 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy [1923], trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT University Press, 1988), 74–75.
105 Benito Mussolini, “Speech to San Carlo Opera Theatre, Naples, 25/10/1922,” in Mediter-
ranean Fascism (1919–1945), ed. Charles F. Delzell (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 42.
106 Sorel, Reflections on Violence, 28. Translation modified. The original French reads, “ce ne
sont pas des descriptions de choses, mais des expressions de volonté.” Jennings’ edition




109 It is thus natural that myth has been a central focus of work on Sorel. In French, Willy
Gianinazzi, Naissance du mythe moderne. Georges Sorel et la crise de la pensée savante
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And yet, the myth that interested Sorel was an “image” or an “idea” which
“contains within itself the whole of proletarian socialism.”110 Myths could be
described as the psychological, ideological, and emotional conditions that
emerge from a self-conscious group of people when engaging in social con-
flict. The metaphorics with which Sorel illustrates the notion of myth in the
Reflections are depth versus surface, movement versus stasis, image versus lan-
guage. The terms are self-consciously Bergsonian.111 Yet there are good reasons
to doubt the importance of Bergsonian notions to Sorel’s argument. One is that
most of the references to Bergson did not appear in the earliest Italian versions
of texts that would become the Reflections, but were added for publication in
French.112 Though Bergson is certainly important for Sorel more broadly, this
introduction has shown that the study of social and political psychology has
much deeper roots in Sorel’s work.
Indeed, Sorel’s thinking onmyth is recognizably drawn fromVico’s approach
to the myths of antiquity as evidence of social reality. For instance, according
to Vico the god Hermes comes to stand for a whole range of phenomena. The
primitive imagination has its own logic and reduces a “totality” of relations into
a compact image. Sorel quotes Vico, “these vast imaginations … curled them-
selves up and were indicated by the smallest signs.”113 A decade later, he would
write that revolutionary syndicalism “concentrate[ed] the whole of socialism
in the drama of the general strike,” constituting intomyth these “images” which
then had then to be taken as a whole and could not be disaggregated without
destroying something essential about their social function.114 If Sorel was eager
(Paris: Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 2006) is the most significant
contemporaryworkhere. See alsoWillyGianinazzi, “Imagesmentales etmythe social. Psy-
chologie et politique chez Georges Sorel,”Mil neuf cent 28 (2010): 155–172; Éric Michaud,
“Le mythe social ou l’efficacité de l’ image sans images,”Mil neuf cent. 28 (2010): 173–183.
Sorelian myth has recently been the subject of but interesting but scattered Anglophone
scholarship. SeeMarkAntliff, “BadAnarchism: AestheticizedMythmaking and the Legacy
of Georges Sorel,” Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies, no. 2 (2011): 155–187; Tudor
Balinisteanu, “Spellbinding Stories. Gender Theory and Georges Sorel’s Concept of Social
Myth,” Critique 42, no. 1 (2014): 107–126; Chiara Bottici, “Philosophies of Political Myth, a
Comparative Look Backwards: Cassirer, Sorel, and Spinoza,” European Journal of Political
Theory 8, no. 3 (2009): 365–382.
110 Sorel, Reflections on Violence, 150.
111 Ibid., 26, 29, 118.
112 Tommaso Giordani, “On Sorel and Bergson. The Impact of Bergsonian Ideas on Sorel’s
Reflections on Violence,”Lo Sguardo—Rivista di filosofia 26, no. 1 (2018): 163–181.
113 See translation below [1022] and §402.
114 Sorel, Reflections on Violence, 113.
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to see the proletarian barbarians at the gate, he tried to understand their incip-
ient civilization by looking to Vico’s reconstruction of the heroic mind.
Close to a theory of ideology, Sorel’s notion of myth was partially developed
to explain the gap between the dwindling empirical validity of certain Marx-
ist predictions and their evident traction in the working class.115 To proclaim
the falsity of Marxism and label the working class confused obviously would
not do. Myths, rather, Sorel came to argue following Vico, represent condensa-
tions of the conditions of life in certain sections of society. But Sorel points out,
“it is not things that are assimilated, but actions.”116 Hence, myths also contain
the aspirations and ambitions of the social group which creates them. A myth
“is, at bottom, identical to the convictions of a group, being the expression of
these convictions in the language of movement.”117There is no spacehere for an
account of the development of myth in Sorel’s writings, and we are not claim-
ing that Sorel’s idea of myth was fully formed in 1896. Quite the contrary. We
are, however, arguing that if we wish to understand the historical beginnings
of this influential Sorelian notion, we will need to look first to the “Study on
Vico,” and then follow its lead into the twentieth century, including the years
after Sorel’s death.
7 Beyond Syndicalism
To conclude this introduction, it is necessary to give a very summary outline of
Sorel’s developments after the publication of the Reflections on Violence: this
will not only show the enduring relevance of the issues at the heart of the
“Study on Vico,” but also offer a somewhat different biographical portrait of
the man widely reputed to have been a fascist avant la lettre. It must, how-
ever, be said that this period contains no important theoretical evolutions:
the philosophical and epistemological positions which Sorel had reached in
115 Some of these dilemmas arrive for Sorel quite quickly. Already in 1898, he writes (for
an Italian audience) on the “crisis” and “decomposition” of Marxism, which was proving
unable to mediate between its claims to scientificity and the demand of actually mobi-
lizing political power. Genuine and necessary reforms, Sorel wrote, are not made simply
on the basis of science. “Our mind needs poetry in order to resolve the heart into action,”
he wrote, but it easy and dangerous to get carried away, “the socialists must not, through
sheer imagination, finish by dreaming up a sociological mythology rather than observing
the facts.” Georges Sorel, “La crisi del socialismo scientfico,” Critica sociale 8, no. 9 (May 1,
1898): 138.
116 See translation below [1022] and §402.
117 Sorel, Reflections on Violence, 29.
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the period between 1896 and 1898 will remain fixed and will only be reformu-
lated through the aid of new philosophical vocabularies, including Bergson-
ism and Pragmatism. It is, nonetheless, a period which is of a wider histor-
ical interest, because in the years after 1906 Sorel will be confronted by the
defeat of revolutionary syndicalism, the Great War, and the Bolshevik revolu-
tion.
As we have seen, for Sorel the question of safeguarding the class identity of
the proletariat was, to a substantial extent, a question of class consciousness
and ideology. It is in the context of this project of ideological intervention that
we should situate a bookwhich cameout virtually simultaneously to the Reflec-
tions, the Illusions of Progress. With the exception of an article on Rousseau,
this is the text in which Sorel deals most systematically with the legacy of the
Enlightenment.118 Thework is to be understood both as an exercise in the social
history of ideas and as a political intervention attempting a critique of repub-
lican ideology: in both of these aspects, the indebtedness to the insights first
developed in the “Study on Vico” is evident.
As a work of intellectual history, Sorel makes it clear in the preface that he is
following the Marxism first outlined “over ten years ago” by Antonio Labriola,
and insists on the sterility of Marxian analyses based exclusively on economic
determinism.119 As a political intervention, the aspect to underlinemore force-
fully is not so much the uses which the Third Republic hadmade of the philos-
ophy of the 18th century, as much as Sorel’s belief that the historical critique of
ideas is an important part of political struggle. This is something in continuity
with the importance which he had attributed since the mid-1890s to questions
of ideology, collective psychology, and class consciousness.
The years after the publications of these two books are years of disillusion-
ment for Sorel, coinciding with the political defeat of the revolutionary syndi-
calists in the CGT, which had gained control of the organization in 1906. The
defeat of the syndicalists, broken by the repression of the state in a series of
strikes, flew, moreover, in the face of Sorel’s argument in the Reflections on
Violence: a more contentious stance had not determined the defeat of parlia-
mentarism and social legislation, butmerely amilitary and eventually political
defeat of those who had challenged the republic.120
118 Georges Sorel, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau,”Le mouvement socialiste 21 (1907): 507–532.
119 Georges Sorel, The Illusions of Progress, trans. John Stanley (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1969), xl–xli.
120 On the events of 1907–1908 and the defeat of the syndicalists see Jacques Julliard, Clemen-
ceau briseur de grèves. L’affaire de Draveil—Villeneuve-Saint-Georges. (Paris: Gallimard,
1973).
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In the first weeks of the decisive strike of Draveil-Villeneuve-Saint-Georges,
he published an article in Le Matin, one of France’s largest daily newspapers,
whose telling subtitle was hors la grève, pas de socialisme (no socialism with-
out strikes). In it Sorel—introduced to the public as someone who “renounced
his bourgeois career to consecrate himself to the social revolution”—lauded
the heroism of the strikers, comparing them to those Napoleonic soldiers who
“accomplished somany acts of valour, knowing all the time they would remain
poor.” Plausibly sensing the impending defeat, he added, “What remains of the
Empire? Nothing but the epic of the Grande Armée; what will remain of the
present socialist movement will be the epic of the strikes.”121
Readers will recognize in this fetishism of the struggle and of the glory it
brings the familiar historiographical Sorel. And yet, even a modicum of con-
textualisation suggests caution: written a few weeks before the decisive defeat
of the syndicalists at the hand of the French Republic, these words should not
be read as the expression of the most fundamental tendencies of Sorel’s social
and historical thought. A year later, the syndicalists’ defeat now firmly estab-
lished, he will publish an article in the Italian Il Divenire sociale in which the
world-historical language of grandeur and decadence is used to talk about the
failure of the syndicalist project, and in which the clash between proletari-
ans and bourgeois is rendered as a clash between greatness and mediocrity.122
These are the years in which Sorel’s rhetorical hostility against the Republic is
arguably at its peak, and they are also the years in which he gets close to the
monarchist and antisemitic Action française. His debut forMaurras’ group is in
an interview given to their daily newspaper, where he is presented as someone
who “in virtue of his past politics, would appear as belonging to the extreme
left,” but whose “independence of judgement and character” allows him to be
taken seriously by the royalists.123
It is undeniable that Sorel lent himself to the attempt of the Action fran-
çaise to proselytize amongst the remnants of a defeated syndicalism, as not
only he occasionally wrote for their publications, but also collaborated more
assiduously in a journal established together with younger royalists, the Indé-
pendance. And yet, neither the extent nor the significance of these episodes
121 Georges Sorel, “Apologie de la violence,”Le Matin, May 18, 1908.
122 Georges Sorel, “Evoluzione e decadenza,” Il Divenire sociale 5 (1909): 16–31, 272–275, 283–
285 and Il Divenire sociale 6 (1910): 24–27, 47–49, 55–56. The text will be published in
French in 1910 as an appendix to the second edition of the Illusions of Progress under the
amended title “Grandeur et decadence.”
123 Léon Daudet, “Une conversation avec M. Sorel—Ferrer et Briand,” L’Action française,
September 29, 1909.
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should be exaggerated. Sorel published only four pieces in the Action fran-
çaise.124 There where, admittedly, two projects to create publications attempt-
ing a synthesis between syndicalism and royalism—the failed Cité Française in
1910 and themore successful Indépendance the following year—Sorel’s collabo-
rationwas not entirely transitory. However, writing toCroce about the prospect
of entering such a project, Sorel had confessed, “It is a terribly burdensome
task for me, given my health conditions; but I have accepted on condition that
[Edouard] Berth be the co-director; in this way, if the enterprise proves suc-
cessful, I will be able to withdraw and leave Berth in a comfortable position.”125
The reasons which brought Sorel to these collaborations have to be searched
for not only in his break from the Mouvement socialiste, but also in a virulent
opposition to the republic which he shared with the royalists. As Jeremy Jen-
nings argues, the defeat of the syndicalists left Sorel in the position of having to
mount “a total attack on bourgeois society, its political structures, and itsmoral
and cultural values. It was this virulent critique that brought him into contact
with the forces of the extreme Right and which, indirectly, led amongst some
of his admirers to the fusion of Sorelian doctrine and nationalism.”126
In short, though Sorel certainly collaborated with nationalists, he was never
himself a nationalist. Not even the nationalistic frenzy of the Great War could
bring this out in him. Though his production dropped throughout the war—
he published nothing between 1916 and 1919—the tone of this 1914 letter to
Benedetto Croce is sufficiently clear:
124 Besides the above-mentioned interview, the other three pieces are a republication of a
political article originally written in 1907 for the Divenire sociale (Georges Sorel, “Social-
istes antiparlementaires,” L’Action française, 22 August 1909), a republication a review of
Charles Péguy’s Lemystèrede la charitéde Jeanned’Arcoriginallywritten for theFlorentine
journal La Voce (Georges Sorel, “Le réveil de l’âme française,” L’Action française, 14 April
1910) and a letter offering further comment to that review (Georges Sorel, “Une lettre de
Georges Sorel,”L’Action française, 6 June 1910).
125 Letter to Benedetto Croce, 28/6/1910 in “Lettere di Georges Sorel a Benedetto Croce,”
La Critica 26 (1928): 341. Edouard Berth (1875–1939) was one of Sorel’s closest followers.
He pursued, much more thoroughly than Sorel, the project of uniting syndicalism with
nationalism. In collaboration with Georges Valois (real name Alfred-Georges Gressent)
and under Charles Maurras’ aegis, Berth would establish the Cahiers du Cercle Proudhon,
a journal which, for its two years of existence between 1911 and 1913, proposed a national-
ist variation on Sorelian themes. Sorel never wrote for this publication, and its strongest
connection with Sorel lies in its fierce critique of bourgeois society and its democratic
institutions. Valois went on to establish the Faisceau, a French imitation of Mussolini’s
party, before returning to the left anddying as a captured resistant inBergen-Belsen. Berth,
on the other hand, remained by his own account on the left his whole life.
126 Jennings, Georges Sorel, 158.
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Like many others, I quit my home, following the advice of the authori-
ties … The events overwhelm me: I feel that we are entering an era more
modern than that of the Revolution … Old Prussia, which felt itself being
absorbed into the new industrial Germany seems to me to be wanting to
die in the middle of rivers of blood; we shall witness something similar
to the Judean war: who will be the poet, the historian or the philosopher
of this terrifying catastrophe? […] I am a man of the past, I have nothing
left to say to men who will be able to loudly affirm their Jacobin princi-
ples; it seems to me that Proudhon, in his last years of life, had similar
impressions to the ones I have now: you are younger and you will be able
to formulate the philosophy of the new revolution.127
Unlike many other French intellectuals who joined the nationalist effort—
some in flesh, like Charles Péguy, some in pen, likeHenri Bergson—Sorel never
saw anything else in the carnage but the total defeat of his ideas and the tri-
umph of “Jacobin” bourgeois democracy. “Those of us who think that we have
entered an era independent from Jacobinism” he wrote in 1914 to Agostino
Lanzillo “are finished. The best we can do is to work on problems which have
nothing to do with social questions.”128
After a protracted wartime silence, however, Sorel will lose this gloom and
come back not only to publishing, but also to political writing, and even to
socialism. In 1919, hewill publish a collectionof his socialistwritings, the above-
mentioned Matériaux d’une théorie du proletariat. The dedication of the book
read: “May my dear comrades Paul and Leona Delesalle accept the homage of
this book, written by an oldmanwho stubbornly remains, like Proudhon, a dis-
interested servant of the proletariat.”129 The reason for Sorel’s newfound energy
and faith in the socialist cause is very easy to guess: the Bolshevik revolution
and the revolutionarywavewhichwas sweepingEurope fromGermany toHun-
gary to Italy. Having lost most of his savings in defaulted Russian bonds, Sorel
was moreover forced now to write for a living, something which he managed
to do by becoming a columnist for the Italian newspapers Il Resto del Carlino
and Il Tempo. It is mostly from the columns of these newspapers, and mostly
127 Letter to Benedetto Croce, 22/9/1914, in “Lettere di Georges Sorel a Benedetto Croce,” La
Critica 27 (1929): 51.
128 Letter to Agostino Lanzillo, 23/10/1914, in Cher camarade, 210.
129 Georges Sorel,Matériauxd’une théorie duprolétariat (Paris:Marcel Rivière, 1919). Paul and
Leona Delesalle, beyond being personal friends of Sorel, were anarcho-syndicalist mil-
itants of a certain relevance. See Jean Maitron, Paul Delesalle. Un anarchiste de la belle
époque (Paris: Fayard, 1985).
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for the Italian public, that in the last years of his life he agitated in favour of
Lenin and the Bolsheviks. Thus, in the beginning of the biennio rosso, after a
quasi-insurrectionary general strike in the summer of 1919, and at the opening
of the Bologna congress of the PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano), Sorel intervened
in favour of the radical (massimalista) wing of the party with an article in the
Resto del Carlino:
Bolshevik legislation offers us a pragmatic translation of communism: it
has instituted councils of control over factorieswhich are nominated only
by workers.Whenworkers, instead of asking Kautsky and his friends for a
blueprint, go through their industrial education by having greater powers
inside factories, they are doing their work as communists! The experience
which is being had in the FIAT factories [at the time occupied byworkers]
… is more important than all the writings published in the Neue Zeit!130
Sorel’s infatuation for the Bolsheviks, as we can see, has many layers. The insti-
tution of the soviets appeared to him as a realization of his old syndicalist
vision: an autonomous, self-governing, proletariat who takes control of pro-
duction and develops administrative and juridical capacities. Moreover, even
if not yet successful in Italy, this institution had certainly triumphed in Russia,
discrediting with its victory decades of social-democratic experience and lead-
ership of the working class by parties. Finally, this infatuation was not merely
the romantic revolutionary mirage of an old man, but involved, as this article
shows, active intervention in concrete politics, albeit not in France. If we com-
pare the amount of work and interest which Sorel dedicated to the Bolsheviks
to the almost complete indifference he reserved for Italian fascists, the idea
of Sorel as a supporter of both Lenin and Mussolini appears, euphemistically,
implausible.131
A final pointworthmentioning is the return, in the years after theGreatWar,
to serious work on questions of epistemology and the philosophy of science: a
mere year before his death, Sorel will publish what is arguably his most sys-
tematic work of philosophy, a long tome entitled De l’utilité du pragmatisme.
130 Georges Sorel, “Il massimalismo italiano. Ai miei compagni d’Italia,” Il Resto del Carlino,
October 5, 1919.
131 The only source which attributes to Sorel sympathies for Mussolini’s fascists in the imme-
diate postwar is Jean Variot, Propos de Georges Sorel recueillis par Jean Variot (Paris: Galli-
mard, 1935), but it is a highly suspicious one.Variotwas involvedwith Sorel in theproject of
the Indépendance and was a militant royalist. Moreover, these memories were published
13 years after Sorel’s death, and clash quite stronglywith Sorel’s writings of 1919–1922, over-
whelmingly concerned with Russia and with the possibility of social revolution in Italy.
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American pragmatism was a philosophy that Sorel, like many other French
intellectuals, had discovered starting from 1906, when a series of translations
and discussions of the work of William James had entered French intellec-
tual life. Initially suspicious of this philosophy, Sorel had gradually changed his
mind, coming to see in the pragmatist theory of truth a philosophical argument
very much in line with his long-standing concern to make science “descend
towards the concrete.”132Utilité du pragmatisme not only represents a return to
the conceptual problems which had been central to the “Study on Vico”—the
epistemic nature and the limits of scientific claims, the relationship between
practical activity andabstract thought, the extent to andmode inwhich science
is to be considered an historical product—but constitutes the most radical re-
statement of the historicist theses which Sorel had started formulating as early
as the late 1880s. “The only truthful element in thehistory of sciences” he claims
in this last book “is artificial nature.”133
8 Conclusion
The “Study on Vico” which follows in English translation ought to be read
within the contexts whichwe have outlined in this introduction. Themost gen-
eral framework through which Sorel approached Vico was that of his ongoing
concern for the epistemology of the sciences, both social and natural. It was
this concern which had led him to the discovery and embrace of Marxism.
The difficulties which had plagued Sorel’s previous epistemological work were
not resolved by Marx, but by Vico’s principle of verum ipsum factum, which
Sorel read back intoMarx. Before the encounter with Vico, Sorel had oscillated
between historicist stances—insisting on the historicity and artificiality of sci-
entific practice—andneo-Kantianism, i.e. the belief that scientific explanation
required causality, necessity, and some form of determinism.
With verum ipsum factum, Sorel abandoned neo-Kantianism and increas-
inglymoved in a historicist direction, towards an ontology of the socialworld as
marked by human agency. Vico himself had organized this agency according to
“nation” and divine Providence. Sorel dropped Providence and disaggregated
the nation into the class and the institution, each liable to the processes of
development recognized by Vico. From scientific theories to moral systems,
132 Georges Sorel, De l’utilité du pragmatisme (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1921), 342. For a summary
overview of Sorel’s pragmatism see Tommaso Giordani, “Introduction au pragmatisme de
Georges Sorel,”Mil neuf cent 32 (2014): 93–110.
133 Sorel, Utilité du pragmatisme, 350.
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from economic transformations to political revolutions, everything now had to
be understood as human production, as the fruit of human creativity deployed
in given historical conditions. Only an epistemological principle like Vico’s
could allowhim tomake thismove.This philosophical commitment tohistoric-
ity and human agency is what allows us to explain Sorel’s later philosophical
interest in pragmatism.
But the “Study on Vico,” as we have shown, also represents the turning point
of Sorel’s engagement with Marxism. Insofar as Sorel’s commitment to Marx-
ismwas of a scientific kind, there is a clear connectionwith the epistemological
break outlined above. From the “Study on Vico” onwards, Sorel ceased seeing
Marxism as science rationelle, as a social science capable of unearthing funda-
mental historical necessities. These historical necessities were now a concep-
tual impossibility—history was made by human agency—although perhaps
they remained psychologically essential. Thus, it is in this textwhichwe can see
the first formulations of the fundamental tenets of SorelianMarxism: the rejec-
tion of economic determinism, the rejection of historical determinism, and the
understanding of Marxism as a form of proletarian self-consciousness.
Politically speaking, Sorelian revisionism implied a commitment to the
development of proletarian historical subjectivity, an issue which is merely
alluded to in the “Study onVico”—when Sorel speaks of the proletariat’s acqui-
sition of the “consciousness of its historical role” as one of the conditions for
socialism—but which will be developed more thoroughly a couple of years
later in the “Avenir Socialiste des Syndicats.” It implied, moreover, a rejection
of a conception of the revolution as insurrection: far from a “Jacobin” seizure
of power, socialism will be the result of a long historical process involving eco-
nomic transformation and,most importantly, the development of a newhistor-
ical subjectivity, that of the proletariat. And yet, though this revisionism gave
these two political imperatives to Sorel, it still remained politically underde-
termined and reconcilable with a large number of mutually exclusive political
positions. What ensures the growth of proletarian institutions in the present
context? To this question, Sorel gave different answers, and these answers help
us understand his transition from instrumental reformism to revolutionary
syndicalism.
What should be underlined byway of conclusion is how this commitment to
proletarian institutional development is the logical consequence of a very par-
ticular understanding of Marxism. Profoundly alien to any form of base/super-
structure way of thinking, the Marxism elaborated by Sorel through Vico and
Labriola is, philosophically, rooted in a full commitment to historicity con-
ceived as collective human agency. Since this agency is fundamentally creative,
it requires the abandonment of both historical and, perhapsmore importantly,
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economic determinism. It is a good indication of themisreading of this thinker
thatMartin Jay should describe Sorel’s viewof Vico as “the anticipator of Marx’s
contention that ideas were epiphenomena of material forces embodied in the
mode of production.”134
For though Sorel in the “Study on Vico” does indeed use the term “epiphe-
nomena,” it is to say that “moral valuations” are not epiphenomenal but rather
play a “capital role” in the historical process. As we have amply shown, for
Sorel and for Labriola “materialism” is not to be interpreted in terms of a deter-
mination of material factors upon ideal ones. Instead, it is a commitment to
historical immanence and to an ontology of the social world and of history in
terms of human creative agency. If this argument is accepted, there is space
for a rethinking of Sorel in terms of an important pre-war instance of a tradi-
tion of thought that has been called humanist Marxism. The Italian roots of
Sorel’s Marxism—the same roots which later nourished the thought of Anto-
nio Gramsci—seem to indicate the appropriateness of this hypothesis.
134 Jay, Fin de Siècle Socialism, 49.
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Note on the Text and Translation
Sorel’s “Étude sur Vico” appeared in le Devenir social over three installments
in October, November, and December 1896. This original publication can be
accessed through Gallica.fr. Sorel often republished in book formmaterial that
had first appeared in a periodical, sometimes with significant revisions. This
was not, however, the case with the “Étude.” Since nomanuscript has survived,
the text itself presents few problems. Anne-Sophie Menasseyre prepared in
2007 a critical edition of the essay together with a substantial introduction and
annotations, which have been of great help to the present work.
The “Étude” has never before appeared in English. A few points about the
principles of the present translation are worth making.
Much of Sorel’s text consists of quotations from Vico, which is to say quo-
tations from Jules Michelet’s 1827 translations of Vico, in the edition pub-
lished as part of Michelet’s collected works in 1894. Cristina Belgioioso, who
re-translated theNewScience intoFrench in 1844,wrote inher introduction that
Michelet’s “fidelity to Vico … prevented him from clarifying the obscure pas-
sages, without always obliging him to render them as Vico had written them.”1
IndeedMichelet’sVico is notoriously and successfully freewith the original.We
therefore translate quoted passages directly from Michelet’s French. We note
discrepancies betweenMichelet’s text and Sorel’s quotations where they occur
and provide—where possible—references to Nicolini’s standard paragraph
numbering of the New Science (marked with a §), also used in Thomas Bergin
andMaxFisch’s English translation, or pagenumbers in standardEnglish trans-
lations of other works. Square brackets […] enclose these and other editorial
insertions.
Sorel’s placement of footnotes—generally just before the quotation they
source—was likely to be extremely distracting for any contemporary reader.
Since no meaning hangs on the placement of notes simply containing a cita-
tion, we have silently regularized them. However, in some cases, where Sorel
appends a note to a word, even inside a quotation, we have left the note in its
original location. Sorel’s references are not always complete—in the bibliogra-
phy for the “Study” we have collected all the texts he cites in the editions he
used or seems most likely to have used.
In general, this translationprefers English cognates for Sorel’s andMichelet’s
terms. In this it follows the principles of the Bergin and Fisch rather than the
Marsh New Science.
1 G.B. Vico, La science nouvelle. Translated by Cristina Belgioioso (Paris: Renouard, 1844), cxviii.
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Sorel’s prose style was not considered polished in its time and may appear
to modern readers of English as genuinely unfinished. He makes heavy use
of semi-colons and dashes, often resulting in long sentences that in English
would be implausible or at least burdensome. We have therefore not always
respected Sorel’s use of punctuation or sentence divisions. Belgioioso’s censure
of Michelet’s translation, however, we hope does not here apply.
Finally, although apportioning credit in any co-authored text is tricky and
responsibility rests entirely on all heads, it should be said that Tommaso Gior-
dani did the majority of the work on the introduction, as Eric Brandom did for
the translation.
© Eric Brandom and Tommaso Giordani, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004416338_005
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC 4.0 License.
Study on Vico
Georges Sorel
In 1839 Jules Michelet published an abridged translation of the New Science.
In his preliminary discourse he stressed the originality and the worth of Vico’s
ideas. The great French historian claimed that soon the Neapolitan philoso-
pher would be appreciated at his true value and that then it would be possible
to give to the public the whole work. He thought it necessary, in themeantime,
to make rather large cuts.1
Vico’s work remained little known in France. It is cited almost exclusively
to recall the principle of ideal history, common to all peoples and destined to
renew itself eternally.—This part of the New Science is of real interest for our
contemporaries, because if Vico’s ideas have real scientific value, hope must
be given up of the socialist transformation ever taking place.—The mythol-
ogy developed in this book has been abandoned with good reason: Michelet
thought it so bad that he almost completely removed it, asking the reader’s
indulgence for these arbitrary combinations. I believe that we ought to be
equally | severe when it comes to ideal history. This idea can serve no pur-786
pose andunfortunately covers over very fine theories that still today retain their
importance.
In a note in Capital, Karl Marx observes the powerful interest a history of
technology would hold and adds: “Darwin has called attention to the history
of natural technology, that is to the formation of the organs of plants and ani-
mals understood as means of production for life. Does not the history of the
productive organs of social man deserve similar investigation? And would not
such a history be easier to compile, since, as Vico says, human history differs
from natural history in this, that we have made the former, but not the lat-
ter?”2
This conception of the construction of history by mankind constitutes the
original part of Vico’s work; this is the part of the New Science that deserves
to be deepened still today and that can give useful indications to the historian
1 Michelet followed the edition of 1744 even though he thought it quite mediocre.
The citations in my text all refer to Michelet’s translation in its 1894 edition: this volume
includes, in addition to the NewScience, Vico’s autobiography, the treatise on the ancient wis-
dom of Italy and some minor works.
2 Capital, French translation; p. 162, col. 1, note [Sorel has omitted the phrase “material basis of
all social organization” after “social man.” Marx, Capital, 493–494].
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of institutions and revolutions. But in order to appreciate the full worth of the
theses to which Marx refers, one must first free the path of obstacles; all the
superficial parts of Vico’s system must be removed, above all that which is the
most famous, but which is unnecessary.
I
The conception of an ideal history—that is to say, of anunequivocal succession
of political forms in a system, reproducing itself always in the same way—
would have appealed to the spirits of ancient times because of its resemblance
to the conception of the stages of individual life. When the living being dies,
another replaces it and the same evolution is evident, at least until the species
changes; but the transformation of specieswas dismissed by almost all philoso-
phers.
Aristotle, on the basis of observation and the history of institutions, crit-
icized Plato’s theories about the order in which political forms succeed one
another; he showed that, in reality, things do not develop as simply as theorists
like to imagine and that [here] there is no law verified by experience.A1
The influence of preconceived ideas is so strong that Aristotle’s criticisms 787
do not seem to have had a great intellectual influence.3 Polybius takes up
again the notion of ideal history and traces a table which, according to him,
represents the natural order (Book VI, §§4–9), but he warns us that it is not
rigorously exact. “One might be mistaken about the time, if one tries to pre-
dict the duration of this or that government, but one will rarely be wrong
about the degree of growth or decadence to which it has arrived—or about
the nature of the changes that it must undergo. It is above all regarding the
Roman constitution that this method, wisely applied, will allow us to know
origins, developments, maturity, as well as changes yet to come. For, more
than any other, this republic was established and has grown according to the
laws of nature; and the revolutions that await it will follow the same order”
(§9). Polybius’ understanding of the Roman constitution (which contains ele-
ments borrowed from monarchy, from aristocracy, and from democracy) does
not allow it to be placed in the schema, which presents to us the follow-
ing evolution of simple forms: arbitrary monarchy—monarchy based on uni-
versal consent—tyranny—aristocracy concerned with the common good—
3 It is, after all, quite remarkable that Greek science—for reasons that are still unclear—relies
on Plato more than on Aristotle. This can be seen very well in Galen.
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oligarchy—democracy—ochlocracy dominated by the pillaging appetite of
factions, until the multitude finds a leader which returns it to monarchy.What
results from Polybius’ text is that the Greek historian considered the Roman
constitution as having lost, in his time, its ancient strength and as destined to
being swept away, despite its perfection and its complexity, by the theoretical
movement described above (§57).
In Machiavelli we find this superstitious respect for formulas driven to its
highest degree. In chapter two of the first book of his discourses on Livy, he
copies Polybius more or less word for word and does not try at all to apply this
theory to the numerous revolutions which the Italy of his time allowed him to
observe. He believes that the logical development of things according to ideal
relations occupies a place superior to and above observation. The old Platonic
idea prevents him fromestablishing a social science based on the study of facts:
reality in its complexity does not seem to be reducible to any exact law, for | it788
is but an imperfect imitation of ideal forms which, alone, are sufficiently dig-
nified to keep the philosopher busy.
This consideration will be seen as well in Vico, who was strongly nourished
by the study of Plato. The sources onwhich theNeapolitan philosopherworked
were not very numerous.4 The history of the Orient was unknown to him; and
that of the Jews systematically put aside, for the chosen people could not have
developed according to the same laws as everyone else.
Among the classical peoples, he does not even find a perfect regularity. “The
Carthaginians were prevented by their native African shrewdness which was
further sharpened by their maritime trade. The Capuans by the mild climate
and the fertility of this happy Campania … But the Romans, having none of
these obstacles, proceeded with even steps being ruled by Providence through
the medium of vulgar wisdom. Through all three forms of civil states […] they
persisted in each until it was naturally succeeded by the next. They retained
the aristocracy down to the Publian and Petelian laws; they preserved popu-
lar liberty down to the time of Augustus; and they clung to monarchy as long
as it was humanly possible to withstand the internal and external causes that
destroy that form of state.”5
4 At the end of the third chapter of the first book, he cites a number of authors, who probably
are the only ones that he had read concerning themores of peoples foreign to our civilization:
“for the Peruvians and Mexicans, Acosta; for the peoples of Virginia Thomas Aviot [Har-
riot]; for those of New England RichardWaitborn [Whitbourne]; for those of Guinea Hugues
Linschotan [Hugo van Linschooten]; for the Siamese, Joseph Scultenius [Joost Schouten].”
[§337]—He read no Arab geographer or historian.
5 Book V, chapter 3, p. 627 [§1088].
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I will frequently return to the crucial role that Providence plays in Vico’s
sociological theory. We can already observe here that the regularity of Roman
history is not explained exclusively in terms of human causes, but is connected
to an otherworldly cause. The Romans had the good fortune of having instincts
capable of allowing the full execution of the providential design;—the rational
plan of history realized itself better with them than with other peoples.
Again, it must be added that this realization depends in part on quite an
extraordinary phenomenon. Romulus, in founding Rome, opened an asylum
and thus enacted an archaic creation. “He had to found his | city on the same 789
basis that had been given to the first states [cités] of the world. Roman civ-
ilization began from this principle.”6 But at the same time it had to use the
language [langage] of cities in Latium that were alreadymuchmore advanced.
This had two important consequences. On one hand, “[Roman] heroism was
young, while it had already begun to age with the other people of Latium”; and
on theother hand theheroic periodof theRomanswas told in a vulgar language
and in a form that was already partly historical.
InGreece therehadbeena contrary phenomenon.History, rather thanbeing
artificially lengthened, was shortened. The philosophers brought the country
abruptly from a state of barbarism to the most refined civilization. The heroic
era left traces only in legends, which have not even survived in their primitive
form. Vico imagines that the fables were originally stories about the history of
peoples.7 Later on, philosophers tried to find depth in them: “it was what was
done byManetho, great priest of Egypt, who gave the history of his country the
deep meaning of a natural theology.”8 In Greece, he supposed that there had
been, well before the classical culture, another transformation, “the fableswere
changed, twisted from their first meaning, obscured in the times of corruption
and dissolution that preceded even the existence of Homer. The Greeks, afraid
to find the gods as contrary to their wishes as they must have been to their
morals [moeurs], attributed thesemorals to the gods themselves andoften gave
to the fables a shameful or obscenemeaning.”9 No kind of proof is given to sup-
port this theory, which seems to be invoked here only in order to have onemore
reason to reject the Hellenic legends and to be able to reconstruct them with
the resources furnished by Roman history.10
6 Axiom 21 [§160].
7 Axiom 13. Vico has no idea of the migration of fables; he considers them autochthonous
[§144–146].
8 Axiom 55 [§222].
9 Axiom 54 [§221].
10 If Vico has gone badly wrong here andmakes a gratuitous hypothesis in attributing to the
pre-Homeric poets such a refined casuistic—what to say about modern authors who go
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The ancient history of Rome does not appear as very certain until the sec-790
ond Punic war. Yet it does present descriptions of a general nature that allow
an understanding of the evolution of customs [moeurs] and of laws. This evo-
lution should, according to Vico, also be found in the true heroic period of the
Greeks. It then becomes possible to discover, behind the self-serving fictions
of the poet-casuists, the events reflected in the history of Rome before the Lex
Publilia.
In order to judge this method of reconstruction, I extract from Michelet’s
analysis the following passage: “The pretensions of the plebeians are noted
by the fables of Ixion, lover of Juno, of Tantalus still changed in the midst of
the waters, of Marsyas and Linus who defied Apollo in song battle, which is
to say who disputed with him the privilege of his auspices. Their efforts were
not always met with success. Phaeton falls from the chariot of the sun, Her-
cules suffocates Anteus, Ulysses kills Irus and punishes Penelope’s lovers. But,
according to another tradition, Penelope gives herself to them, like Pasiphae to
her bull (the plebeians obtain the privilege of formal weddings); andmonsters
such as Pan andMinotaur are the result of these criminal unions. Hercules fem-
inizes himself and weaves under Iole and Omphale; he pollutes himself with
the blood of Nessus, becomes mad and dies.”11
It is clear that Michelet was quite inspired to dissimulate as well as he could
such extravagances: they show how far a man of genius can go when he allows
himself to be guided by the sophisms of sufficient reason. All that is quite well
connected; originsA3 offer only, according to Vico, “incertitude and obscurity”;
it is like “a field without a master, which belongs to the first occupant;” one
must not settle for the opinions that have been expressed about the first forms
of civilization, but bring them under “scientific principles.”12
Many contemporary authors who do not have Vico’s genius have proceeded
just as cavalierly as he and have reconstructed for us quite satisfactory look-
ing primitive worlds that are quite agreeable novels … but that are, like Vico’s
Greekmythology, too reasoned to be realistic [trop raisonnés pour être vraisem-
blables]. Happily, the New Science contains theories of a | greater interest that791
this one and I have cited it only to show how the preoccupation with ideal his-
tory can be dangerous.
looking in the poems of the philosophical period for evidence about ancient customs?
This is anyway what M. Giraud-Teulon does in claiming to find in Aeschylus’Eumenides a
proof to support his matriarchal thesis. (Les origines de la famille, 1re edit. p. 238). Argu-
ments of this kind cast doubt on even the best claims.A2
11 Page 510[–511. §1076]. This fragment of the second book has been briefly analyzed sepa-
rately and put in an appendix.
12 Book I, chapter 1, p. 305 [§118].
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According to Vico’s theory, the Middle Ages ought to reproduce a second
time the course of ideal history: this opinion seemed singularly paradoxical to
the first writers who studied the New Science, and Michelet approved of Mario
Pagano for having thought that “the second barbarism had not been so like the
first as Vico seemed to think.”13 Certainly in the 18th century the feudalism of
the High Middle Ages was too little understood for it to have been possible to
establish scientific comparisons between it and old Roman institutions. This
part of Vico’s work often lacks solidity. The Neapolitan philosopher did not try
to find, in the medieval period, the reproduction of events that took place in
Rome, and he did not try to apply to the legends the strange procedures that
he had set in motion to explain Greek mythology. There is one point on which
his ideas seem to have been confirmed by contemporary research. The Middle
Ages indeed began with a return to the customs [moeurs] of primitive people:
up to the 11th century, in order to really understand things, one must look to
the customs [coutumes] of the raiding and ferocious peoples of central Africa,
or those of the redskins [Peaux-Rouges]. This return to barbarism must strike
an Italian more strongly than authors from countries where the tradition of
the Middle Ages has left so much of a mark in the most intimate elements of
modern national life. In Italy, feudalism was a sociological monstrosity.
In the New Science, Vico gives hardly any indication about the future of
Europe, but we find a curious exposition in a letter written in 1726 to Father
Vitré (S.J.).14 The genius of Europe seems exhausted. The classical studies that
were so brilliant during the Renaissance have been abandoned. Research into
law [droit] is no longer done: the experimental method is held in contempt.15
Time is given only | to composing synopses and dictionaries to replace individ- 792
13 Appendice à la vie de Vico, p. 142 [This appendix was not included in the “Discourse on the
life and system of Vico” translated in 2008 by Ashraf Noor].
14 Page 170 [see Pinton, “Four Letters,” 42–45].
15 Here the author is alluding to Cartesianswho he sees as above all responsible for the deca-
dence of scholarship. In a letter to G.L. Esperti, he appreciates I think more justly the role
of Cartesianism and says that its success has to do with the character of a “century of
supercilious superficiality, in which one wants to appear enlightened [éclairé] without
study” (p. 177) [“Four Letters,” 36–42]: Cartesian philosophy is no longer considered here
as a cause, but as an effect.
In the July 1896 number of the Revue demétaphysique et demorale, [792] one can read
excellent observations fromM. Lanson on the intimate relationship that existed between
Cartesianism and literature of the second rank in the 17th century. The remarks, full of
the wisdom of the judicious [savant] professor, confirm Vico’s views. The personal genius
of Descartes has nothing to do with all this, as Vico has said elsewhere (Discours sur le
système et la vie de Vico, p. 11, and Réponse à un Journal littéraire, p. 168).
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ual work. The world seems to return to the practices of the late Empire. From
this it is only a short step to the conclusion that the moment of a great revolu-
tion is near: but Vico does not draw the conclusion.
II
Ideal history applies very imperfectly to the reality of things, especially for the
second evolution. But not everything in this notion is of equal importance.
What seemed essential to Vico was the obligation to start with a government
of aristocratic barbarism in order to finish with a civilized monarchical gov-
ernment that would apply natural equity. This is what he called law of royalty
[loi royale], and he scolded modern interpreters of Roman law for not having
recognized it.16
He returns several times to the law of royalty and gives several explanations.
He says first: “Here is the eternal formula in which nature has conceived it:
when the citizens of a democracy no longer consider anythingmore than their
particular interests and when, to attain this goal, they turn the forces of the
nation to the ruin of the country, then a single man rises up who, making him-
self master through force of arms, takes for himself all publicmatters and leaves
to the subjects only the care of their own particular affairs. This revolution is
for the good of the people…When citizens have thus become strangers to their
own country, it is necessary that the monarchs direct and represent them.”17
Here we do not quite grasp the thought of the author, who clarifies himself—
partly—in another passage: “The free power of a State, throughwhich precisely
it is free, must in someway realize itself. Thus, all the force that the nobles lose,
the people gain, until it becomes free; all that | the free people loses goes to the793
profit of the kings, who finally acquire monarchical power. The natural right of
moralists is that of reason; the natural right of peoples [gens] is that of utility
and of force.”18
But we are still in the presence of purely idealist evolutions: simply because
we see the suitability of something, its necessity for the health of the State, it
does not necessarily follow that this suitable thing must take place. The prox-
imal cause, the real mediation through which the change takes place, escapes
us. In the first cited passage, Vico indeed says that the monarch rises through
16 Book IV, chapter 6, §2, p. 595 [§1007].
17 [§1008].
18 Book V, chapter 2, p. 626 note [§1084].
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force of arms, but we do not see why this force is effective at this particular
moment and not at another. In this second passage, he gives us arguments only
of a logical order.
The detailed explication is in the fourth chapter of book five. It is one of the
most important parts of thework, because it allows us to understand, in a com-
pleteway, the role thatVico attributes to Providence. The citizenswant tomake
use of their wealth to obtain power, they trouble the peace and push the coun-
try into anarchy. “To this frightful social ill, Providence applies the three great
remedies about which we will speak.” Monarchy establishes itself through the
force of arms and this government “is neither tranquil nor durable, if it does not
knowhow to satisfy its people through religion and natural liberty.” The second
procedure is used when “Providence does not find a remedy within, she brings
one from without.” The people, having become slave to its passions, becomes
slave of a people conquering “by the law [loi] of the right [droit] of peoples.”
But these twomethods can be replaced by an extreme remedy: “these men are
accustomed to thinking only about private interest;—they live in a profound
solitude of soul and of will. They have becomemore ferocious … through intel-
lectual [réfléchie] barbarism than they had been through that of nature.”19 Civil
wars devour the country: “the people becomeas thoughnumband stupid… the
small number of men who remain at the end, find themselves with an abun-
dance of necessary things, and become again naturally sociable; the antique
simplicity of the first ages reappears among them, they come to know again
the religion, truthfulness, and good faith that are the natural bases of justice.”
Applying these principles to the High Middle Ages, he wrote, “God permits 794
that a new order of things be born among the nations. He brings back the cus-
toms of the first age, which merit more then than before the name divine.”20
From these citations it clearly follows that the return of ideal history is amira-
cle and that the law of royalty is themanifestation of a providential will seeking
to correct men as gently as possible.
The origins of civilization show us analogous phenomena, that is to say an
ensemble of uncontested miraculous actions. History begins at the moment
when our ancestors began to think likemen,21 butwemust ask howwe can rep-
resent for ourselves these first thoughts. “In the lawless state, Providencewakes
in the soul of the most violent and the most proud a confused idea of divinity,
in order that theymight enter into social life, and that it may introduce nations
19 [§1103–1106] It must be observed here that Providence can have recourse to three quite
distinct remedies, which takes a great deal away from the regularity of ideal history.
20 Book V, chapter 1, p. 616 [§1048].
21 Book I, chapter 4, p. 358 [§377–378].
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there.”22 Frightened by lightning, certain men abandon their wandering and
begin to bridle their passions. They know “modesty, which, after religion, is the
principle tissue of societies. Thusmarriage is established, which is to say union
of the fleshmade according tomodesty andwith the fear of a god.”23 Vico finds
three survivals of this primitive process in marriage rites: “the first is that of
the auspices of Jupiter, auspices drawn from the lightning that had decided
the giants to observe them.” The second consists in the veil as a memory of
“this first movement of modesty that determined the institution of marriages.”
Finally, the Romans conserved the simulacra of the abduction [rapt], “in order
to recall the true violence with which the giants carried off the first women
into their caves.” Juno was the first divine symbol created after Jupiter. Finally,
on the basis of who knows what, the Neapolitan philosopher believes that the
primitives contented themselveswith only onewoman for life. A third progress
lead to the institution of tombs, the cause of which at first was “the need to
hide objects that shocked the senses.”24 Soon there arose universal belief | in795
the immortality of human souls. Such are the first three principles of the New
Science.
I amnot going to stop todiscuss this reconstitutionof thepastmadebyVico’s
imagination. I onlywant to call attention to the impossibility of rendering these
processes intelligible in a completewaywithout the intervention of a supernat-
ural cause. The greatmerit of the author of theNewScience seems tome to have
been here to recognize in a perfectly clear way the conditions of the problem
and not to have sought to hide the insufficiency of his theories.
Ideal history begins and ends with the miracle; but is it possible even to con-
ceive of the uniformity, more or less apparent, of the causes of events, without
the intervention of a common and superior cause? The response can hardly
be in doubt. “The New Science will be, in one of its main aspects, a civil theol-
ogy of divine Providence… the philosophers have either been entirely unaware
of Providence, or have considered it only in the order of physical things … the
NewSciencewill be, so to speak, a demonstration of the fact, a historical demon-
stration of Providence,25 because it must be the history of the decrees through
which this Providence has governed, unknown tomen and often despite them,
22 Axiom 31 [§178].
23 Book II, chapter 4, p. 436 [§504–505].
24 Book II, chapter 2, §1, p. 444 [§529. This is from a section of the text considerably reduced
by Michelet].
25 Michelet says that some authors have thought it possible to draw Vico together with the
philosophers of the 18th century and to suppose that his Christianity was purely superfi-
cial. He thinks that this is a serious error (Appendice à la vie de Vico, p. 134).
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the great state of humankind.”26 Providence employs the simplestmeans, orga-
nizes everything harmoniously, and “orders nothing that does not tend toward
a greater good thanwhatmen have proposed.” Following from these divine ori-
gins of history, “the destiny of nations has, does, and must follow the course
indicated by the New Science, even if infinite worlds are born through eternity.
In this way, the New Science traces the eternal circle of ideal history, on which
the histories of all nations turn in time, with their birth, their progress, their
decadence and their end.”
So it seems that Vico has seen the metaphysical foundation of his ideal his-
tory perfectly well, for him this is the providential principle.
III 796
The preceding observations by no means exhaust the question, for divine
action, in ancient philosophy, was understood in two ways: sometimes it cor-
responds to theWill [Volonté] acting with reflection, with motive and with an
end in view;27 other times it is only unconscious force, regulating, through a
fixed law, successive changes. Vico, like many thinkers, often confuses these
two distinct notions. He writes that “the reader experiences a divine pleasure
when he contemplates within the uniformity of divine ideas this world of nations,
across the whole breadth and variety of places and times. Thus, we have proven
by fact to the epicureans that their chance cannot wander according to the
madness of its caprice, and to stoics that their eternal chain of causes is itself
suspended in the powerful and benevolent hand of God, very great and very
good.”28
When Vico denies chance, he affirms the unilateral intelligibility of histori-
cal causes, and he affirms it without ambiguity: “Can our mind [esprit] imag-
ine causes more numerous, less numerous or other than those of which the
social world is the result?”29 He would not speak otherwise about a question
of physics. When he refers the permanence of laws to the uniformity of divine
ideas, he reproduces the ancient notion of the unchanging first mover guaran-
teeing the stability of the world.—But, at the same time, he attributes to this
mover prevision, wise and goodmotives: in this way he distances himself from
modern science and remains closed within the sphere of finalism.
26 Book I, chapter 4, p. 361 [§342].
27 Here the end is “conservation of humankind.” Book I, chapter 4, p. 361 [§341].
28 Book I, chapter 4, p. 363 [§345].
29 [§345].
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We must ask ourselves why such a discerning mind so abused Providence
in his explanations. What was said in the preceding section makes it possible,
already, partly to make sense of Vico’s motives: scientific causes are not suffi-
cient to demonstrate the historical laws he believed himself to have discovered.
But Vico’s illusion has causes of a different nature, which prevented him from
seeing the truth and rigorously criticizing these theories.
It is only in our own time that it has become really clear that moral judge-797
ments do not belong to the scientific study of institutions. These are phenom-
ena, the historian seeks to grasp fully their workings and follow their changes,
but he can judge themonly subjectively, according to ameasure that cannot be
given as scientific. Theses on progress are epiphenomenal.30 Formerly, things
were understood from a different point of view: much time was spent labelling
actions and then seeking the reason for this succession of moral phenomena.
This reason of course escaped any scientific investigation and therefore led to
the imagining of more or less supernatural causes, immanent tendencies, ideal
laws of the spirit, and so on, which is to say to the creation again and again of
idealist chimeras.
Vico took this as his starting point and, just as the harmonies of nature had
been discussed a great deal, he gave the ethical formula that dominates all the
states of humanity: this formula is remarkable because it was destined for great
success in our own time, among groups that certainly do not know the NewSci-
ence. The final chapter of Book V is given over to explaining how, from the origin
of societies, power belongs to the best, forming a natural aristocracy.A5
I said, above, how he pictured the formation of the first families, living, he
says, in a monastic way. The chiefs of the family were at once religious and
barbarians, in the grip of fanatical superstitions, like Polyphemus fearing light-
ning.31 Savageswho remained in the plains, given over to primitive promiscuity,
took refuge in strong places where the first families | lived. They worked for the798
masters who protected them: “strangers to modesty, they obeyed the men who
contented themselves for their whole lives with a companion given to them by
religion; weak and until thenwanderers, they obeyed prudentmenwho sought
30 It must not be concluded that moral valuations are epiphenomena. This is no more cor-
rect than to say that consciousness is an epiphenomenon in psychology. Without going
into details, I observe that moral valuations played a capital role in the ancient struggle
of the orders and in modern class struggle. But it is because these valuations are not sci-
entific and demonstrable that they play this role: struggle cannot be undertaken over a
mechanical theorem. Moral judgements are therefore, from a certain point of view, the
basis of all historical movement.A4
31 Book II, chapter 5, §1, p. 441,Vicoobserves that onemust be cautious abouthow the golden
age has been described by “feminized poets” [§522].
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to know the will of the gods through auspices, heroes who tamed the earth
through their labors, killing ferocious beasts and helping the weak in danger.”
The first form of the family, purely natural, had been founded on religion and
the instinct of the species.32 The second, partly civil, grew because it was useful
and held within it the principles of future servitude. Here, power belonged to
the fathers, “who had the superiority of sex, age, and virtue,” even here it was
still “the best who reigned, optimi.”
The servants were oppressed and rose up: the family leaders united in order
to form aristocratic political bodies, among which ruling senates formed and
chose the mostly powerless kings of the heroic period. Land was given over
to the plebeians, but on conditions worse than the patrician’s domains.33 The
nobles made “the public good consist in the conservation of this absolute
power that they had originally over their families and that they maintained in
the state, so that they understood theword country [patrie] in the etymological
sense that it can take of the interest of the fathers.”34
The plebeians wanted to participate in religious rites and in “political and
private rights [droits], whichwere regarded as somany dependencies of it [reli-
gion]. The zeal of the people for religion also brought it to civil society.” Here
Providence intervenes in a truly singular way: it encourages the invention of
the census, so that “industrious, economical and foresighted men … generous
and magnanimous men … the rich endowed with some virtue or some image
of virtue would be regarded as the most worthy for government, as the best.”
Finally, the lawof royalty and the need for conquest, in case of necessity, give
the government to those who are the most capable.
Two kinds of causes can easily be distinguished in this schematic picture. | 799
Inspired by Roman history, Vico derives many changes from the struggle of the
orders. However, the crude result of these struggles repelled him: power might
have been distributed by chance. So he makes Providence intervene, charged
with bringing a certain moral order to the world.
To Vico, historical reasons seem insufficient to produce this order that he
regarded as a postulate accepted by all philosophers.Wewill see the reason for
this postulate in the next section.
An ethical paradox presented itself to him from the beginning: man has
vices, these vices cannot be changed into virtues and nevertheless legislation
makes use of these bad sides of human nature.A6 “Thus from three vices, fero-
cious pride, avarice, ambition, which mislead humankind, it draws the profes-
32 Book II, chapter 5, §2, p. 445 [§554].
33 Book II, chapter 6, §1, p. 456 [§597].
34 Book II, chapter 6, §8, p. 482 [§677].
70 study on vico
sion of war, commerce, politics, inwhich courage, opulence, and thewisdomof
the Statesman are formed. Three vices able to destroy the human race produce
public happiness [félicité].”35 This seemed to him impossible to understand
without the intervention of an exterior power: “thanks to it the passions of
men—given over entirely to private interests, which could make them live in
solitude like ferocious beasts—these same passions have formed civil hierar-
chy, which maintains human society.”36
Vico’s ideas are not completely developed here. Indeed, these three vices
do not serve to constitute society, but civil hierarchy, the historical importance
of which is no doubt great, but which can be metaphysically separated from
society—in the expectation that socialismwill expel the State andcapitalism.37
We find a more advanced moment of the theory in the chapter on method.
“Men still tyrannizedby egoism followonly their own interest. Eachwanting for
himself everything useful without giving anything to his neighbor, they can-
not give to their passions the useful direction that would bring them toward
justice.” Still, man can be seen continually enlarging the circle of his preoc-
cupations: he is concerned first of all with his family, then the city, then his
country, and finally “he embraces in the same desire his own conservation and
that of humankind. In all these | circumstances, man is principally attached800
to his particular interest. It must therefore be Providence itself that maintains
him in this order of things and thatmakeshimpursue it into justice, family soci-
ety, the state and finally human society. Guided by Providence, man, unable to
attain everything useful that he desires, does obtain what hemust have, and this
is what is called the just. The dispenser of the just among men is divine justice
which, applied to worldly affairs by Providence, conserves human society.”38
But Vico goes still further and poses a great problem that still preoccupies
philosophical thought.Men very often gowhere they did not expect to. “Doubt-
less, men have themselves made the social world … but this world is nonethe-
less the product of an intelligence that often departs from the particular ends
that men have proposed for themselves, which is sometimes contrary to them,
and always superior. These limited ends are for it the means to attain more
noble ends, which assure the health of the human race on this earth. Thusmen
want to enjoy brutal pleasures, at the risk of losing the children who will be
born, and the result is the sanctity of marriages, first origin of families. The
35 Book I, chapter 4, p. 360 [Sorel’s citations on this page are disorganized. §132].
36 [Italics are Sorel’s, p. 310, §133].
37 Book II, chapter 4, p. 639 [The force of this citation is not immediately clear. It may be
incorrect, like those on either side of it. §1107–1108].
38 Axiom 7 [§341].
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fathers of the family want to abuse the paternal power that they have extended
over clients, and the city is born. Sovereign bodies of nobles want to give more
weight to their sovereignty over the plebeians and they fall under the servi-
tude of laws, which establish popular liberty. Free people want to throw off the
obstacle of the laws and they fall under the subjection of monarchs … Who
was able to do all that? It was no doubt spirit [l’esprit], because men acted
with intelligence. It was not fatality, because they acted with choice. It was
not chance, because the same actions undertaken again regularly produced the
same results.”39 There is no doubt about how to respond: this order comes from
Providence.
IV
This moral order must not, in any case, be assimilated to vulgar optimism. It is
connected to a conception that is of a very great | importance in the New Sci- 801
ence. The question is, where does law [le droit] come from?This problem is still
today far from resolved.
Vico takes it as a confirmed result of the inductions made by legal schol-
ars that “law’s reason is living, imperishable … Rights [les droits] being eternal
in the understanding, otherwise put in their ideal, and men existing in time,
rights can come to men only from God.”40 This reasoning must have appeared
rather penetrating in the past: the same question posed itself in natural science
which, it had long been thought, had to be placed outside mobility and above
human experiences.
From another direction, he puts forward an extremely productive princi-
ple that is difficult to reconcile with the previous one. He teaches us to seek
out the origins of our metaphysical constructions in the more or less empir-
ical constructions of social life,—in the same way that we find the origin
of our scientific theses in observations made in the arts by technicians. He
insists many times on the pre-existence of vulgar wisdom. He says that “the
authors of nations are earlier by more than a thousand years than the authors
of books.”41 He compares vulgar wisdom to understanding [connaissance] of
theworld through the senses and reflective wisdom [sagesse réfléchie] to intel-
39 It is not useless to observe that, indeed, this hierarchy is nothing other than that in the
quoted passage.
40 Book IV, chapter 7, §2, p. 610 [§1038].
41 Book I, chapter 4, p. 364 [§348].
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lectual understanding.42 What Aristotle said of the individual can be said of
the species: “there is nothing in the intelligence that was not previously in the
senses…The intelligence actswhen it draws fromwhat has been felt something
that does not fall within the senses.”43 It is from themore or less reflective or sci-
entific practice of life that philosophers have extracted their ideas: there must
be a realization before the ideation,which seems to us today to be isolated from
its source.
The following passage explains his way of seeing things: “If it is certain that
there were laws before there were philosophers, we must infer that the spec-
tacle of the inhabitants of Athens coming together through the act of legisla-
tion, in the idea of an equal interest that is common to all, helped Socrates to
form intelligible kinds or abstract universals, through induction, an operation
of the mind that gathers together uniform particulars able to compose a kind
by | means of their uniformity. Later Plato remarked that, in these assemblies,802
the minds of individuals, each impassioned regarding his own interest, come
together in the dispassionate idea of the common utility … Thus was prepared
the really divine definition of law that Aristotle left us: will free from passion
…Aristotle understood justice, queen of the virtues in the heart of the hero (of
philosophy), because hehad seen legal justice,which lives in the soul of the leg-
islator and the Statesman, order prudence in the Senate, courage in the armies,
temperance at the festivals, particular justice, now commutative as at the forum,
now distributive as at the public treasury. Fromwhich it results that the princi-
ples of metaphysics, logic, andmorality come from the public square of Athens.
Liberty44 makes legislation and from legislation comes philosophy.”45A7
Inspired by these ideas, the New Science seeks to determine the principles of
law. It follows the example neither of those whowant to construct law through
pure reason, nor of those who pretend to limit themselves to recognizing his-
torical facts. It reasons on institutions in order to bring out the truth, through
an operation analogous to the one described above.46 Rather than consider
42 Book II, chapter 1, §1, p. 376 [§364].
43 [§363].
44 This word is understood here in the sense of the republican State. Cf: the beginning of
Tacitus’ Annals: “libertatem et consultatum L. Brutus instituit.” Elsewhere Vico says “phi-
losophy is born in the popular republics.”
45 Book IV, chapter 7, §2 p. 608, note [§1043]. Cf. Also the note on p. 636 [§1101].
46 “philosophy contemplates reason …; philology studies acts of human freedom … Philoso-
phers have remained at the halfway mark because they have neglected to bring to their
reasoning certitude drawn from the authority of the philologists: the philologists have
fallen into the same error because they neglect to give their facts the character of truth
that they could draw from philosophical reasoning” (Axiom 10) [§138–140].
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one state [cité], the nations taken altogether are considered. “The principle
of natural law is the just in its unity, otherwise put the unity of the ideas of
humankind concerning things whose usefulness or necessity is common to
all human nature … Only Plato’s doctrine presents the just in its unity. This
philosopher thinks that as a measure of the true one must follow what seems
one, or the same to all men.”47
He defines common sense: “a judgement without reflection, shared | by a 803
whole order, by a whole people, by a whole nation, by the whole of human-
kind.”48 He then says, “the common sense of human kind is the criterion indi-
cated by Providence to the nations to determine certitude in the natural law of
peoples [des gens]. This certitude is reached by knowing the unity, the essence
of this law, to which all nations conform with diverse modifications.”49
But law [droit] is not composed of metaphysical beliefs, analogous to those
that philosophers have sometimes wanted to base on universal agreement. It
has the conditions of life for its object. To study it, one must consider what is
necessary and useful for social life.50 It therefore seems that enormous differ-
ences must appear in law from one country to another and that it must bear
the marks of all the accidents of economic life. Vico does not think that this
is so: it seems to him that there exists a remarkable uniformity in moral rules
and he does not believe that these resemblances can come from migrations.
“The natural law of peoples [gens] is born with each particular people [peu-
ple], without any of them knowing about the others. Later, on the occasion
of wars, embassies, alliances, commercial relations, this law was recognized as
common to all humankind.”51 Relations between nations were thus an influ-
ence on the period of reflective [réfléchie] thought and served to give a solid
basis to the opinion of philosophers who generalized about juridical ideas.
Nations all have a common nature, which reveals itself not only in this uni-
formity of law, but above all in the uniformity of thoughts applied to practi-
cal life. “All the things that occupy human activity in society are understood
uniformly, but expressed with so many modifications that things can be con-
sidered from diverse points of view. We see it in the proverbs: these maxims
of vulgar wisdom are understood in the same way by ancient and modern
nations.”52
47 Note to axiom 5, from the 1725 edition [First New Science, 53].
48 Axiom 12 [§142].
49 Axiom 13 [§145].
50 Axiom 11 [§141].
51 Axiom 13 [§146].
52 Axiom 22 [§161]. This doctrine has had a very great success in our own time among ethno-
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This established, let us turnback and try to get a general | idea of Vico’s juridi-804
cal concepts, startingwith the principles posed at the beginning of this section.
We have to understand how history must be ordered for law to exist in God and
for it to be knowable by us through reason applied to the practices of social life.
1st—Acts of authority must in large measure conform to law and be able to
serve as a basis for the philosopher’s inductions.53 This is why the government
can only belong to the best, to those who are most able to direct men.We thus
find the reason for the optimism that seemed so strange in the previous section.
2nd—Theexperimental foundationsof ethical sciencemust present enough
uniformity that reflective thought [pensée réfléchie] will not be in danger of
discovering contradictory moral principles [morales] once it has embraced a
sufficient quantity of facts. These contradictions in the human spirit cannot be
reconciled with the existence of law in God: it would be as though God did not
exist. In the same way that there is (for Aristotle) only one unmoving mover
assuring the eternal rigor of science, so too ethics must be able to be consti-
tuted in a rigorous way, grasping social truth—just as science grasps physical
truth.54 It must therefore be the case that there is a common nature among
peoples, a common sense, leading to a natural law of peoples.55
Thuswe become able to conceive of the necessity of an ideal historywithout805
which law would lack the foundation we require of it.
graphers who have for a long time thought that savages formed a homogenous mass,
representing primitive humanity: they mix up all the testimony of travelers, without ask-
ing why a given practice persisted here and died away there.
53 “Civil law is defined in Ulpian thus: ‘a law [droit] which is not entirely separate from the
natural law of peoples, which is not entirely the same, but which sometimes adds to it,
sometimes removes from it.’ In the part where it is the same, it is nothing other than nat-
ural law, where it is separate, it is properly civil law.” (Unité du principe et de la fin du droit
universel, p. 181) [See Keys to the New Science, 39–42, and “On the one principle and one
end of universal law,”NewVico Studies, 2003].
54 Wewill see further on that science, according toVico, does not completely penetrate phys-
ical truth; I expressed the analogy here in a modern way and therefore more clearly.
55 Vico observes elsewhere that legal scholars have toomuch separated reason and authority
“as though authority were born from caprice.” (Unité du principe… p. 182).
It is remarkable that Aristotle was so little concerned about the sovereign good in his
Ethics. Barthélémy-Saint-Hilaire does not fail to reproach him on the subject. We know
throughVico’s testimony that it was “reading Plato that woke in his spirit the first concep-
tion of an eternal ideal law, in force in the universal city [cité] which is enclosed in the
mind [pensée] of God and in the form of which are instituted all cities across time and in
all countries [pays]. Here is the Republic that Plato had to derive from his metaphysics.”
(Vie de Vico, p. 69) [In fact page 59. Fisch & Bergin, Autobiography, 122]. Vico is asserting
his originality here, which is the search for this ideal city in history.
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3rd—Philosophers do not like to admit that their systems may be incom-
plete: that is especially dangerous in moral philosophy because we are used to
thinking of morality as all of a piece, and because the idea of ethical devel-
opment is still unfamiliar to us. These preoccupations were yet more serious in
Vico’s time. It would have appeared scandalous, in that period, to cast doubt on
the possibility of knowing all the principles of morality. But because these prin-
ciples must be discovered by induction in the study of historical movement,
it must be admitted that the movement of history has already taken place in
a complete way. This justified the idea of a doubling of ideal history and the
reproduction of its earlier periods since the barbarian invasions.
4th—Practically all system-builders take their own age for the age when
humanity finished its progression and their school for the ultimate expression
of human thought. Engels wrote about Hegel: “According to all conventions,
a self-respecting philosophical system must close with some sort of absolute
truth. Also, while affirming that this absolute truth is nothing other than the
development of logic, of history itself, it sees itself forced to put an end to
this development, because it must indeed, at the end, finish the system …
The content of the Hegelian system is proclaimed absolute truth …What goes
for philosophical understanding goes for historical practice. Humanity which,
in the person of Hegel, has managed to elaborate the absolute idea, must be
advanced enough to realize this absolute idea in practice.” Engels adds that, in
the philosophy of law, Hegel was in this way led to proclaim the excellence of
the Prussian monarchy limited by the “Estates-General, old-regime style, that
FrederickWilliam III promised to his subjects” and to “demonstrate, in a spec-
ulative way, the necessity of the aristocracy.”56
Vico does not escape from this necessity, whichweighs on nearly all philoso-
phers. He understands that in his time, the great States | of Europe are monar- 806
chies.57 He sees not more than “five aristocracies, properly speaking: Venice,
Genoa, and Lucca in Italy, Ragusa in Dalmatia, and Nuremberg in Germany.
They have only a little territory.” He believed that Poland and England, which
“seem under aristocratic government” would soon be “pure monarchies.” The
most widely spread political constitution, and that of the most civilized coun-
tries, also seemed to him the most perfect. “Monarchy is the government that
most conforms to human nature, in the ages when reason is the most devel-
oped.”58
56 Ludwig Feuerbach et la fin de la philosophie classique allemande, in l’Ère nouvelle; April
1894, p. 144 [Collected works 26: 361].
57 Book V, chapter 3, p. 629 [§1092].
58 Book IV, chapter 6, p. 597 [§1009].
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It is usually objected that philosophers have an odd idea of history because
they suppose that it can be exhausted. Vico is not vulnerable to this reproach
because he teaches that this royal government, so well adapted to human
nature, cannot last and that theworldhas before it an indefinite future inwhich
other periods return.This considerationmust not be forgottenwhenevaluating
the main idea of the New Science. The conception of indefinite progress was a
problem for 18th century thought, and serious difficulties presented themselves
in the attempt tomake it intelligible.The repetitionof periods, of historical evo-
lutions, did not present the same obscurities and could be reconciled with an
indefinite age for the world—as the ancients had recognized.
5th—Finally, the special conditions in which Vico lived and the intellectual
milieu inwhich hismindwas formed,must be taken into account.Michelet has
this to sayon the subject: “Meridional Italy retains this taste for universality that
had characterized the genius of Magna Grecia. In antiquity, the Pythagorean
school had allied metaphysics and geometry, moral philosophy and politics,
music and poetry. In the 13th century, the Angel of the school [Saint Thomas
Aquinas] had covered the field of human knowledge to reconcile Aristotle’s
doctrines with those of the Church. Still in the 17th century, legal scholars in
the kingdom of Naples felt themselves alone faithful to this ancient definition
of jurisprudence: Scientia rerum divinarum atque humanarum. It was in such
a country that, for the first time, all the knowledge that had man for its object
would be united in a vast system, which brought together the history of deeds
and languages, illuminating both with a new form of critique, and which rec-
onciled philosophy with history, science with religion.”59
Superstitious respect for Roman law survived more in Italy than in other807
countries. That the natural lawof civilized peoples had to be taken into account
was learned from the Justinian Compilation. Michelet has just told us that
jurisprudence had beenmade the center of philosophical studies. Vico himself
wasdeeply influencedby thismethod, hedidnot tend to think verymuchabout
the things thatwere of greatest concern forwriters in other countries. “Hismas-
ters,” Michelet says, “were Roman legal scholars, the divine Plato, and Dante,
to whom his own melancholic and passionate character drew him. While the
whole century threw itself down the new paths that philosophy had opened,60
Vico had the courage to return to now-scorned antiquity and to identify himself
with it.”61
59 Discours sur le système et la vie de Vico, p. [11–]12 [“A Discourse,” 22].
60 Michelet judges this tendency severely: “Peoples no more than individuals can give up
their originality with impunity. The Italian genius sought to follow the philosophical
impulsion of France and England, and negated itself” [“A Discourse,” 23–24].
61 Discours sur le système et la vie de Vico, p. 12 [In fact 13–14. “A Discourse,” 23–24].
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It was therefore entirely natural that the history of the development of
Roman law occupied a place of honor in the preoccupations of a thinker raised
in this way, and subordinated to itself all questions relative to the philosophy
of history. Not only was this history well known, but it was really the history
of the spirit marching from barbarism to the light of reason and managing to
formulate the true by its own strength.62
I believe that I have said enough to show how the providential order, which
realizes itself through ideal history, is dominated by Vico’s ethical preoccupa-
tions. The moral question dominates his whole philosophy of history: modern
man must be in a position to know what is truly good.
Historians have today been pointed away from ethical theories because of
the requirements of scholarly research.Technicalnecessities havehad the same
consequences in thehuman sciences as in thephysical sciences.The chemist or
naturalist does not ask the finalist question of why, about the harmonic reason
of things and so on. He observes and he tries to discover laws. If the old philos-
ophy of nature is dead,—at least | for scientists [savants]—philosophy of his- 808
tory no longer exists for scholars: it now interests only those amateurs who do
Sociology or the authors of those thoughtful, wisely republican, and blissfully
patriotic books that the French government supports at taxpayer expense.A8
Just as science has struck finalism out of nature, so historical materialism
has eliminated the great antinomy that caused so much trouble for Vico. We
no longer have to ask how order exists despite bad tendencies, because order
exists only in our imagination. Engels, like the Neapolitan philosopher, notes
the contradiction arising between ends that people will and the things that are
accomplished, but he draws from it quite different conclusions. “The interlac-
ing of innumerable individualwills and actions in thehistorical domain creates
a state of things that is entirely analogous to that which reigns in unconscious
nature … Historical events seem also to be dominated by chance.63 If chance
does come into play on the surface, it is nonetheless governed by immanent
and hidden laws … Individual motives, however striking, are not so important
to understand as themotives that agitate the greatmasses, whole peoples, and,
within each people, whole classes.”64
62 Vico excludes the Hebrews from his study because they had supernatural assistance, as I
have already noted.
63 The word chance is here opposed to “ideal and fantastical relations that ancient phi-
losophy of nature established in order to obtain a picture of natural connections in a
systematic and approximate form, substituting for missing facts with intellectual concep-
tions, filling gaps with the aid of imagination.” (Cited article, May 1894, p. 13).
64 Cited article, May 1894, pp. 14–16 [Collected works 26: 386ff.].
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Just as in natural science the “proper succession” of things is accepted, with-
out feeling that something should be added,—in the same way it is no longer
permissible to replace the real sequence of history with some kind of law
existing in the philosopher’s head. Engels signals, forcefully, the necessity of
abandoning “in this field, as well as in that of nature, artificially constructed
relations.”
Thus ideal history has perished, overcome by the development of histori-
cal research. It is now nothing but a memory. However, the ethical problem
for which it was thought to be such a | simple and satisfying solution remains809
entirely and cannot be set aside as outmoded. In natural science as well there
is a similar sort of problem that contemporary philosophy has shown itself
equally powerless to resolve. Critique of the idea of divinity has shaken the
foundations of all knowledge that drew its certitude from the ancient idea of
“God in nature.” Science no longer seems, today, safe from contingency, the
fixed point has disappeared. It is enough to read the titles of contemporary
theses on understanding and contingency to understand how it preoccupies
reflective minds [les esprits réfléchis].A9
Neither does it seem easy to respond to those who want to know where law
[droit] finds its place in materialist conceptions of history.65 The difficulty is
the same as above: law that is immutable and rests in the divine Idea has dis-
appeared as has science possessed totally by God. Nothing is served by denying
the difficulties that result from these new principles, but this is not a reason
to revive famously incorrect doctrines. The notion of ideal history was quite
useful, but it is false. We will not return to it to give an illusory solution to an
ethical problem that is so serious and immediate. Just because we recognize its
importance we do not want to accept illusory solutions and we refuse to falsify
anything in historical reality for the sake of pedagogical decorum.
V
Before undertaking the examination of the New Science’s explicative theories,
we must return to the passage to which Marx makes allusion in Capital and
understand it precisely. Vico says that the origins of history are shrouded in
profound darkness, but that some light can be thrown on them by beginning
with this incontestable truth: “the social world is certainly the work of men; from
65 Cf. the closing observations in the curious brochure fromB. Croce “Sulla concezionemate-
rialistica della storia” [See Benedetto Croce, Historical materialism and the economics of
Karl Marx (London: Allen & Unwin, 1914)].
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which it | follows that one can, that onemust, discover its principles in themod- 810
ifications of human intelligence. This admitted, will not anyone who thinks
about it be surprised that philosophers have seriously attempted to know the
naturalworld, thatGodhasmade andwhose secret he holds, and that they have
neglected to meditate on this social world, which men can know, because it is
their creation?”66
It was this last line that Marx found so striking. He commented on it in
the following way, “technology strips naked man’s mode of action vis-à-vis
nature, the productive process of his material life and, in consequence, the ori-
gin of social relations and the ideas or intellectual conceptions that flow from
them.”67
We cannot ask Vico to take the same point of view asMarx. Economic ques-
tions were foreign to him, even though Italians in his time had already made
investigations in this order of ideas. On the other hand, he lived far from any
industrial movement and in amilieu foreign to scientific discussions. He there-
fore could not have a clear notion of the role that Marx would later attribute to
technology.
To make an exact account of Vico’s thinking, we must look to the polemic
directed against the Cartesians. Michelet strongly agrees with the arguments
of the illustrious Neapolitan and points to his originality. “Nowhere were the
abuses of the new philosophy attacked with greater strength and moderation:
the distancing from historical studies, the disdain for the common sense of
humanity, the reduction to an art of what ought to be left to individual pru-
dence, the application of the geometric method to things that were hardly sus-
ceptible to a rigorous demonstration, etc.”68 I pause over this polemic because
M. Tocco devoted an article to it in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale,
official organ of the high University of France, and this article completely and
unfortunately denatured the theories of our philosopher.69
One must certainly notice the distance that Vico put between himself and
the purely intellectualist and spiritualist arguments [thèses] that dominated
European thought at that time. This is all themore curious | because Descartes 811
had really only given form to tendencies long latent in theworld. In the scholas-
tics there are propositions like this one: intelligence has no other reason for
66 Book I, chapter 3, p. 353 [§331]. Most often Vico seems to limit his research to discovering
the origins of civilization. In any case the study of origins is the most developed part of
his book.
67 Capital, fr. trans., p. 162, col. 1, note [Capital, 493].
68 Discours sur le système et la vie de Vico, p. 14 [“A Discourse,” 24].
69 July 1896, p. 568.A10
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affirming the objectivity of its perceptions than the certain knowledge [la sci-
ence] that it has of its own nature and its own truth.When the reaction against
the philosophical systems of the Middle Ages drove cultivated minds toward
more or less mitigated Platonisms, spiritualist conceptions became dominant,
dualism quietly replaced the ancient unitary theory of man and one came to
conceive of the isolated intelligence reasoning alone on itself. Descartes was
the first to succeed in formulating a complete system of philosophy embracing
nearly the whole of the traditional encyclopedia, and presented so well that he
must have hoped to see it enthusiastically welcomed by the Catholic colleges.
The need for new theories was felt everywhere, and it seems that the Church
ought to have been happy to find such a great and skilled scholarly reformer.
Reflecting on this situation, one understands better the infinite precautions
Descartes took to avoid frightening the Catholic doctors, his professions of
faith, which have appeared to many people a little too passionate to be com-
pletely sincere, and the suppression of the book on Light after the judgement
against Galileo. Vico pointed out quite rightly why the French philosopher pre-
sented himself as such a good Catholic. He said that Descartes’ intention “was
to establishhis empire oneday in the cloisterswhere, since the 11th century, had
been Aristotle’s metaphysics.”70 To achieve this great result, it was excusable to
be diplomatic.71 The Jesuit colleges were the means through which this reform
could be most easily made. The Jesuits had been behind the trial of Galileo, so
Descartes distanced himself—with good reason—from the ideas of the Italian
physicist.
Cartesian doubt seemed toVico really a ploy. It was not | by any suchmethod812
that Descartes could have constituted his philosophy. He pretended to have
swept the whole of the past away and his partisans did not bother to read the
ancient authors, but he himself was quite knowledgeable [savant].72
This appeal to individual sentiment, this pretension to reconstruct through
personal effort what past generations built with such difficulty, seem to Vico
ways to destroy any science. Experience had shown already that among “the
Cartesians themselves, an idea that is clear and distinct for one is often obscure
and confused for another.”73
70 Vie de Vico, p. 68 [Autobiography, 130].
71 It is not easy to say why the Church has never been willing to accept Cartesian spiritu-
alism: it had, with the scholastics, corrected Aristotle with platonic spiritualism; it could
have corrected things that were too offensive, for instance relative to transubstantiation.
This question was not raised in M. Blondel’s article on “Descartes’ Christianism” in the
Revue de métaphysique et de morale, July 1896.
72 Réponse à un journal littéraire, p. 169 [Most AncientWisdom, 184–185].
73 Lettre à G.L. Esperti, p. 177 [“Four Letters,” 37].
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“Skepticism,” he says, “does not doubt that it thinks…but if it is sure of think-
ing, it maintains that this is only consciousness, and not science, nothing but
a vulgar consciousness [conscience] that belongs even to the most ignorant
… In practical life, when dealing with things of which we can give no sign, no
proof, we give the testimony of consciousness.”74We would say, today, that this
testimony of consciousness [conscience] seems to us all the more subjectively
solid the greater the mass of subconscious memories and affective tendencies
on which it draws—in a word, the more blind it is.
What preoccupiedVicowas science: the sceptics that onemeets in life agree
with everyone about matters of opinion, of belief, but they place in doubt the
results of demonstration, they agree to accept these results as long as they are
advantageous. To the Italian philosopher, this is what seemed destructive of all
scientific research.
One thing made a great impression on Vico: science was not born yesterday,
it has a history behind it, it is only in consulting this history that we can come
to know it well. It is not an object that demands personal belief or allegiance.
It interests the life of man as a species and the development of humanity. It is
not individual, it is social, we would say todayA11. “The skeptic of the state of the
social community returns man to his solitary state.”75 There is a beautiful idea
[belle pensée] that could as it stands enter into modern philosophy.
Science is the product of immense cooperative labor in which successive 813
generations have participated. It therefore does not conform to reason to ne-
glect the authority of tradition, which must rather be studied and discussed.76
Science does not at first appear as science. Later, Hegel would compare philos-
ophy to the owl of Minerva that shows itself just as night begins. Vico says, “in
the first times,menhad to find, to invent everything necessary for life.Whoever
reflects on this will find that things necessary or useful for life, and even things
that are only convenient, pleasing, or luxurious, had alreadybeendiscoveredby
the Greeks before there were philosophers … The first peoples, who represent
for us the childhood of human kind, therefore established theworld of arts. The
philosophers, who came long after and who represent old age, established the
world of sciences, which completed the system of civilization.”77 This process is
not limited to the origins of humanity. It is through art that humanity prepares
its scientific knowledge. Vico says again: “Those who have written about inven-
tors teach us that all the arts and conveniences of life, whosework has enriched
74 De l’antique sagesse de l’ Italie, chapter 1, §2, p. 225 [Most AncientWisdom, 54–55].
75 Letter of 1729 to D. Francisco Solla, p. 173 [“Four Letters,” 50].
76 Réponse à un journal littéraire, p. 168 [Most AncientWisdom, 183–184].
77 Book II, chapter 3, §6, p. 431 [§498].
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human kind, have been found either by chance, or by comparisons drawn with
animals or other parts of human industry.”78
There are many important observations to make about these texts. If arts
precede sciences and serve as their preamble, thenwemust recognize that this
chronological anteriority should be translated into metaphysics as a law pos-
ing technology as the basis of all possible ideologies. Vico does not draw this
conclusion, but we find it expressed in a very precise way in the passage from
Karl Marx mentioned at the beginning of this section.
And then, if topic precedes critique, as Vico says, if history, tradition, author-
ity, have such great importance in the formation of science through reflective
thought [pensée réfléchie], one must think that man does not place himself,
as philosophers ordinarily say, | face to face with nature, to observe and know814
it. Rather, the scientist [savant] works on amaterial that has been provided for
him by previous generations, material belonging to what we would today call
the artificial milieu. It is therefore in a milieu made by humanity that we prac-
tice induction and not in the cosmic milieu. This conclusion is much clearer
for us today that it could have been in the 18th century, which had no idea of
scientific industry, which is to say industry formed by the successive contribu-
tions of inventors, having acquired an anonymous or social character thanks to
the multiplicity and variety of combinations realized in it.79
In passing from empiricism to reasoned understanding, from practice to sci-
ence, we move only within a historical order founded on human ideas. “The
New Science proceeds by a severe analysis of thoughts about what is useful
or necessary to social life,80 which are the two natural sources of the law of
peoples. Understood in this way, the New Science is a history of human ideas,
according towhich it seems themetaphysics of the humanmindmust proceed.
If it is true that the sciences must begin from the same point as their subject,
metaphysics begins at the era in which men set themselves to thinking in a
humanway andnotwhenphilosophers begin to reflect onhumanactions.”81 At
the origin one finds a metaphysics of the imagination, connecting barbarians
and children, later on more elevated forms of reasoning appear, from the syl-
78 De l’antique sagesse de l’ Italie, chapter 7, §4, p. 272 [Most AncientWisdom, 102]. Doubtless
this is what M. Tocco is thinking of when he says that “Vico prefers to minute analysis
creative synthesis, to distinct ideas the half-light of divine intuition.” (art. cit., p. 569).
79 K. Marx says: “A critical history of technology wouldmake clear how little it was generally
the case that inventions in the 18th century were the work of single individuals.” (Capital,
p. 162, col. 1, note) [Capital, 493].
80 Compare to K.Marx’s idea about economic infrastructure. The step taken by the author of
Capital is considerable and related to the extraordinary development of modern industry
he had before him.
81 Book I, chapter 4, p. 364 [§347].
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logism (which seems quite poor to Vico) to induction from which “the English
draw such great advantage in experimental philosophy.”82 This whole opera-
tion never takes us outside the artificial milieu. Understanding perfects itself
in accordance with the law of metaphysical progression proper to the human
spirit, but it always remains social, so that today “humanity is its own work.”
This is, as Michelet says, “the watchword of the New Science.”83
This homogeneity of process allows us already to understand that science 815
must participate, like art, in the categories of invention, combination, and
action.
In Vico’s time, arithmetic and geometry were regarded as complete and per-
fect sciences. There was no clear idea of their origins in experiment and it
was believed that they had emerged fully formed from the human brain. Our
philosopher therefore says that the scientist [savant] created, without mate-
rial, abstractions forming the pure elements of mathematical science: “he con-
structs aworld of forms and of numbers that he can embrace entirely”;84—“the
human spirit contains elements of truths that it can order and harmonize and
out of the arrangement of which comes the truth that it demonstrates: it fol-
lows thatdemonstration is a creative operation and that the true is identicalwith
the made.”85
Physics seemed to Vico quite inferior to mathematics because it could not
become entirely human; “physics will be true for me when I have made it; just
as geometry is true for men because they make it.”86 As for interrogating con-
science, like Descartes, it seems to Vico entirely deceptive; “the criterion of the
true is to havemade it; in consequence the clear and distinct idea that we have
from our ownmind is not a criterion of the true; it is not even a criterion of our
own mind, because in knowing itself [se connaissant], the soul does not make
itself and since it does not make itself it does not know [sait] the way in which
it knows itself [se connaît].”87
Vico says thatGod knows the things of theworld through their causes,—this
is the traditional doctrine. Physicists cannot pretend to recreate the world, the
82 Book II, chapter 3, §6, p. 204 [Sorel gives the wrong page number: it should be page 433.
§499].
83 Avant-propos, p. 3. He adds, “social science dates from the day when this great idea was
expressed for the first time. Until then, humanity thought it owed its progress to the luck
of individual genius.” [Michelet is here quoting himself from the opening pages of his ear-
lier Histoire romaine].
84 De l’antique sagesse de l’ Italie, chapter I, §1, p. 221 [Most AncientWisdom, 50].
85 Id., chapter 3, p. 236 [65].
86 Id., chapter 7, p. 276 [104].
87 Id., chapter 1, §1, p. 221 [The quote actually appears on page 222.MostAncientWisdom, 52].
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elements are outside of them.88 It follows that Descartes’ deductive method is
only a pseudo-geometry. Opinions founded on observation must satisfy us. But
to observe, we divide what was unified. “This being, this unity, this figure, this
movement, this body, this intelligence, this will | are otherwise in God, where816
they are one, than inmanwhere they are divided.89They live in God and inman
theyaredead.”90True sciencemust be able tomodel itself on that of God,which
is composed of causes.91 “To know [Savoir],” he writes, “is to know [connaître]
the way, the form in which things are made.” This knowledge [savoir] exists
completely in mathematics, but it is missing in physics: we can nonetheless
approach it through experimentation, of which Vico has only a very imprecise
idea and which he calls an imitation of nature.92 Still he recognizes its impor-
tance and considers it the basis for ascribing superiority to certain doctrines
rather than others.
Today, we can make for ourselves a more exact idea of the conditions of sci-
ence.Weno longer see any essential differencesbetweengeometry and rational
mechanics, nor even between the latter andmathematical physics. In all these
cases we know that one begins with what is given by experience [expérience]
and obtained through induction:93 the axioms of geometry do not escape from
this universal law, which dominates all scientific research.With these elements
we construct something that really is ours, which is our creation and which, in
consequence, is at once the true and the made, as Vico says.When we conduct
an experiment [faisons une expérience],wedonot imitate nature:wemakeuse
of combinations, tools, which really are ours. We try to produce movements
which never take place in the cosmic milieu. Experimentation is therefore a
88 Id., chapter 3, p. 236 [65–66].
89 M. Tocco is wrong to say that man must reconstruct what he has divided (art. cit., p. 571).
That is quite wrong. One must construct with human elements, make human combina-
tions, in order to reach the true. It is not a matter of succeeding analysis with synthesis,
anatomy with physiology (as M. Tocco says), but of emancipating oneself from natural
conditions.
90 Id., chapter 1, §1, p. 219 [Most AncientWisdom, 49]. Here Vico says that we divideman into
body and soul and the soul into intelligence and will; this analysis of psychology is the
source of what follows.
91 Id., chapter 1, §3, p. 227 [56].
92 Id., chapter 1, §2, p. 225 and 229 [54–55 and 58].
93 Vico understands very well that geometry applies to particular questions of physics and
founded on experimental laws can be of great help: he cites the example given by Galileo
(id. chapter 7, p. 274 [103]). Today, the mathematical physics created by Galileo and our
great Pascal proceeds in the same way. The Jesuits seem still to want to persecute the
latter. The new spirit prefers Descartes: see in the above-cited number of the Revue de
métaphysique (page 488) a regrettable insult addressed by M.P. Tannery to “the author of
the Provinciales”A12
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creation,94 it belongs entirely to the artificial milieu: it is at once the made and
the true. | Experimentation differs from mathematical exposition by the same 817
difference that exists between mute language (to speak like Vico) and spoken
or written language.
In modern science, the search is always for rigorous experimental deter-
minism, with the character of an automatic machine, analogous to those that
industry presents to us. It is by the perfection of this tool [outillage] that the
value of the proposed physical law is judged. With only simple observation
at one’s disposal, nothing certain can be obtained. On this point, Vico saw
correctly: we know how phenomena develop only in cases—more and more
numerous—in which we control this development artificially. So the Italian
philosopher is therefore right to be wary of the testimony of the consciousness
[conscience]. The so-called psychological experiments undertaken with such
enthusiasmby our contemporaries have producedmore absurdities than could
be found in peasant tale-telling.95
We will never really know the cosmic world, but we must know the artifi-
cial world because we make it—on the first we can have opinions and form
hypotheses, the second gives us science. Claude BernardA14 has expressed sim-
ilar ideas, which it seems pointless to review. It is however interesting to note
how little modern thought has been able to add to Vico’s claim. The latter has
only been clarified and given precision.
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(Suite)
VI
In the previous section I presented this fundamental formula from Vico: “the
new science is a history of human ideas according to which it seems that the
metaphysics of the human mind [esprit] must proceed.” This proposition was
singularly daring in a time when psychology had not been seriously studied
and when it was believed that a great discovery had been made in basing it on
personal sentiment. It was at that time impossible to have a scientific idea of
the objective laws that Vico announced: our philosopher was himself wrong at
94 Cf. Capital, p. 16, col. 2 [Capital, 133 ff.].
95 The books written by the best-known authors (MM. Beaunis, Féré, and Binet) are full of
foolishness that is worth no more than the boasting of the spiritists.A13
96 See October issue.
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every step of his research, but great men are fortunate in that even their errors
are fertile and worth studying with care.
In the course of this study I will often make use of the principle enunciated
in §IV on the formation of philosophy under the influence of the spectacle
offered by the practice of political life. This law is of the highest importance
and awhole branch of psychology could be constitutedwith it as a foundation,
so I propose to call it Vico’s ideogenetic law. I must draw attention to a passage
in Capital in which the role of this law is indicated unmistakably. At issue is
value, and Marx asks himself why Aristotle was not able to discover the rela-
tionship that exists between value and “indistinct human labor.” The reason,
he says, is that “Greek society had as its foundation the natural inequality of
men, … | … the secret of the expression of value, the equality and equivalence907
of all labor, by virtue of being human labor, could be deciphered only when the
idea of human equality had already acquired the tenacity of a popular preju-
dice.”97 This popular prejudice belongs to the juridical order and could only be
produced through history, by the forms of civil justice and the theories of law
professors.
It would be easy to bicker with Vico over facts. He could not know Roman
history as we know it today, and above all its facts could not appear in the same
light as they do to scholars today. It would therefore be beside the point to
engage in a detailed critique of his historical expositions. I will make repeated
use here of notes taken in the course given byM. Flach at the Collège de France
on primitive institutionsA15. These lessons have dealt thus far with only a lim-
ited number of known peoples, but they already contain a number of general
observations of great interest.
Vico is not always faithful to his own method of historical observation.
Often, he contents himself with remarks belonging to superficial psychology
and applies them to the interpretation of ancient facts. He was not the last to
do so. Here, for example, is how he explains the origin of religious sentiment:
“man, not hoping for any help from nature, brings forth from his own desires
something supernatural that can save him … One observation that supports
this idea is that libertines, who grow old and begin to feel their natural strength
failing, generally become religious.”98 Obviously there is no comparison to be
made between primitive peoples and elderly 18th century libertines, who have
after all received a Christian education and live in a milieu entirely suffused
with Christianity. We know the extreme importance of the recall of abstract
97 Capital, p. 23, col. 2 [Capital, 152].
98 Book I, chapter 4, p. 359 [§339].
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formulas learned in childhood and what a decisive difference they can make
during life crises. Nothing similar could take place for beings who do not yet
think in a human way, which is the case with these primitive peoples accord-
ing to Vico’s hypothesis. They live like beasts and it is when lightning strikes for
the first time that they remark on the existence of the sky.99
Vico several times bases his reasoning on observation of the ignorant popu- 908
lation of the countryside. Doubtless, they offer certain remarkable analogies
with the half-wild tribes of old heroic Greece: “The heroes were barbarians,
proud, difficult, obstinate in their resolutions andat the same timevery change-
able. This is not contradictory. You can observe the stubbornness of our peas-
ants, givingway to the first reason given to them, but throughweakness of reflec-
tion forgetting quickly why they changed and returning to their earlier idea.”100
Here the reason for the analogy is theweakness of reflection that, indeed, exists
in both cases. But in another case quite contestable principles are derived from
amistaken comparison: “the physics of the ignorant is a vulgar metaphysics, in
which they relate the causes of phenomena that they do not understand to
the will of God, without considering the means employed by this will.”101—“In
the beginning men, still simple and coarse, in good faith divinized whatever
excited their admiration, now a virtue, now a helping power, now the goodwill
of those who had civilized them.”102 “Once our intelligence is raised in admira-
tion … curiosity, daughter of ignorance and mother of science, brings us to ask:
what does this phenomena mean?”103
Do we really see, among primitive peoples, this psychology of the ignorant
having received the rudiments of religious philosophy living side by side with
the scientist? Vico supposes that savages already have very developed ideas
about religion, and one cannot attribute such ideas to beings he represents as
analogous to animals.
Curiosity is not only the daughter of ignorance. It supposes a whole body of
acquired knowledge perhaps in the scientific realm or perhaps rather in that of
the imagination. Hegel is right when he says, speaking about primitives: “Here
we have | man with his own immediate strength [force], with his desires, with 909
99 Book II, chapter 2, §1, p. 383 [§377]. Vico supposes that for a long time the earth was
too humid for storms to take place. This bestial state would [908] have lasted a century
after the universal flood and would have been a degeneration provoked by their savage
life (axiom 42) [§195].
100 Book II, chapter 7, §3, p. 490 [§708]. There is a similar comparison in Aristotle. (Politique,
book II, chapter 5, §12) [Politics, 48–49].
101 Axiom 33 [§182].
102 Axiom 38 [§188].
103 Axiom 39 [§189].
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activity and the immediate relations of his will. Man does not yet ask himself
theoretical questions such as: what did that, etc.? He does not yet distinguish
in objects what is essential, causal, caused, and the effect.”104
Muchmore frequentlyVico compares historical development to the individ-
ual development of man. This is a very old idea, which draws the Neapolitan
philosopher into singular errors. It seems to him evident that the primitive
world must reproduce the characteristics that we see today in children.
“It is usual for children in their games to take inanimate things and to speak
to them like living persons. Men of the youthful world [monde enfant] must
naturally be sublime poets” because “the most sublime effect of poetry is to
animate and impassion insensible things.”105 But why do children not make
sublime poetic combinations?Who teaches them to address inanimate things
in an imagistic language? Is this not something learned, like all contemporary
language?
It can be admitted, to some degree, that primitives, like children, transport
“the idea and the name of the first things that they see to all the things that
resemble them.”106 Indeed, it can be seen that there is a common cause here:
both have at their disposal only a very imperfect verbalmechanism and take no
interest in the differentiations that scientific understanding will reveal later.107
Some comparisons are less satisfying: “In childhood, memory is very strong;
also the imagination is excessively lively, for imagination is nothing other
than memory with extension or composition. And that is why we find such
a strikingly true character in the poetic images that the world formed in its
youth.”108—“Children have a great capacity to imitate. Everything that they
can already understand, they like to imitate. When | the world was young,910
there were only poetic peoples. Poetry is nothing but imitation … all the arts
… were discovered in the poetic eras …; arts are only imitations of nature,109 a
real poetry, if I dare say it.”110—“Languages must have begun in monosyllables.
104 Philosophie de la religion, fr. trans., vol. II, p. 53 [Lectures on religion, 224–225].A16
105 Axiom 37 [§186].
106 Axioms 48 and 49 [§§206–210].
107 Vico nonetheless seems here to separate better than in other cases the primitive and the
child, because he speaks of the first in axiom 49 and the second in axiom 48.
108 Axiom 50 [§211].
109 Vico does not explain what imitation is. When he speaks of men, he understands by it
adaptation to human needs, which is something quite different from imitation proper,
which children do. M. Flach says, “Nothing is done through imitation, but through trans-
formation” (Lesson of March 11, 1896). On the difference that exists between tools of
human technique and natural origins, see Reuleaux (Cinématique, fr. trans., p. 554) [Reu-
leaux, Kinematics of machinery, 525–526].A17
110 Axiom 52 [§217].
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Still today, with such a capacity to learn articulated languages, children, whose
organs are so flexible, always begin in this way.”111
Psychological analogies of the sort discussed thus far sin by omitting the his-
torical conditions of development.Although it is always dangerous topass from
biology to sociology, it is not useless to recall here that an analogous question
played an important role in zoological discussions. As is well known, parallels
have been established between phylogenetic development and the develop-
ment of the embryo, and it has been claimed that the latter reproduces the
whole chain of ancestral species. F. Müller has observed that historical docu-
ments are often erased because the embryonic process takes a short cut, and
often falsified because of adaptation to conditions during the existence of the
larvaA18. Savage peoples have a history, which appears much more compli-
cated than had been understood before, and they have engaged in a variety
of different struggles. This history and these struggles are manifest today in
psychological consequences observed by travelers who have a difficult time
understanding mental states and ways of reasoning so different from our own.
These difficulties would be in large measure overcome by taking on board the
principles of historical materialism, and by not always assuming, in an uncon-
scious way, that man is nonetheless always identical to himself, and that his
system of ideas is independent of the particular needs and wants that result
from his way of life.
Real psychological laws do not bring together things of different kinds,
betweenwhich no apparent link can be | grasped: coincidences, analogies, can- 911
not constitute scientific laws. In many cases, psychology can easily determine
the diverse aspects of a consistent group of states of consciousness through
observationsmade here and there. Thus Vico can say: “Oncemen have allowed
their soul to be overcome by a superstition full of terrors, they connect back to
it everything that they can themselves imagine, see, or do.”112
Butwhatmost characterizes psychology is the existence of lawsof sequences,
which define the evolution of states through which the mind [l’esprit] passes
in a uniform way, going from affective and unreasoned origins to intelligible
and scientific developments. M. Ribot’s most recent book on the sentiments is
largely given over to a description of these transformations, which are of great
importance and to which Vico continuously calls attention when he speaks to
us about divine, heroic, and human states.A19 There is considerable difference
between the modern point of view and Vico’s. He believed that psychological
evolution took place in one mass, across the whole of society and developed
111 Axiom 60 [§231].
112 Axiom 34 [§183].
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exactly as the history of the peoples themselves. Once complete, it could not
be reproduced unless history itself began again. Today we see things quite dif-
ferently: psychological evolutions are sequences with their own existence and
autonomy, arising in any era,mixing in society in themost confusedway. Rather
than a homogenous bloc, we have an interlacing of evolutions, which cannot
be brought under any general definition because at any given instant we find
them at all moments in their development. But economic conditions, social
relations, all the historical complexes act on these evolutions to favor certain
developments.
This analysis of history is of the first importance for interpreting facts
according to the doctrine of historical materialism. Indeed it seems on first
view that in abandoning the idealist viewpoint, one suppresses any possible
science. If there are only facts, which can be known only in an empirical way,
we might well ask what interest the spirit [l’ esprit] could have in these moun-
tains of historical atoms. This is why Véra sees idealism | as an obvious neces-912
sity.113 And it is for the same reason that according toM. Jaurès everyone agrees
that the movement of humanity has a determined direction.114 No doubt in
this way history can be made intelligible, but it is also—and this is of some
importance—falsified.
Vico saw very well that events had to be combined: he saw very well that
they have to be assembled, according to what is concrete and living, according
to what is human, which is to say the laws of psychology. That he did not suc-
ceed in his attempt is not important, his glory is secured by having recognized
that history has an identity of substance.115 Of course he did not understand this
identity of substance exactly as do the moderns; but it was not yet possible for
him to take, in the first half of the 18th century, the path thatMarx would point
out in the middle of the next century, a path that even today is little traveled
and ill-defined.
In his response to criticism made against him in the acta eruditorum, Vico
says that the essential object of his research is the common nature of nations,
but he does not say what makes this unity.116 At the beginning of the fourth
book, he sets out the tripartite division that he adopts for the exposition of his-
toricalmovements: “These three sorts [sortes] of unities of kind [espèces], with
many others which follow from them, themselves make up a general unity of
religion honoring Providence. There is the unity of spirit which gives form and
113 Philosophie de la religion, Hegel, translation: introduction to the second volume, p. cv.A20
114 Idéalisme de l’histoire (Jeunesse socialiste, jan 1895 p. 20). [Jaurès, Rallumer tous les soleils,
238].
115 Book V, chapter 3, p. 631 [§1096].
116 Notae in acta eruditorum Lipsiensia, p. 202 [See Verene, “Vico’s reply,” 151].
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life to the social world.” In the last chapter of Book Five, he returns to this point
and says, “the first governments, founded on belief in Providence, had religion
for their entire form, and it was the only basis for the state of the family. Reli-
gion was still the principal foundation of heroic governments … If religion is
lost among peoples, they have no way left to live in society. They lose at once
the connection, the foundations, the defense of the social state, the very form
of the people, without which they cannot subsist.”117
It was natural that Vico would place religious ideas at the first rank because 913
it is in religion that the autonomous existence of psychological causes appears
most clearly.118 Today we can raise ourselves to a more general point of view,
and include in this historical substance the whole breadth of manifestations
of human activities, in as much as they are related to the laws proper to the
development of the spirit [l’ esprit]. Among all the various succeeding facts, we
finally find a human connection that gives them a true fundamental unity, hid-
den from the eyes of the superficial observer.
No doubt we have once more lost the hope of unifying things according to
abstract formulas, of constituting a historical science analogous to some one of
the physical sciences. Yet this negative result is a guarantee for us of the value of
the considerations proper to historical materialism. Rather than a false unity,
we have found the concrete and living unity of man obliged to follow certain
paths, always the same, to raise himself to intellectual understanding and to
renewhis history constantly without ever exhausting it.119We know, today, that
historical laws do not translate the effect of a cause, but give a false unity to
an infinite complexity of causes: what they describe never takes place again
and never has taken place, because in order to reproduce such complex com-
binations, whose coincidence is so accidental, is completely improbable. We
no longer seek unity in the immanent tendencies of man, imagined | in order to 914
117 Book V, chapter 4, p. 641 [§1109]. Vico calls civil institutions materials [matériaux]: “reli-
gions, languages, lands, marriages, proper names and weapons or emblems, finally the
magistracies and laws.” These materials already exist before political organization, as
things proper to the individual (book II, chapter 4, §5, p. 467) [§630], it is in considera-
tion of the passage from the individual to the social that they are considered as matter
[matières].
118 It is even possible to observe today that religions reproduce in a particularly striking way
the evolutions that bringman from affective to intellectual life. Onemay say that any psy-
chological phenomena is above all visible in the religious domain.
119 I have already mentioned Vico’s particular position on progress. Michelet says that, in
the first edition, our author had “hoped for humanity a stationary perfection. This idea,
that so many other philosophers would repeat, does not return in the following editions.”
(Discours p. 18 [“A Discourse,” note 7, 48].) This remark is significant. It shows that Vico
understood the innovative character of the doctrine that would produce the New Science.
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give shape to the appearances of history, but in psychological evolutions,which
are hidden under the cover of historical laws.
VII
Two categories must be carefully distinguished from one another in the expli-
cations thatVico gives of the development of the human spirit [l’ esprit]. Some-
times he begins with his ideal history and arranges psychological phenomena
in accordance with his assumptions;—other times he takes as starting point
empirically and historically observed facts, and he tried to make sense of their
causes. Finally, he sometimes fills in his research with remarks about the states
of mind that he recognizes in his contemporaries: such attempts are not the
most successful and I have already pointed out several mediocre examples in
the above section.
When the evolutions are related to divisions in ideal history, they are not
very precise because these divisions sometimes extend for inordinate lengths
of time.The first period (divine) corresponds to theGreek golden age and to the
Latin age of Saturn; the second (heroic) is characterized by Hercules, Orpheus
and other “ideal types of the founders of societies and theological poets;” the
third dates in Greece from the first Olympiad.120
I begin with the examination of the sentiments. This part is, certainly, the
easiest and that in which modern psychology can give us the most helpful
information;—in any caseVico recognized verywell that the “principles of ideal
history” consist in the study of transformations in sentiments. The Neapolitan
philosopher must have been lead to this point of view by the moral considera-
tions that were so important for him. “Governments,” he says, “must be in con-
formity with the nature of those who are governed. From which it results that
the school of princes is the science of the customs [moeurs] of the people.”121
He does not examine the evolution of sentiments in a purely psychological
way. He does not ask how they unfold in all normal development conditions,
which | would be the proper object of a science of the spirit [l’ esprit]. He exam-915
ines the sentiments as he finds them (or believes that he finds them) in typical
history. And he does not propose to distinguish between psychological laws,
which produce (or tend to produce) uniformdevelopments, and the social con-
ditions that accelerate, slow, limit, or snuff out growths that are too weak. As
noted above, historical documents are often falsified: this is true above all for
120 Book I, chapter 1, pp. 296–300 [§61–95].
121 Axiom 69 [§246–247].
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sentiments. If we can consider their evolution as regulating “the principles of
ideal history” it is above all because they represent perfectly the whole group
of internal movements that remain obscure and sometimes elusive for the his-
torian so preoccupied by events.
M. Caird has observed that there has beenmuch confusion about the role of
metaphysics: metaphysicians have less invented than put into form and given
a methodical exposition of ideas that exist in their milieu. “What is really due
tometaphysics is not the error, it is rather this clarity and determination in the
expression of the error, which is in fact the refutation of the error and which
makes possible a higher point of view.”122 The idea becomes therefore not the
first mover, but the final product of a given civilization.
We can say something analogous about sentiments. They mark, sometimes
with infinite delicacy, the states through which a people passes.123 They pro-
vide excellent explications for the movements and resolutions of individuals.
But they must, in turn, be connected to the general conditions of existence.
Sentiments do not make themselves, and it is difficult if not impossible to act
on them through education, in an effective and durable way, if social relations
are not favorable to their unfolding.A21
Vico’s theories are not always satisfactory from this point | of view. The dif- 916
ferent sentiments succeed one another in an artificial order and are detached
from their historical lineage. But it seems to me that the Neapolitan philoso-
pher is still quite superior to ourmodern authors, who ponder abstract man by
enclosing him in a skeleton of vaporized sentiments. Sociology has retreated a
long way.
In a lecture on idealism in history, M. Jaurès details for us one of his socio-
logical conceptions in which sentiments are considered with as little reality as
possible. “What was cannibalism?” he says, “It was doubly contradictory: for in
obliging man to kill man even outside the excitation of combat, it did violence
[to] the first sentiment of sympathy:moral contradiction. Andmore, it made of
man, who has a certain aptitude for regular labor, production, a sort of beast of
prey whose flesh only was useful: economic contradiction. It follows that slav-
ery had to be born, because the domestication of man wounded the instinct
122 CitedbyM.Fouillée (Lemovementpositiviste et la conception sociologiquedumondep. 270).
123 This delicacy of measure has serious consequences: it is not possible to attribute a uniform
sentimental character to a long period, as Vico does. This denatures the procedure—
otherwise so precise—that had been adopted to characterize phenomena. Vico’s error
is all themore excusable because historians have continued to follow the same procedure
and to speak about sentiments in a vague way. I think, however, that in order to arrive at
really scientific precision, to the naming of sentiments must be added an exposition of
the principle economic conditions.
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of sympathy less and was more in the master’s interest, in drawing from man,
through labor, much more than his substance could give.”124
It would be useless to ask for historical proof in support of such a poetic
conception.125 The instinct of sympathy and the aptitude for labor are not the
motors of man: these things exist only for reflective thought, for the scientist.
Moral contradictions bother only the philosopher, economic contradictions
appear only to the economist and, as Vico says, such thinkers came only long
after the formation of the classical institutions.
Let us pass now to examine the principles of ideal history:126 axiom 66 is
conceived thus: “Men feel first the necessary, then pay attention to the use-
ful, then seek out the convenient. Later they love pleasure, abandon themselves
to luxury, and come finally to be tormented by their wealth” [§241]. In our
societies, which are developed and divided into classes, these phenomena
do not present themselves in an ordered succession, but | are found all at917
the same time. The sequence must be rediscovered in the history of a given
class.
Inwealthy classes, luxury and evenwaste,whichVico describes in terms bor-
rowed from Sallust, appear well before the needs of hygiene and even comfort
make themselves felt.127 Apologists of capitalism often observe that the worker
(in certain places at least) has at his disposition conveniences in everyday life
that were unknown to even persons of importance a century ago. Property in
bodies finally disappeared in France in the grand siècle [17th century]. Urban
hygiene could not be improved until the terror of epidemics overcame old
habits. As for domestic hygiene, some time yet will be required before it is
widely practiced.
In this way Vico was able, it seemed to him, to appeal usefully to phenom-
ena that could easily be observed in children and peasants. Both, through lack
of reflection and foresight are drawn above all to luxuries and to spend on fes-
tival days without counting. Here sentiments aroused by economic relations
must be brought to bear. The peasant, like the savage, in the past did not know
how to count. He had only a confused idea of the conditions of production.
He did not compare the troubles he brought on himself with the satisfactions
of the foolish self-regard [amour-propre] that led him to drink his wine. The
124 Loc. cit., p. 24. Certainly orators’ texts cannot be the basis for scientific discussion. I would
not cite this passage if the scholastic form given to the exposition did not indicate the
author’s clear intention to affirmdoctrine: this is not a simple resort tometaphor, asmight
result from a quick reading.
125 To speak of constraints exerted on human instincts by a sociological entity requires a sin-
gularly mythological conception of history.
126 Axiom 68 [§243–245] will be discussed separately at paragraph IX.
127 Divitias suas trahunt, vexant [Sallust, Bellum catilinarium, 20].
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development of markets insinuated the idea of value everywhere: the transfor-
mation has been greatest in countrieswhere agriculture ismixedwith industry,
because the wage regime puts the peasant-worker in the presence of two cate-
gories of price and labor time and presents them to him in a profound union.
But this is only one element of the question: progress in understanding of
value, in calculating bills, hardly constitutes more than formal progress. There
has been a series of transformations of different sorts that have eliminated, in
part, the peasant stupidity that appears so starkly in the taste for trials, the rapid
destruction of what has been constructed with such difficulty, the barbarous
egoism of the master of the house, and many other attractive qualities lauded
by themoralistic and conservative writers. These changes cannot be explained
by psychology. They derive, as everyone | understands, fromnewways of living. 918
And these are intimately connected to contemporary conditions of production.
Among these conditions the first andmost important to highlight is the clearly
understood possibility of improving the family budget by the intensification
of labor,—abandoning routines and the desire to pursue new methods prac-
ticed by progressive cultivators,—the requirement of better appreciating the
role of each particular enterprise,—greater care given to maintaining special-
ized tools,—the habit of workingmore quickly and of combining kinds of work
in order to reduce wasted time during the day.
Thanks to all these changes a more intimate union than could have existed
beforewas formedbetweenmanand theproducts of his labor.128 In thepassage
through commercial production, man came to understand better the useful-
ness of different things. Different moments of this process ought to be put in
place of Vico’s formula, certainly a greatmany typeswould have to be identified
in order to look into the question carefully.
Axiom 67 is a little more satisfying than the previous one: “the character
of peoples is first cruel, then severe, then gentle and benevolent, then friend
to study, finally dissolute.”129 Manifestly, the first three states form a homoge-
nous sequence, but the other two are here only in order to embrace the whole
of Roman history in one schema. It is, anyway, quite difficult to say exactly
what is meant by the character of a people: sometimes it means what is most
widespread, sometimes what exerts the most influence on institutions.
128 This is a point that has not always been taken sufficiently into consideration in discussions
around historical materialism and the influence of the economy. Changes in armaments
have often exercised a decisive influence in the course of history, in periods when the
instruments of labor were stationary, and such changes must be taken into consideration
as progress in dominant tools.
129 [§242. Michelet has given “ami de la recherche,” which is translated here, whereas the
Italian has “dilicata,” i.e. delicate].
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Certainly, a taste for study and dissolution can be discovered in civilizations
that are not very advanced in cultural terms andwhose customs have remained
rather primitive. These two characteristics ought to be examinedmore closely,
because eroticism has played a very considerable role in history and eroticism
can take many forms. On the subject of sexual relations in antiquity, | Vico919
makes two very important remarks: “Achilles, who cried out so loudly about
having Briseis taken from him, and whose anger was enough to fill the Iliad,
does not show even once in the whole poem a sentiment of love; Menelaus,
who armed all of Greece against Troy to reconquer Helen, does not give, in
the course of this long war, the least sign of being tormented by love or of jeal-
ousy.”130
The study of eroticism is all the more interesting for social science because
this sentiment seems the most to escape political and economic influences:
partisans of the doctrine of races do not fail to claim this as evidence that
history can be deeply influenced by innate sentiments. For instance, the sen-
suality of the Semitic races has often been called up as evidence.131 Yet it must
be said that social conditions exert a considerable influence on eroticism, as
Aristotle recognized. He pointed to the enormous influence that women could
have on men when the latter are exclusively warriors, as in Sparta.132 This
investigation into sexual pleasures is far from necessarily leading to what Vico
calls, “gallant heroism of themoderns,” to which he opposes Homeric manners
[moeurs]. A famous passage in Aristotle tells us that the primitive Greeks were
always armed and sold their women, which does not indicate very great jeal-
ousy among the warriors.133 But this question is much too complicated to be
treated here.
VIII
The softening of manners [l’adoucissement des moeurs] described in axiom
67 constitutes one of the most important and difficult questions of social sci-
ence. Vico returns to it frequently, but he does not succeed in really explain-
ing its process, or the process that leads to this result. Indeed a number of
observations suggest that the softening of manners has a great number of
causes.
130 Book II, chapter 7, §3, p. 491 [§708].
131 M. Flach, lesson at the Collège de France, 20 May 1896.
132 Politique, book II, chapter 6, §6 [p. 95. Politics, 50].
133 Politique, book II, chapter 5, §12 [p. 90. Politics, 48–49].
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The cruelty of primitive peoples is first of all connected | to superstition 920
that fills the soul with terror.134 Our author observes that this cruelty subsists
in more recent times in the mysteries of magicians. He thinks that this is an
example of a really constant law because the practice of human sacrifice has
existed in all countries, so that it could not have been transmitted between
them but must have arisen in a spontaneous way.135 The question is certainly
more complicated. It can be admitted that terror renders people ferocious; this
is awell-established fact, but still difficult to explain;—as far as the immolation
of human victims, this is a practice that could have arisen fromdifferent causes
in different places.136
Magical superstitions do not necessarily contain a religious element, in the
proper sense of these terms. Hegel recognized this very well, and today it is
broadly admitted that magic contains within itself the germs of science just as
much as of religion.137 The magician may be ancestor more to the doctor than
the priest.
In our own time, superstitions have not disappeared. Far from it. But they no
longer exercise so direct and overwhelming an influence on institutions. There
are at least two exceptions to notice. I’ve already spoken about the considerable
action produced by fear of epidemics: scientists [savants] too often exploit the
terror people feel just as brazenly as African fetish-priests. But those charged
withmaintaining public hygiene, in almost all the large European countries, try
to calm this terror and make use of it. We can follow there a curious evolution.
It is understood generally that hygiene involves many superstitions, that archi-
scientific treatment is not exempt from ridiculous snobbism, but the super-
stitions and foolishness are differently managed than before. They are used,
at least in part, to give us confidence in | provisional improvements that we 921
might have hesitated to adopt after a full critical investigation. In this way, for
instance, huge public works have been executed in order to bring water into
large cities—even while received theories about the influence of bad water
were based at least as much on legend as demonstrable fact. The result was
on the whole good, and this is all that can be asked.
134 Axiom 40 [§190–191].
135 Book II, chapter 4, p. 438 [§517].
136 Ethnographers have often gone wrong in thinking that a custom [usage] is all the more
primitive when we find it more horrible. Vico falls into this error as do many moderns on
the subject of cannibalism. M. Flach has shown that cannibalism, when well established,
can easily be reconciled with institutional development that is not found in peoples prac-
ticing cannibalism in an only intermittent way (Lesson of March 18, 1896).
137 [Hegel] Philosophie de la religion, fr. trans., book II, p. 80.
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Patriotic superstitions seem no less important than the above [medical
ones]. They set themselves up against the at least equally strong softening
of manners [l’adoucissement des moeurs] by provoking mad terrors. We are
especially sensible to fear of treason and this foolishness has led to many
crimes. There are few stupidities so great as believing that there could be secret
weapons or mysterious formulas. The scientists [savants] who ought to be the
first to combat these errors, propagate them in order to prop up their own pres-
tige. It is not too clear to me what of value can come from these superstitions
from time to time surging up with a savagery worthy of cannibals.A22
Vico relates the atrocity of heroic wars to religious ideas: “the vanquished
are regarded as men without Gods and lose not only civil liberty, but natural
liberty.”138 This reasoning does not seem able to explain the cruelty of theMid-
dle Ages, any more than the great massacres performed in the philosophical
era by the Greeks in their civil wars and by the Romans. In our time, we have
seen atrocitiesworthy of themost distant past return in our civil wars and espe-
cially executions done in cold blood, after combat, ordered bymen accustomed
to civilized life.139
The transformation of familial customs is not easy to explain | and its influ-922
ence is enormous across modern civilization. Vico is not wrong about the early
role of woman. He sees her everywherewith the barbarians a slave and thought
as a necessary instrument for having children. He attributes the liberation of
women to the constitution of the dowry: “it buys liberty from the husband and
obtains from him a public declaration that he is unable to support the bur-
den of marriage. This is perhaps the origin of the significant privileges the
emperors gave to dowries.”140 As an explanation of the dowry, this is more
than contestable; but what interests us here is the juridical effect of the con-
tract, not its subjective side. Vico was quite right to connect the importance
taken on bywomen inmarriage to a property regime. Failing to take account of
the economic side of things has made it difficult to explain the importance of
138 Book II, chapter 6, §8, p. 481 [§676].
139 In colonial wars, the European becomes a barbarian for other reasons. The very strong
tendency of the European to imitate the customs [les moeurs] of the barbarians that he
is supposedly civilizing is quite well attested. In the first phase of the wars in Africa our
officers conducted themselves just as Turkish officers would have. This phenomenon is
not so easily explained by well-known psychological theories. The cruelty of the Euro-
peans has to do in part with fear: they are few and riven with fear of being destroyed
by their enemies. Their ferocity frees them of dangerous men and augments their pres-
tige.
140 Book II, chapter 6, p. 481 [§671].
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women in certain countries.141M.Giraud-Teulon thus associateswith problems
in the past something that is, often, a juridical development with economic
causes.
There are here two really singular opinions on the family:
1) Wills [les testaments] would have been favored by democratic govern-
ments in order to divide up fortunes.142 However, their effect is often the
reverse, and Aristotle objected already to the inconveniences of wills and
gifts [donations entre-vifs] in Sparta.143 Thanks to the great liberty pro-
vided by the law, property was divided up in too disproportionate of a
way. It is, anyway, impossible that a liberty can produce anything at all on
its own; accountmust bemade of individual sentiments andmotives. The
will [testament] can lead to very different effects.
2) Vico, observing that inHomer bastards can inherit the throne, thinks that
in the time when the Homeric poems were composed, “heroic law had
fallen into disuse in Greece, and its place taken by popular law” more
favorable to simple blood relations.144 It is easy to see that the accession
of bastards to political dignity is | frequent among primitive peoples. The 923
same things often happened in the Italian tyrannies.
Paternal tenderness is connected to a political and social cause: the cruel edu-
cation of the heroic era145 had been a survival from primitive barbarism, but
“when power passed from nobles to the people, plebeians, who took their
wealth and power to consist entirely in the multitude of their sons, began to
feel paternal tenderness. This sentiment had been unknown to the plebeians
who lived alongside the heroes and who raised sons only to see them become
slaves of the nobles.”146 A little later he says, “democracies have goodwill to the
sons, monarchies wish that fathers be busied with love of their children,” and
he thinks that emperors “show themselves favorable to the rights of human
nature” because the brilliance of nobility casts them in shadow. These explica-
tions will appear to everyone superficial and too artificial.
141 M. Flach, lessons at the Collège de France, 29 April 1896 on the Beni-Amer, according to
M. [Werner]Münzinger,—27May 1896 on Egypt and particularly contracts after the VIIth
century.
142 Book IV, chapter 5, §2, p. 586 [§994].
143 Politique, Book II, chapter 6, §10 [p. 97. Politics, 51].
144 Book III, chapter 3, p. 525 [§802].
145 It is not clear why. Nonetheless it is worth remarking that indeed education is almost
always behind themanners [moeurs] and institutions of thewider country: corporal pun-
ishments have persisted with deplorable cruelty even while social relations have become
refined.
146 Book IV, chapter 5, §2, p. 586 [§994].
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The fact in itself is correct and easy to verify in our contemporary societies:
the expansion of democratic ideas leads to a softening of family customs [cou-
tumes]. Aristotle, who lived in a country in which democracy had advanced
a good deal, regarded the authority of the father as founded on affection and
age.147 He did not see children as beings abandoned to the whim of the head of
the family, but as future members of the State, who must be raised in order to
take the places of their parents.148 Democratic relations are incompatible with
rigid paternal power.149
According to the Neapolitan philosopher, progress in manners [moeurs]
comes from plebeian families. In our own time, we see | an analogous phe-924
nomenon: relative freedom of family members developed first of all in the
middling sections [couches] of the population, in which there was no reason
to maintain aristocratic traditions. The upper levels of the Third Estate had
imitated the customs [moeurs] of noble families and shaped their ideas about
justice according to the habits that they saw above them. Vico tried to show
how the legal rules in force between patricians were a model for the Roman
plebeians in constituting their own families as property.150 We would not say
that it is an imitation, but we see there an application of Vico’s ideogenetic law,
to which we must have recourse in order to understand how ideas are formed
and how they are born out of existing forms. The families of commoners in
France were transformed when they no longer sought to raise themselves up
to the rank of nobility and had lost any reason for considering noble manners
[moeurs] as perfect ones.151
Today, the proletariat finds itself knocked back and forth between two op-
posed tendencies. Some of its members try tomake themselves bourgeois, and
to raise themselves as did the ancestors of the present bourgeois. Others, on the
147 Politique, book I, chapter 5, §2 [Politics, 28].
148 Politique, book I, chapter 5, §11 and book IV, chapter 14, §2 [Politics, 30 and 190].
149 It is probably for this reason that it has been easier to gain recognition for the rights of the
child in our contemporary legislation than for the rights of married women. It is under-
stood that there are certain things that cannot be allowed to happen to future citizens and
that there are certain obligations to impose on parents regarding their instruction.
150 Book II, chapter 6, §1, p. 457 [§598].
151 I find a curious example of what is called the strong manners [moeurs fortes] of the past
in the Mémoires de M. Jaume, published by M.Ph. Torreilles in 1894. The author was pro-
fessor of law at the University of Perpignan: he tells how his grandfather, procurer of the
sovereign council of Roussillon, raised with his legitimate children an illegitimate child
[enfant adultérin], who he imposed on his wife and who was expelled from the house on
the death of the head of the family. This childwas entered, under the auspices of his father
and with his name, into the order of the procurers (Introduction, p. xiii). Many analogous
examples could be found in the old French bourgeoisie.A23
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contrary, full of the feeling of their own class, emancipate themselves from the
ideas and prejudices of the higher reaches of society. For proletarians, the con-
ceptionof the family is quite other than among thenobles and it does not entail
paternal authority. It is closer to the peripatetic idea. The division of labor is
physiological and engenders sentiments of affection that have no relationship
with those that tradition has taught us to consider fundamental.When the pro-
letariat is strong enough, its habits will shape ideas about justice, which will be
consecrated in the Code. It is already clear that the free union [union libre]
will not fail | to exert a considerable influence on legislation andwill transform 925
juridical relations with the family.
Contrary to a generally received opinion, I believe that the constitution of
the family (influenced by political life) must be said to be the principle source
of our moral ideas. This would be a second ideogenetic law whose importance
would be no less great than the one Vico set out. This theory reduces to noth-
ing the pretension of moralists who want to found social reform on individual
improvement: this improvement can come only from general causes, forms
constituted in daily practice. Vico did not fail to notice the influence of laws
regulating family relations, but he does not seem to me to have had a suffi-
ciently broad understanding of their external importance, of their reflection
onto all of moral life.
Our century has seen a considerable transformation in penalties. The soft-
ening of punishments is a phenomena that seems to take place automatically
across the world, but it is not easy to make sense of it, or even to pose the
question correctly. Vico is far from having treated the question fully. He does
emphasize the brutality of old Roman laws, but he does not follow the changes
in modern times.152 He does not speak about the cruel inventions of Italian
criminal lawyers during the Renaissance. He says nothing at all about what
happens in the law courts of his own time. For causes, he looks to new political
forms, but in a confused way. Human judgements “are dictated by a sort of nat-
ural shame, respect for those like us, which accompanies enlightenment.153They
[judgments] fit the spirit of openness that characterizes the popular republics
… They fit even better the generous spirit of the monarchs.”154—“Punishments
are made gentler under democracies. The weakness of the multitude renders
it more compassionate. Finally, in monarchies, the princes honor themselves
with the title of merciful.”155
152 Book IV, chapter 7, §1, p. 601 [§1020].
153 This is not always seen, when magistrates are not driven by public opinion.
154 Book IV, chapter 4, §1, p. 579 [§974]. This is to say in the human period, after the heroic
period.
155 Book IV, chapter 7, §1, p. 602 [§1022].
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Many modern authors have denounced the growing gentleness of criminal926
justice as an aberration of the spirit, and have claimed that this path leads to
an indifference about the law,whichmanifests itself clearly among certain peo-
ples. I would not be surprised if Vico was thinking of his own country in saying
that the weakness of the multitude made it compassionate. He indeed lived
in a milieu in which popular indifference to the law had grown enormously.
In most cases, this compassion provokes ferocious responses: either from the
State seeking to shock its subjects out of their torpor by intimidating tortures,
or from certain groups organizing lynchings to defend themselves. At bottom,
there is no essential difference between the two kinds of reaction: in both cases
the goal is to frighten people who live in a criminal way and to defend interests
menaced by dangerous groups.
I do not want to enter into the theory of criminology here, since it does
not belong in this review. I only want to show how the evolution of punish-
ments can be interpreted and clarified in connection with other concomitant
phenomena. This evolution, which Vico describes for us as taking place from
barbarism to civilization, repeats itself endlessly in modern history.
There are moments in which a terrified society thinks only of freeing itself
from people who trouble its normal life. This is the birth of inexorable laws jus-
tified by various theories all founded on social utility. Then, when the terror has
passed, there is a period of attenuation, of transformation, when people hesi-
tate to apply rules whose utilitarianmeaning appears too clearly andwhich are
opposed to the ruling moral sentiments.
Opposing heroic to human times, Vico observes that primordially the reason
of State was supreme law.156 Family heads had a direct interest in the conserva-
tion of order; their private interest was the same as the public interest.Without
this, social ties would have been lacking, and society would have perished. We
have seen that this was also a time of ferocious punishments, so we find here
an application of the law posed above, according to which the cruelty of pun-
ishments is founded on a utilitarian principle.
In human governments, Vico finds “desire for rest, paternal and conjugal
love, attachment to life.” He observes that | in democracies, power is divided927
infinitely between all the citizens, that in monarchies, the subjects busy them-
selves onlywith their particular affairs. There is no longer the same strong iden-
tification of the reason of State with individual ideas [la pensée individuelle].
“This is why men today are naturally brought to consider things according to
the most particular circumstances that can compare private interests of equal
156 Book IV, chapter 3, §4, p. 565 [§950].
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justice … The multitude can understand in no other way, because it grasps the
motives of justice in their direct application to causes, according to the indi-
vidual kinds of facts.”157
This requires explanation. The three characteristics of human eras fit per-
fectly well with countries where juridical indifference reigns and where—in
an irregularway—scenes of juridical savagery take place.158Vico does not seem
to have taken full advantage of his wonderful observation about the reason of
State. The infinite division of political power can have the effect of practically
cancelling out this old principle: it falls to the rank of something dormant in
consciousness, without apparent effects,—at least in normal times. Each cit-
izen, called on to be judge, puts himself at the same time in the place of the
accused. Acts and their consequences are no longer weighed by a master who
directs subjects and punishes men who have disobeyed the rules—rather they
are considered in the conscience [for intérieur] of each as though they were
personal. From this necessarily results a certain indulgence and an attenuation
of the social evaluation of the incriminating deed.
So we come to understand why in countries where popular justice exists,
things are no longer held up to the sorts of general rules that a jurist, concerned
only with reason of State, might pronounce, but are examined one by one and
related to the motives that the judge takes seriously according to his own char-
acter, his ownways of thinking. AsVico says, themost particular circumstances
form the basis for decisions. The functioning of the jury, whose verdicts have
nothing to do with rules either in France or in Italy, shows us this clearly.
Civil law is everywheremore or less the business of technicians, | peoplewho 928
have learned formulas. However, the same is not true for penal law. At least
in civilized countries each citizen considers it from his own personal point of
view, submits all the cases to his own particular ideas, treating it as a depen-
dency of one’s self-understanding [conscience-de-soi].159 Many criminal acts
(according to the Code or from the point of view of conscience) are intimately
bound up with civil interests. Crimes of passion, family dramas, bankruptcies,
great frauds, all confront the public with questions of civil law. Through the
decisions of juries and open discussion in newspapers, citizens are presented
with problems about which they have never learned to think: perhaps they
157 Book IV, chapter 3, §4, p. 566 [§951].
158 This is why the monarchies, whose mercy Vico lauds, do not seem always to have been
very gentle in the 18th century.
159 It goes without saying that, in many cases, class consciousness predominates here: juries
in France, where class feeling exerts a notable influence, take the utilitarian point of view
and are quite harsh.
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would never even have dared to doubt the perfect wisdom of legislators, if
bloody catastrophes or scandals had not posed the problem in a criminal form.
This manner of thinking allows us to see legal decisions no longer as a way of
acting on the criminal world in order to punish, intimidate, or proscribe. They
are, rather, ways of acting on the State [Cité] in order to develop in it new ideas
about normal relations and to push it toward juridical perfection. Criminal jus-
tice is one of the factors of change in civil legislation; it acts in virtue of Vico’s
ideogenetic law in order to give birth to moral theories through the practice of
public life.
The above explanations show uswhy democracy really does have a less fero-
cious idea of punishment than aristocracies dominated by utilitarian consider-
ations. I do not believe that Vico thought about the importance of sentiments
developed in a society of equals by participation in criminal justice. Nothing
he had before him would have led him to study the problem, which is more
interesting for us moderns. He was, in any case, persuaded that inequality was
a logical law foundedon the distinction of material [matière] and form, of body
and soul. “This civil sovereign, considered as a person, has its soul and its body;
the soul would be the company of the wise… the plebeians represent the body.
And it is an eternal law of societies that | some turn their minds to the work929
of politics, while others apply their bodies to the arts and professions [arts et
métiers]. But it is also a law that the soul must always command, and the body
serve.”160When the judiciary is drawn from the ruling classes, the so-calledwise
men who represent the soul of society, its decisions are, in general, very harsh.
A curious characteristic of our contemporary civilization is useful to note: it
is not at all the case that atrocious punishments have become impossible, as is
too often said. It has only become less possible to admit to them than before,
because everyone pretends to act according to democratic principles and the
customs [moeurs] that democratic practice has developed. The higher classes
always take a utilitarian point of view, but they are less concerned with mak-
ing examples than with selections: they have therefore adopted a tactic that is
not well understood by their adversaries. They want to keep themeans of terri-
ble repression, but they do not want this repression to be well known.161While
the principle of democratic justice is the identity, in the conscience of each
citizen, of the psychological states proper to the judge and the accused,—the
principle of the separation of these states, foundedon the real separation of the
classes and on the distinctions betweenmaster and servile being [être servile],
160 Book II, chapter 6, §5, p. 467 [§630].
161 This is their goal in practicing relegation, transportation, and sending to Algeria those
undergoing discipline in the military.
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remains to shape the thinking of our rulers. It is therefore natural that they
seek to prevent, on the occasion of punishments, the awakening of sentiments
of democratic justice in the popular consciousness that would prevent utili-
tarian policies from developing fully. Superior men believe themselves to have
only a very indirect connection with the lower levels of society, yet they dare
not show their real thinking and openly defy popular ideas.
In this summary study of the softening of manners [adoucissement des
moeurs], we have twice pointed out the predominant importance of the plebe.
Some authors have been struck by this contagion of sentiments that operates
from low to high, while imitation ought rather to go the other way … but they
have not sought to offer any other explanation and M. Le Bon limits himself
to writing, “themechanism of contagion is so powerful that its action dissolves
evenpersonal interest.”162 Butwhat is this |mechanism?This is never explained 930
to us: psychology here fails, as it often does.
However, ideal history also casts a deceptive light. The system of customs
[moeurs], which seems to Vico so general and connected in such a simple
way to political forms, presentsmore variety and complexity than he supposes.
He maintains tenaciously that paternal power existed in one form everywhere
identical to the classical Roman form.163 This is simply not defensible. The his-
tory of ancient Egypt shows us an opposed and even paradoxical phenomenon:
all living beings are placed on the same level and children are not subordi-
nated.164 The history of China presents to us a government arrived at the pure
monarchical form—the most pure, perhaps, according to Vico’s ideas—but in
which the ferocity of the criminal code never vanished.165 Our philosopher
seems not to have known, in any case, this country, for he limits himself to say-
ing of the barbarous regions: “the Khan of Tartary, who united his vast empire
with that of China, governs an effeminate people, as were the Seres of the
ancients.”166
We see here a new proof of the impossibility of remaining on abstract
ground.What must be sought are the conditions of life in the different classes,
the history of their conflicts and the ideas that developed over the course of
their struggles.
162 Psychologie des foules, p. 116.A24
163 Book II, chapter 4, p. 438, note [§517]. And book II, chapter 6, §1, p. 451, note [§582].
164 Flach, 27 March 1896.
165 According to Vico monarchical government shows itself to be popular, wants its subjects
to be equal, busywith their own activities, so that they enjoy “natural liberty” (Book VI, §2,
p. 596 [§1008]). See also what has been said above about the familial manners [moeurs]
encouraged by monarchies.
166 Book II, chapter 3, p. 628 [§1090].
106 study on vico
IX
Historical movement is not one homogenous development. It is not even pos-
sible to say, as in physics, that causes have immediate effects. There is a great
complexity of changes acting on one another, and one of the | most consid-931
erable objects of sociology is the study of decelerations and accelerations [in
historical change].
Vico understood the importance of these phenomena, and perhaps even on
certain points he saw more clearly than modern sociologists, who are too pre-
occupied with abstract relations. “Each state,” he says, “is combined with the
previous state, a mixture founded on the axiom: when men change, they keep
for some time the impression of their first habits. Patriarchs [pères de famille],
having passed from bestial life to human life, keep, in the state of nature, in
which there was as yet no government other than that of the gods, their orig-
inal character of ferocity and barbarism and retain, with the formation of the
first aristocracies, the sovereign empire that they had over their children and
their women in the state of nature …The states were at the origin aristocracies
mixed with the domestic monarchy of the patriarchs.”167
This passage allows us, already, to understand that State forms include sur-
vivals, that the State is a retrograde being; but it is not this question, as inter-
esting as it is, to which I want to call attention. The permanence of institu-
tions has to do not only with the psychological axiom enunciated above. This
would only give us an insufficient explanation and would not take account
of the most important fact, which dominates primitive history, the struggle
between groups. Vico is not wrong: he insists strongly on the reciprocal con-
cessions through which the political order is founded. “When the gathering of
families formed the first states [cités], the nobles, who had only just left the
independence of wild life behind, did not want to submit themselves to the
yoke of laws, nor to public duties: here are the aristocracies inwhich the nobles
are lords. Then the plebeians became more numerous and warlike, and the
nobles submitted to contributing to public upkeepwith the plebeians: here are
the nobles in democracies.”168 Contemporary history shows us struggles and
transactions in the field of economic law | that recall, in many respects, the932
ancient history of Rome: when some reform or other is proposed, the upper
classes protest against tyranny being inflicted on them and protest in the name
of individual liberty that the new lawwill curtail. Our industrialists are like the
167 Book IV, chapter 6, §1, p. 593 [§1004–1005]. Cf. on continuity, Book II, chapter 6, §5, p. 468
[§631–632].
168 Axiom 96 [§293].
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ancient nobles, they do not want “to allow what they have taken through their
courage to be lost through their negligence, but will give way only to necessity
or interest, and that only a little at a time and as little as possible.”169 It is enough
to replace couragewithmerit or talent, and you have transplantedVico’s axiom
into contemporary politics.
In the beginning, lawwas a sort of propertyof patrician families.170Theplebe
attacked this property, and demanded enjoyment of rights that the old regime
had reserved for nobles alone: these last want to remainmasters and to possess
unchecked power. “The weak want laws; the strong reject them … the nobles
makeknowledgeof the laws the secretof their order, so that lawswill dependon
their whim and so that they can apply the law just as arbitrarily as did the kings
…This is also the reason for the repugnance the senators showed for admitting
this legislation:mores patrios servandos; leges ferri non oportere.”171 Roman his-
tory is only a series of transactions assuring a continuity that made for Rome’s
greatness.172
In axiom91 [§281],Vicodepicts the situationof the contendingparties in the
followingway: “magnanimous confidence of the plebeians,whowant the patri-
cians to extend civil rights to themat the same time as the lawswhosemysteries
they reserve for themselves; courage of the patricians, who keep within their
own order such a precious privilege; wisdom of the jurisconsults who interpret
these laws andwho extend little by little their usefulness [utilité]. There are the
three exclusive distinguishing characteristics of Roman jurisprudence.”
From these observations several important consequences can be drawn
regarding the problems posed in the contemporary era.
Transactions possess, in all eyes, a | more respectable character than im- 933
posed decisions. Therefore when reforms are presented to the individual con-
science in this form, they do not provoke such a sharp desire for revenge and
can rapidly take their place among the intangible institutions. We often see
conservatives accept rather easily laws made against them and then not even
want to hear about a return to the past when they again have power: modern
industrial life is so intense that any innovation may link itself very quickly to a
mass of interests so that it can become more difficult to get rid of than it was
to introduce.
169 Axiom 82 [In fact, 81. §261].
170 Book IV, chapter 5, §2, p. 588 [§998].
171 Axiom 92 [“the customs of the fathers must be preserved … the laws must not be pub-
lished”. §283–284].
172 Book IV, chapter 5, §3, p. 592 [§1003].
108 study on vico
All transactions suppose that there had previously existed a dubious region
of the law, a precarious situation justified by old habits, but destined to disap-
pear when new circumstances arise to show its confusions. Reform takes place
in this region, and the wisdom of legal scholars is supposed to limit the move-
ment, in order to avoid stepping beyond what might be called the threshold of
possible agreement.While things remain on thismiddle ground, themovement
has in the mind of the jurist a progressive character: the old situation corre-
sponding to vulgar wisdom, to the order of things founded only on unreasoned
custom [usages], to the practicality of a vulgar empiricism;—the new situation
havingbeen introducedbydiscussion and comparison, demonstrates thedesir-
able reaction of reflective thought on historical material. This way of thinking
about phenomena plays a capital role inmodern history: indeed, psychological
evolutions of this kind are irreversible, as Vico recognized. As long as we have
the feeling that a juridical transformation has been accomplished in the natu-
ral order of psychology, we do not feel the desire to revolt and to return to the
past. The reform becomes inviolable, because it appears with that particular
tone of sentiment that corresponds to the vulgar notion of progress.173
History does not always show transformations made in this transactional934
way. Vico is not so taken in by the sophism of ideal history that he does not
see that Rome is exceptional in this regard.Many times, attempts weremade to
exceed the limits of the dubious regionof law in order to establish anew regime
by force. This operation can succeed only if the vanquished entirely disappear.
And it has succeeded more than once, as the history of religious persecutions
shows us. Civil wars are so ferocious because they have for object exactly the
transformation of institutions through violence and the destruction of adver-
173 These considerations cast new light on the conception of progress: the men of the 18th
century were not completely wrong in assigning such great importance to the progress of
enlightenment. They translated (incorrectly, it is true) the psychological process [proces-
sus],much better understood byVico than by themand definitively elucidated bymodern
science, which makes us pass continuously from a less to a more intellectualized state.
Vico’s error was to not see that the passage does not take place in a bloc and that it is
renewed constantly from the affective bases [§934] of psychological evolutions: this point
cannot be too much insisted upon.
Against Bodin, Vicomaintained that aristocracy cannot succeed the popular state, nor
royal government. This would be “irreconcilable with the social nature of man.” On the
other hand,monarchy and the popular state can permutate (book V, chapter 2, p. 625, note
[§1087]). We see here an application of two psychological principles: 1) the irreversibility
of psychological evolutions; 2) the substitution of equivalents. I called attention to one of
these substitutions in an earlier article (February 1896, p. 126, note)A25; these substitutions
can take place only on the basis of a profound common sentiment, as is easily seen in the
case I examined.
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saries. In their wars of conquest, the Romanswere so easily able to impose their
customs [moeurs], their laws, their language, because their great preoccupa-
tion was to eliminate the old ruling classes which might have kept too vivid a
memory of the old culture.
It has often been objected to socialists that the proletarian revolution will
be obliged to follow the same law, that it must take on the ferocious character
of a war of extermination, and that it will compromise a European civiliza-
tion acquired with such patient labor. This reproach would be well founded
if the proletariat was an exalted mass, maddened by idealist preaching,174 bay-
ing for the destruction of worldly things and breaking abruptly with the past
under the false pretext | of realizing a marvelous plan worked out in some big 935
brain or other. But this is not how it will be, because the first condition of the
future revolution is the development in the proletariat of the consciousness
of its historical role; the second condition is that the organization of labor by
large industry be so adapted to the needs and conditions of collective produc-
tion that economic realities constitute the bridge by which the passage from one
state to another will take place;—finally, social hierarchies must be no more
than shadows.
Juridical continuity will not even be violently broken by the proletarian
revolution, if contemporary civilization has elaborated a system of laws pru-
dently regulating the relations between industrialists: the capitalist part of the
Codes can disappear, as the feudal regime disappeared, without much trou-
bling juridical ideas. It is therefore of the greatest importance for socialists to
accelerate the movement of juridical reforms and to take what they can get,
even if the new laws leave much to be desired.
Socialists oftenmeetwith the objection that their conceptionof total revolu-
tion is in opposition to the laws of history, because themost apparent character
of all existing transformations is the transaction. Marx was perfectly familiar
with this objection and he did not hide what was new in the idea of revolu-
tion whose theory he was sketching, but he showed also that the proletarian
forces developed by large industry were not insufficient to overcome the capi-
talist order. The transaction is the necessary character of two active minorities
fighting for their share, it assures continuity by bringing the newcomers into
174 I do not say led by the idealists, because these gentlemen lead nothing: they content them-
selves with confusing the people’s reasoning with their illusions, their promises, their
demands; and when enthusiasm has rendered men incapable of reasoning, they wash
their hands of the spilled blood and speak about thepurity of their intentions. It is unlikely
that an idealist revolution will not be bloody. We others are for a revolution founded on
knowledge of the possible, and such a transformation can hardly include proscriptions.
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the civilization of the old possessors of the law. But if the proletariat becomes,
in industry, the only living organization, if there remains alongside it only a
powerless and negligibleminority, if it eliminates fromwithin itself any formof
hierarchy likely to separate itself out and form a governing faction, if finally the
development of social legislation has invested it fully with the idea of law:—
economic and juridical continuity will be assured without a transaction. We
can even add, in reference to the theory of civil warsmentioned above, that the
greatest revolution the mind can imagine will be the most peaceful,—because
it will not find before it any adversary that might be reborn.
When one examines history from the objective point of view—which is |936
ours,—one no longer has any interest in pontificating on the moral motives
that have inspired men. One no longer pretends to judge ancient institutions
according to some ethical norm or other. The philosophical historian no longer
thinks of himself as the director of the people’s conscience. One simply tries to
understand [savoir] what role certain social rules have played in the passages
from one form to another. All readers of Capital know that this is Karl Marx’s
way of proceeding and it seems to me useless to bring in citations on this sub-
ject. Vico also asked himself what results had come from vanished institutions
and he understood them as preparation for subsequent institutions. Thus, for
example, hemaintained against Plutarch the usefulness of barbarian religions,
which served as a first step toward civilization.175 He said, speaking of the first,
ferocious families, “men, having left their native liberty and [been] tamed by
the severity of family government found themselves ready to obey the laws of
civil government that would succeed it.”176
In Vico, this theory of preparation is subordinated, as always, to providen-
tial wisdom and, therefore, bound tightly to moral and religious valuations.
Evidently modern science can undertake to dissociate these without the least
difficulty and conserve the historical theory without keeping the theory of
Providence. It is useless to insist on this.
The causes of historical movement are not abstractions or logical consid-
erations.177 The presocialists gave themselves | a great deal of trouble trying937
to show that not everything was perfect in the world and they finally decided
175 Book II, chapter 4, p. 439 [§518].
176 Book II, chapter 5, §1, p. 441 [§523].
177 Here again I return to M. Jaurès’ theory about contradictions provoking revolutions. He
borrows from Spinoza this idea that all tyranny must disappear by virtue of the forces it
has itself provoked: if it is too hard, it provokes desperate insurrection, if it is gentle, it
prepares men for liberty (Idealisme de l’histoire, p. 23). It would not be useless to reread
the last chapters of Aristotle’s Politicswhere so many revolutions are recounted: it will be
seen that in antiquity, things did not happen so simply. And now that we know better the
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on the extirpation of everything that seemed to them to engender contradic-
tions.178 It would have been just asworthwhile to resolve on destroying human-
ity, because this is to pronounce an end to any development.
History is continuously presenting to us decisive figures, whose character,
tendencies, and genius,must be the object of special study. Vico sought to trace
a general picture embracing all the essential elements of this political psychol-
ogy. “First we see coarse and barbarous figures rise up, like Homer’s Polyphe-
mus. Then come the proud and magnanimous such as Achilles. Then the just
and valiant, Aristides, Scipio. Later on there appear, with noble images of virtue
and at the same time great vices, those who the vulgar judge to be truly glori-
ous. Later on there are the somber characters, of thoughtful [réfléchie] malice,
Tiberius. Finally come the mad who abandon themselves to shameless disso-
lution, like Caligula, Nero, Domitian. The hardness of the first was necessary in
order that man, obeying man within the familial state [état de famille], would
be prepared to obey laws;—the second, unable to cede to their equals, serve
to establish after the familial state aristocratic republics; the third, to open the
path to democracy; the fourth to raise upmonarchies; the fifth toweaken them;
the sixth to overthrow them.”179
I have quoted this long extract in order to show clearly how consideration of
ideal history confuses the questions. The characters are arranged in an empiri-
cal order, without any link appearing between then, and their role is not always
the same in the order of events. The regularity, uniform connection of cause
and effect, everything that might give a scientific value to the exposition, is
missing. The historian cannot say what produces a Caesar at a given moment,
but he can try to know what causes make a Caesar decisive in given circum-
stances.
In another passage, Vico seeks to pose principles of | a quite different order. 938
He examines the goals pursued by the active parties of classes engaged in strug-
gle and the situation of people in each of the considered cases. “Men love, first
of all, to free themselves from subjection and desire equality;—thus the ple-
beians in aristocratic republics, who finally made popular governments. They
seek next to surpass their equals;—thus the common people in popular states
great Asiatic monarchies, what can we think of this so-called demonstration of Spinoza’s?
Aristotle already knew very well that things did not happen among the barbarians as they
did with the Greeks, among whom there were a great many causes, deriving from true
sentiments and not theoretical sentiments of abstractman, fabricated for the needs of con-
temporary sociology.
178 Catholic writers continue to engage in this sort of discussion, which is entirely without
interest since Marx placed socialism on a scientific basis.
179 Axiom 68 [§243–244].
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that degenerate into oligarchies. They want then to put themselves above law
and from this results unbridled democracy … Then the common people seek
a remedy and flee into monarchy.”180 The nobility also accepts this solution,
seeing in it a guarantee of rest and the possibility of leading an easy life.181
I will not stop to criticize the inexactitude of this picture, which is too broad.
But I think it is useful to briefly signal here one important particularity. Active
groups, which form the army of revolutions, are moved by considerations that
are not at all the same as those found in the first rank of decisivemen.These lat-
ter are strongly individual, and their individual sentiments play a capital role,
but in groups very different sorts of sentiments develop, or more exactly indi-
vidual sentiments take on a different kind of color. It is these affective group
tones that the historian ought above all try to bring to light, and that Fr. Engels
signals as susceptible of entirely objective study.182
These affective group tones express themselves in demands and, for this rea-
son, they have often been confused with juridical idealities. Thus the search
for equality that Vico pointed to as a motor of revolution is confounded with a
metaphysical theory of equal rights, and so on.We touch here one of the causes
that have lead idealists so badly astray in their historical interpretation.
This error is all the easier to make because revolutions rarely fail to work
some profound transformation in the juridical characteristics of society. It is
imagined that the motives of the actors in the drama were all dictated by a
clear view of the result obtained, and their conduct is judged by that to which
a theoreticalman ought to have held in pursuing this goal. |939
All revolutions fall into two distinct types: the struggle can have as object the
exploitation of public power [force], or it can try to change the situation of the
classes. Vico knew perfect well to distinguish these two cases: the first seemed
to him to belong to the decadence of popular states and to the period that pre-
pared monarchy, the second alone was productive. The struggles between rich
and poor in the Greek republics represented the first time, those of the ple-
beians against patricians the second. In reality the two types are almost always
mixed in history. One of the great difficulties experienced by contemporary
socialismconsists in acquiring a clear idea of the proletarian revolution, in fully
understandingwhat distinguishes it from awar of the poor against the rich and
in shedding the superstition of the State.183
180 Axiom 95 [§292].
181 Axiom 96 [§293].
182 Cf. the passage already cited in §IV.
183 Also, one popular school seeks to oppose the progress of socialism in the following way:
to divide the proletariat and bring out the most active minorities to which exceptional
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Connected to these problems is a very obscure question, on which we have
thus far only incomplete studies, I mean survivals [survivances]. Regarding the
survival of Hellenic fables, Vico’s observations seem to me to have a consider-
able value, although he was unable to resolve all the difficulties. “They were at
their origin true histories of a serious character. The fables were born bizarre
and became successively less appropriate to their original subject, changed,
untruthful, obscure, with a shocking and finally incredible effect.”184 The philo-
sophical era gave them interpretations without any relations to their historical
origins, but they nonetheless continued to play a considerable role in the devel-
opment of thought. Here is how Vico explains the phenomenon. The fables
gave philosophers, “an easy way to present themost sublime ideas by using the
expressions of poets, a beneficial heritage that they had | received;—ease of 940
consecrating their opinions with the authority of poetic wisdom and the sanc-
tion of religion.”185
I do not know that this last consideration is of great value, since it is unlikely
that religion had played at the origin of societies the preponderant role attri-
buted to it by our author. We know that a great number of tales or practices of
the most profane origin became dogmatic expositions and rites at a late date
in history. This is hardly contested for the history of the Israelites: it is hard to
believe that a religious sense had been attached tomany of the Jewish legends.
The celebration of Easter and the rite of circumcision do not appear to have
had religious origins. In general, a custom [usage] whose original meaning is
lost, but which continues to maintain itself in a state of solemnity, takes on a
ritual character and gathers around itself a rich literature of legends: the causes
of this paradoxical phenomena remain to be given.
Whatever theory one uses to explain primitive practices, the respect that
the Greeks had for their fables cannot be denied. Many of them, those that
had passed through the hands of the great poets, possessed aesthetic prestige.
Finally the national poems and songs, having served for the education of the
youth, evoked in affectivememory a greatmanyemotional tendencies. In intro-
ducing into their discourses [exposé] many well-known fragments, philoso-
phers transported to their works a part of the sentiments that these fragments
advantages will be granted;—to demand great monetary sacrifices from the rich in order
to show the poor the devotion of the upper classes; to reorganize the whole State in
order to give more satisfaction to ambitious members of the poorer classes. Cf: Aristotle’s
reflections on how to preserve oligarchies (Politique, Book VIII, chapter 7) [Politics, 134–
139]. These efforts cannot be successful because proletarian socialism proposes something
quite other than simply sharing wealth and honor.A26
184 Book III, chapter 5, p. 531 [§814].
185 Book II, chapter 1, §1, p. 375 [§362].
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had evoked. It is really essential for an innovator to find a way to develop for
himself the sympathies of his readers: no philosophical system has owed its
success entirely to the logical value of its arguments. It has always been neces-
sary for the author to find a way to provoke emotions that will tip the balance
of our spirit in his direction. No doubt faith seeks to justify itself before reason,
but the justifying reasons would have no value if there did not exist profound
affective states giving consistency to the beginning of belief.186
The same can be said of all philosophical theories. It must be observed also
that these affective means act all the more effectively the less our mind is on
guard, and everything takes place in | a domain that escapes apperception.We941
see here the importance of survivals: in citing fragments of respected poems,
the Greek philosophers did not present their doctrines as consequences of
the fables from which these expressions were borrowed—reason would have
revolted against such a system—they only provoked subconscious states [états
ignorés de la conscience],waking affectivememories through simple signals.187
Vico goes even further. He understood very well that the innovator expe-
riences the greatest difficulty in presenting revolutionary ideas in a language
that has been adapted to other systems. Over language, the public has as it is
said a sovereign power and everyone is obliged to understand things as do the
mass of people.188 One must therefore speak a new language and experience
shows that there is no language richer in new forms than that into which have
been mixed ancient expressions that have lost their earlier meaning. The his-
tory of early Christianity is a good illustration of this principle. In making use
of expressions borrowed almost entirely from books familiar to the Jews, Saint
Paul succeeded in constituting a theology that was in absolute opposition not
only with the historical meaning of these books, but also with the interpre-
tations that the rabbinical schools had made familiar to their listeners.189 No
doubt this is an extraordinary example, but many less striking examples of this
procedure exist. The Reformation followed Paul’s methods with great success
and set new ideas in what was apparently a very ancient language. We know
that attempts in this direction were made by the presocialists, but failed. The
sentiment of historical truth is today too well developed for exegetical inter-
186 Read on this subject chapter three of the third book of Croyance by M.J. Payot.
187 Detached from their origin, these fragments became simplepoetical abstractions and thus
are ruled by the well-known law of the permanence of abstracts; everything we learned in
childhood maintains itself in this way and acts on us without our knowing.
188 Book IV, chap. 2, §2, p. 559 [§936].
189 No one, in any case, worried about historical meaning. Saint Paul was less daring than
were the Jewish doctors of the Talmudic tradition.A27
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ventions to have much chance of succeeding. Socialism must therefore follow
a purely scientific path, as difficult as the scientific road sometimes can be.
Study on Vico190 1013
(end)
X
Vico’s attempts to determine the laws of expression of human ideas are of great
interest. At the time he wrote, science was yet in possession of too few pieces
of the puzzle; his etymologies are generally very arbitrary and imposed rather
than demonstrated. Michelet has eliminated many of these overly bold inter-
pretations, but more than enough remain. It seems to me tiresome to insist on
this.
In order to fully understand Vico’s thinking and to realize its full value, it is
not useless to recall the principles of scholastic philosophy regarding under-
standing and language. M. Mercier, the professor from Louvain, begins his the-
ory of ideas by posing this proposition: “Intelligence has for its proper object
only material things;” and among the proofs that he gives is this, drawn from
language: “in following up the etymologies of higher ideas, such as the ideas of
being, understanding, thought, intelligence, wisdom, those of virtue, relation,
duty, right, justice, finally thoseof soul, spirit, God, one arrives always at notions
whose meaning is entirely material.”191 He says further, “the proper object [of
intelligence] is material objects; its improper or indirect object is immaterial
beings, the human soul, minds, God.”192
It is therefore very easy to understand how Vico has written: “We see in all 1014
the languages things belonging to the soul and to the intelligence expressed in
metaphors which are drawn from bodies and their properties.”193 This proposi-
tion would have been rather difficult to demonstrate, but it must have seemed
tohimevident because it conformedwith traditional doctrines.His affirmation
did not present itself with the paradoxical character that has been attributed
to it on occasion in our own times.
The difficulty begins in trying to pass from these very general conceptions
to historical applications. Axioms 17 and 18 [§151–153] are quite vague: “Vul-
190 See the November number.
191 [Mercier] Psychologie, p. 293.
192 Op. cit., p. 288.
193 Axiom 63 [§237].
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gar ways of speaking [parler] are the most serious witnesses to national habits
[usages] in the times when languages [langues] were formed. An old language
that has remained in use ought, considered before its maturity, to be a great
monument from the first ages of the world.” But how to reason confidently
about such old texts? A curious attempt has beenmade in recent years to inter-
pret theVedas according to a systemanalogous towhatVicoproposes.M.P. Reg-
naudobserved thatwords towhich traditionattacheda religiousmeaningmust
have had a material meaning that could be recovered. So he transformed the
hymns by translating them with a dictionary made in this way. The attempt
seemed to him more all the more defensible as orientalists are obliged to haz-
ard hypotheses to arrive at meanings for many expressions that have fallen out
of the language of the Hindu commentators. Regnaud’s results seem generally
paradoxical and have not been accepted by orientalists.
Vico seeks, as is his habit, to determine the differentmoments of the process
in axioms 64 and 65 [§238–240]: “The order of ideas must follow the order of
things.—Such is the order that human things follow: first the forests, then the
huts, then the villages, next the cities [cités] or reunions of citizens, finally the
academiesor reunions of the learned [savants].Thehistory of indigenous [indi-
genes] languagesmust follow this series of changes undergone by things. Thus,
in the Latin language, we can see that all words have wild and rustic origins.”
This last observation derives naturally from the principles posed earlier:
primitive words could not have come | at first except from the vocabulary of1015
peasants. But it is remarkable that Vico considers languages as having been
subordinated to academies in eras of full civilization even though he says, so
often, that the people is absolute master of the meaning of words.194
Vico supposes that originally men did not speak. “Divine language was
hardly articulated and almost entirely mute; the language of Heroes mute and
articulated in equal measure; the language of men mute almost not at all and
more or less entirely articulated.”195 Butwhat could this unarticulated language
be? We must, to follow Vico’s principles, try to see what use it was, how it was
connected to the intellectual development of barbarous men;—the diversity
of languages,196 like the diversity of customs [usages] is, indeed, caused by the
variety of aspects under which one sees the things that are useful or necessary
for life. It is not the things themselves that man wants to indicate. This con-
sideration belongs only to periods of higher development. At the beginning,
man put himself only in a very summary relation to the world and he saw it
194 Book IV, chapter 3, §5, p. 568 [§953] and book II, chapter 3, §4, p. 416 [§439].
195 Book II, chapter 3, §4, p. 419 [§446].
196 Book II, chapter 3, §4, p. 418 [§445].
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only through his impassioned nature, “at that time he was a stranger to any
abstraction, any subtlety, dulled by the passions, plunged into the senses and,
as it were, buried in the material [matière].”197 From this it results that the first
expressions of language were connected to emotions.
Vico has perhaps not done all that he could have with this theory. He makes
several ingenious remarks. “The first men must not have tried to speak until
they experienced extremely violent passions. Such passions are expressed at
the top of the voice, which multiplies diphthongs and becomes a sort of song.
This first song came naturally out of the difficulty of pronunciation.”198 He
rests this doctrine on several quite faulty observations: he says that people who
stammer stop on syllables that are the | easiest for them to pronounce and 1016
in this way make a kind of song,—that the ancient “Greek and Latin prose-
writers made use of poetic quantities,—[that in] the Middle Ages the Fathers
of the Latin Church did as well, and [that] their prose seemed made to be
sung.”199
It is not out of place to ask what after all Vico means here by song: does
he mean to speak of rhythm only, or of melody? It seems quite likely that
rhythmplayed, indeed, a very considerable role in the consolidation of the first
emotional expressions; the primitive sonic gesture (Klanggeberde) ismuch less
related to the representation of things than pantomime and it is not easy to
understand how it could become fixed and give birth to articulated language
through its own principles.
It is not plausible that language [le langage] was used at first for the sim-
ple purposes it fulfills today: it is a very exceptional way of expressing one’s
self. Our philosopher indicates the oracles of the Sibyls, sung in heroic verses,
as one of the first forms of language.200 He develops at length the idea that
old Roman law [droit] was a serious poem and he attaches great importance to
the expression carmina, used to designate the ancient juridical formulas that
were to be fixed in an invariable way.201 In the times that preceded articulated
language, men experienced the need to have signs to constitute solemn affir-
mations, to determine the certain: one made use then of acts of the body, a
197 Book II, chapter 2, §1, p. 386 [§378]. He says elsewhere: “the first men were almost as
entirely incapable of generalizations as the animals, for whom all new sensation entirely
erases the analogous sensation that they could experience; they cannot combine and dis-
cuss ideas.” (Book II, chapter 7, §1, p. 487, note [§703]).
198 Book III, chapter 3, §5, p. 424 [§462].
199 [§462]
200 Book II, chapter 3, §5, p. 426 [§463–464].
201 Book IV, chapter 7, §2, p. 608 [§1037].
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well-rhythmedmimicry,whatmight be called a juridical dance.202 Later on ver-
bal formulas, just as rigorously determined as the earlier movements, served.
It therefore seems quite reasonable that gestures of the body and gestures of
sound were submitted to the same evolution and that they were fixed in the
same way, through rhythm. The hypothesis of a primitive song, either in orac-
ular consultations or in juridical constitutions, is therefore very natural.
And there is another fertile idea to be found in Vico, which is that one
must not separate the history of languages [langues] from that of letters (or
rather of signs that have served to express ideas graphically).203 He | says, “the1017
first nations thought by means of symbols or poetic characters, spoke using
fables as signs, wrote in hieroglyphs.”204 It must be understood that originally
[à l’origine], the goal was not to express a thing, but to recall actions.
Vico is right to indicate as the primitive forms of language “the five mate-
rial words that the king of the Scythians sent to Darius, son of Hystaspes, the
poppies that Tarquin the Proud beheadedwith his scepter before his son’smes-
senger.”205 When M. Schweinfurth passed into the land of the Niams-Niams,
he found tied up to a tree a blade of grass [un épi], a rooster feather, and an
arrow: this constituted an inscription whose meaning he did not mistake for
an instant. Here it is clear that each object recalled a complete action and no
doubt was possible because each of the objects can evoke only a few senti-
ments in the simple mind of the savages. The meaning is determined by the
affective states that a sign can call forth. The Scythian’s message was more
complicated, andDarius did not understand it, he was already intellectualized,
while that [the sign] of the Niams-Niams appealed only to affective mem-
ory.206
Juridical signs still play here a great role andVico highlights them among the
elements that have served to form language [langage]. “The first pagan nations
expressed themselves through gestures ormaterials signs, which had a relation
with ideas; they had to affirm through signs the limits of their fields and con-
202 Book IV, chapter 7, §2, p. 611 [§1045].
203 Book II, chapter 3, §4, p. 408 [§429].
204 He says elsewhere that Varro brought together the names of thirty thousand gods; it was
the vocabulary by means of which “the nations of Latium were able to express the needs
of human life.” These names were so many because each fountain and each rock had its
fable. “The divine fables of the Greeks and the Latins were for them the first hieroglyphs,
the sacred characters of this divine language.” (Book II, chapter 3, §4, p. 414 [§437]).
205 Book II, chapter 3, §4, p. 414 [§435]. We can remember here as well the pantomimes in
which the Hebrew prophets engaged.
206 Observation made by M. Flach in his lesson of 25 March 1896. (Cours du Collège de
France).
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serve durablemonuments of their laws;207 all used | coins.208 All the truths that 1018
we have just set down give us the origin of languages and of letters, in which is
included that of hieroglyphs, of laws, of names, of heraldry, of medals, of coins,
and in general of the language and the writing in which, in its origin, the natural
right of peoples was spoken and written.”209
If today it seems somewhat paradoxical to many people to attribute such a
large place in the history of languages [langues] to very primitive law (and to
the oracle, which is hardly detached from it), an important idea of Aristotle’s
must be remembered, “the voice can express joy and pain, and it is not absent
from the animals … But speech [la parole] is made to express good and evil
and, in consequence, the just and the unjust; and man is special in this way,
among all the animals, that he conceives of the good and the evil, the just and
the unjust, and all the sentiments of the same order that, in association with
one another, constitute the family and the State.”210
If this is so, language must be considered to have as object not the things
in themselves, butmuch rather certain particularly human relations relative to
the use of things. According to the Stagirite, ethics is thatwhich ismost human,
and on this point Vico does not seem to disagree. It is therefore natural to seek
the strongest and most living causes in juridical relations. This does not pre-
vent us from thinking that language [langage] may form itself at least partially
by means of other elements from the artificial milieu; but it is reasonable to
attend first of all to which is most specially human.
The Neapolitan philosopher tries to go further and to determine the order
in which the grammatical forms were formed: interjection, pronouns, particles
and prepositions, nouns and verbs. I want to point out here Vico’s singularly
psychological reasoning: “We can observe that children say nouns [les noms],
particles, and not verbs: it is because names [les noms] give rise to ideas which
leave durable traces; it is the same for particles that signify modifications. | But 1019
verbs signify movements accompanied by ideas of anteriority and posteriority
and these ideas cannot be comprehended except with the indivisible point of
the present, so difficult to understand … There exists here a man who, follow-
ing an attack of apoplexy, remembers perfectly well nouns [les noms], but has
207 The importance of signs in the formation of juridical ideas and particularly in the evo-
lution of the idea of property in land, is often indicated by M. Flach. On occasion, it is
possible to penetrate up to the point where the sign [1018] still has all its material value,
its signification as object having had utility (for example, the enclosure in plants that con-
serves the footpath with the Mongoutous: lesson of 25 March 1896).
208 There is a nice example of ideal and reasoned history!
209 Book II, chapter 3, §4, p. 412 [§434].
210 Politique, book I, chapter 1, §10.
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entirely forgotten verbs.”211 In this case, as in many others, Vico totally aban-
dons the method of historical induction.
There is no analogy to be established between the infantwho learns to speak
under the influence of his parents and the savagewho had to formhis language
[son langage] in the midst of the events of a quite complicated existence.212
As far as the order in which an ill person loses words of different sorts, this
order has no relationwith the order inwhich languages [langues]were formed.
According toM.Wundt, in any case, verbs in general persist longer than “words
which are connected to concrete sensorial representations.”
Here is another singular theory: all primitive peoples represent the gods and
heroes with superhuman proportions. In the Middle Ages “the figure of the
Father, of Jesus Christ and of the Virgin [are] of colossal size.” Vico finds a sin-
gular sort of reason: “It is proper to barbarians always to enlarge and extend
particular ideas. […] The reason must be that the human spirit, infinite in its
nature, yet constrained by the crudity of the senses [des sens], could not exer-
cise its almost-divine faculties except by extending particular ideas through the
imagination. It is perhaps for this reason etc.”213 It seems simpler to think that
the authors of ancient drawings wanted to represent forces as they conceived
them, and notmake portraits in themodern sense of theword. In general prim-
itives do not concern themselves at all about resemblance, perspective, the
coordination of forms: they put into subjective order everything that strikes
them. Royal personages, having | much more power than their subjects, are1020
represented as taller: the moderns, muchmore objective, want a reasoned and
quasi-scientific shape; the barbarians want to translate all their impressions in
a clear way and worry little about science.
Vico rightly observes that children and barbarians speak in very general
terms. This seems all the more natural because their language does not try to
seize hold of the objective character of a particular being, but to recall impres-
sions, affective states.When thought begins to develop itself, it must make use
of this verbal material that has not been prepared for it, and then ambivalence
and incoherence begins. Reasoningmust proceed by drawing things into kinds
[genres], but kinds that have as yet nothing scientific about them. “Without
211 Book II, chapter 3, §4, p. 420[–421. §454].
212 M.Wundt says: “mothers andnurses are the inventors of the child’s language.”Visualmem-
ory plays a very great role in education: thus the considerable importance of substantives,
which do not have the same meaning as for primitives: they connect to each name a cer-
tain group of actions. In our civilized language the substantive is still used very often to
designate not this or that, but rather the nature of one thing or rather even of a class of
things. It is quite otherwise for the child, who joins together sound and vision.A28
213 Book III, chapter 5, p. 532 [§816].
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kinds there would be no ambivalences, I do not know, in truth, if the kinds
have not been the cause of as many errors for philosophers as the senses have
been for the vulgar of false opinions and prejudices. The kinds confuse ideas as
much as prejudices obscure them.”214
We find here described in a very clear way the doctrine that will guide in our
own time a quite significant school of research inmythological interpretations.
XI
The great difficulties experienced in study of ancient civilizations come from
knowing relatively little about the functioning of this logic of imagination,
which then held the place of the logic of the philosopher. And yet there are
many points at which such study can be undertaken and Vico has more than
once illuminated these difficult questions.
All this research is dominatedby a general principle, of whichM. Flachmade
the greatest use in his course at the Collège de France and which Vico devel-
oped in several ways: primitive peoples do not understand the subtleties of our
reflective thought; figures, images, fictions, hardly exist for them; everything
has the same degree of reality. It is impossible for them to separate the thing
and its simulacrum.
Originally, following Vico, “Jupiter, Cybele, Neptune, were simply the sky, 1021
the earth, the sea, that the first men, still mute, expressed by indicating them
with their finger. With the names of these three divinities, they expressed all
things relative to the sky, to the earth, to the sea. It was the samewith the other
gods. They connected all flowers to Flora, all fruits to Pomona.”215 It should be
remembered here that it is not the things themselves that are designated, but
actions that are related to the sky, the earth, the sea, and so on. It is indeed
much easier to understand that one could bring under the same sign similar
actions than beings whose appearance is so different.216 Vico frequently insists
onwhat he calls the principle of uniformity, in virtue of which the same person-
age received the attributes of those that have some resemblance with it, but
he does not distinguish sufficiently the different meanings that this principle
could have.
214 De l’antique sagesse de l’ Italie, chapter II, §4, p. 233 [Most AncientWisdom, 62].
215 Book II, chapter 3, §1, p. 397 [§402].
216 This is why a change in physiognomy appeared to them a new face, a new passion indi-
cated a new heart (Book II, chapter 7, §1, p. 487 [§700]).
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In axiom 47 [§205], Vico observes that the vulgar attribute to famous men
adventures related to their character.217We are here in the presence of a princi-
ple of imaginative logic, which can find daily application. It is the character, it
is theway of acting, that forms the principle of agglutination in fables. It is clear
that this work can be undertaken only in brains of an already human develop-
ment and that children can give us no indication about this kind of intellectual
work, even though our author does not fail to invoke their example in axiom
48 [§206].
Elsewhere, Vico expresses the opinion that, even in historical eras, laws have
been attributed to legislators—Solon, Lycurgus—thehonor of which couldnot
possibly have been theirs. “Perhaps Solon is only the people of Athens, con-
sidered as recognizing its rights, as founding democracy. The Egyptians had
attributed to Hermes all useful discoveries, the Athenians attributed to Solon
all democratic institutions.”218 The same observations are then presented for
the first kings of Rome.
Commenting on axiom 49, he makes his thinking more precise: “The Egyp-1022
tians attributed all useful discoveries to the type of the wise man in matters of
social life; and as they could not arrive at this level of abstraction, and still less
that of social wisdom, they personified the whole kind under the name of Her-
mes.”219 Thus it really is a large category of relations existing in the milieu that
formakind and that receives a single unique sign. It is not things that are assim-
ilated, but actions.
The imagination possesses the faculty of abstraction, but it abstracts in its
way, choosing from a vast picture [tableau] the marks that suit it to recall the
ensemble of relations that the totality evoked in a more primitive way. “These
vast imaginations,” Vico says, “curled themselves up and were indicated by the
smallest signs. Jupiter, Neptune, Cybele, became so small and so light that the
first flew on the wings of an eagle, the second rode on the sea, carried in a thin
shell, and the third was seated on a lion.”220 But each of these signs was, just
as much as the things that it replaced, the bearer of all the relations, and these
relations could not be separated from the sign.
217 This axiom is placed at the head of those that are related to poetics, those that treat uni-
formity are numbered 48 and 49 [§206–210].
218 Book II, chapter 3, §3, p. 404 [§414].
219 [§209]
220 [p. 398, §402. Bergin & Fisch give this sentence after “signs”: “Metonymy erected into
dogma the prevailing ignorance of these origins of human things, which have remained
buried until now,” but it does not appear in Michelet].
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This impossibility in which vulgar thought finds itself of making the separa-
tion is seen as well in all the poetry that piles onto a figure qualities that it had
not had. “These lies of fact are truths of the idea. The true captain, for example,
is Tasso’s Godfrey, all those that do not conform to this model do not merit the
name of captain.”221 It cannot be said that this is a law proper only to primitive
peoples and to children: it is rather a general law of our creative imagination
across time.
The cult of icons presents to us the same principle in action in religious life.
And it should be repeated tirelessly that religious life offers to the observer
the most easily studied psychological phenomena. Has it not often been asked
why one image was more venerated in a particular circumstance, or by a given
group, than any other representation of the same figure? This differentiation
seems absurd to one who takes the point of view of reflective and calculating
reason. But reason provokes affective states much more than purely intellec-
tual | ones. The imagination obeys, always, the same laws. TheMadonna is one 1023
unique entity, but the worshiper is notmoved by simply theological considera-
tions; if he addresses himself to an icon, it is because this figure recalls for him a
group of memories, each possesses itsmiraculous legend, evoked by the plastic
sign. To adore a particular Madonna is therefore to evoke all the memories of
extraordinary doings associated with its worship. So here as well is a group of
relations that is figured by a sign and that cannot be separated. M. de Molinari
is quite right when he says, “if one could penetrate into the souls of a crowd,
no doubt one would make strange discoveries there. It would be seen that its
concept of religion differs only in form from what this was in pagan times.”222
The difference that exists between primitives and moderns resides above
all in taste for a more aesthetic representation. The savage is persuaded that
his sketch, as crude as it may be, perfectly well represents the personage whose
memory hewants to conserve.223 Todaywe aremore demanding: it can be seen
that these aesthetic demands belong to intellectual development [processus]
and that they do not include affective states of a religious order. The character
of the sign is notably weakened by the character of the work of art.224
221 Axiom 47 [§205].
222 Religion, 2nd edition, p. 165. I think that the eminent economist is wrong when he limits
his observation to crowds; it has a more general application.
223 M. Flach, lesson of 18 March 1896.
224 We know with what energy certain critics denounced for their irreligious character the
greatest works of Raphael and the majority of 16th century Italian artists. In these discus-
sions not enough attention has been paid to the principle indicated here: when religious
forms intellectualize, they lose their power over souls.
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Occult preoccupations must be noted among the survivals from the prim-
itive way of thinking, which cannot yet entirely leave the human spirit.225 To
want to reach a person or a thing by putting one’s self in relation to its sign is a
desire that does not rise above Dahomey fetishism. The permanence of such a
prejudice, which is constantly reborn, shows the force of the logic of imagina-
tion.
One curious consequence of this doctrine can be drawn for the explication
of poetic monsters and metamorphoses. They | “were the necessary result of1024
this incapacity to abstract the form and the properties of the subject. Guided
by their vulgar logic, ⟦the first men⟧ had to put their subjects together when
they wanted to bring forms together, or destroy a subject in order to separate
its first form from the opposed form to which it was joined.”226
Vico remarks quite rightly that at the beginning the figures of language were
not figures, but the natural expression of men.227 Later on, when themind had
become accustomed to abstractions, it could distinguish between proper and
figurative meaning. At this moment a phenomenon occurred on which mod-
ern science has insisted a great deal: poetic figures were often interpreted in a
prosaic way, and many nonsensical interpretations flowed from this. What has
not been written about the famous miracle of Joshua! All contemporary inter-
preters agree in seeing this tale as simply a misunderstanding.228
If one cannot concede to Vico that fables are, in general, past history, still it
must be recognized that he rightly showed that the ancients had a great deal of
trouble separating poetical and historical compositions, fiction and narrative
[récit]. In antiquity, as in the Middle Ages, authors hesitated to invent entirely
imaginary characters analogous to those of our modern novelists. “Tragedy
took for subjects characters from poetic history: ancient comedy put onto the
stage famousmen who were still alive. Finally the new comedy, born when the
Greeks were the most capable of reflection, created entirely invented charac-
ters.” Dante composed his Divine Comedy with “real characters and historical
facts.”229
In the history of this transformation evidently onemust put to the sidewhat-
ever belongs to prejudice, literary fashion, or academic rules, to consider only
what is really living. Vico did not make this distinction well, for if Dante had,
225 Is not the platonic theory of ideas also such a survival? Things owe their reality to their
resemblance to a perfect type: as signs, they participate also in the active force of this type.
226 Book II, chapter 3, §2, p. 403 [§410].
227 Book II, chapter 3, §2, p. 403 [§409].
228 Renan, Histoire d’ Israël, volume I, p. 243.
229 Book III, chapter 5, p. 533 [§817].
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without a doubt, written according to the laws of development of the human
spirit [l’ esprit humain] in drawing on historical figures, it is also certain that
Petrarch made a work of pure literature in devoting a poem to | the Second 1025
Punic war. Nonetheless our philosopher connects these two facts which are of
quite different sorts.
For peoples of the heroic age, the adventures of famous chiefs form themost
compact, best known, andmost intelligible groupof existing forms to put at the
service of narrators. The adventures of war lend themselves easily to the work
of imagination because it is always impossible to know what has happened
in a battle: two eye-witnesses will disagree. Although the wars of the Revolu-
tion and the Empire are quite close to us, it seems difficult to get an exact idea
of these great events. In those cases where it is possible to seize the forma-
tion of modern legends, one finds that they hardly depend on a slow work of
transformation, but that they are formed above all by a fantastic representation
provoked from the first moment by violent emotions. It is because I have had
occasion to recognize this system of formation that I consider as very doubtful
the ideas expressed by Vico on the historical character of fables. In any case,
according to the theory developed in the section above, these fables could not
have been, at the beginning, the objective description of an external reality,
but signs developed out of emotions: these are not histories in the sense that
we give the word.
The proper and eternal character of poetry is to represent “the impossible
⟦that is⟧ nonetheless believable.”230 Anything is believable in the adventures
of war and the credulity of our contemporaries, who have devoured without
blinking themost deceitful memoirs on the prowess of Napoleonic armies, has
been no less great than that of the ancient Greeks. The most cultivated spir-
its show themselves to be a little more demanding as far as plausibility goes:
what seems natural to primitives seems to them the height of the incredible
and is no longer of interest. In order to satisfy them, the poet creates imaginary
characters [personnages], living under the conditions of real life. He recounts
“particular adventures that one might of course simply not know about and
that for just this reason one finds truthful.”231 Extraordinary adventures can be
accepted only if they are presented in a very cautious way, so as not to offend
too much the cultivated mind.
It should also be observed that primitive peoples do not try to establish | 1026
learned differentiations and that they could hardly do so, since their life is
230 Book II, chapter 2, §1, p. 388 [§383].
231 Book III, chapter 5, p. 534 [§817].
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muchmore affective than intellectual. “To the character [caractère] of Achilles,
which it is the principle task of the Iliad to depict, ⟦theGreeks⟧ attribute all the
qualities proper to heroic virtue… In the character of Ulysses, principal subject
of the Odyssey, they place all the distinctive marks of heroic wisdom … They
attribute to these two characters particular actions whose renown [célébrité]
could strike the attention of a still-stupid people to such a degree that it would
be put in one or the other category.”232 Here we return to what Vico calls the
principle of uniformity: this literature has something impersonal and un-fixed
about it, which indeed harmonizes well with a civilization in which man is as
yet so little differentiated within the group.
The flaws in imitations of ancient poems made in periods of greater critical
development are so striking that the imitations rapidly become tedious. The
heroes of classical tragedy speak a very noble language and demonstrate very
beautiful sentiments. But they are automatons, they are not sufficiently indi-
vidualized, they represent types too much.
The same characteristic of generality also finally made classical comedy
intolerable: the lawyer, the doctor, the judge, and so on, do not interest us
today. We want to be put in contact with perfectly well determined characters
[personnages] who depart from the professional types. The same process of
individuation led our modern authors to invent purely from the imagination
figures that the spectator cannot assimilate to well-known [other] figures.
One must not confuse, as our contemporaries often do, the mixture of his-
tory and fable proper to periods in which the imagination reigns in opposition
to science, with adulterated interpretations of the past: the latter phenomenon
occurs in eras of highly developed intellectualism. Vico was very preoccupied
with this sophistication of history, and it was in part to combat errors trans-
mitted by ancient authors about primitive times that he tried to give social
science such a deductive form. In the first axiom, he recalls Tacitus’ phrase:
omne ignotum pro magnifico est.233 He often rebels against the prejudices that
have attributed to primitive peoples a thoughtful life and an intelligence | that1027
they could not have had. He has not the least confidence in the virtues of a
golden age invented by “the learned.”234
In all adulteratedworks,we can findanapplicationof axiom54 [§220]: “men
interpret unclear or doubtful things they encounter in conformity with their
ownnature and the passions or habits [usages] that derive from it.”Vico applies
232 Book III, chapter 4, p. 529 [§809].
233 [From Galgacus’ famous anti-imperialist speech in Agricola 30: “the unknown always
passes for the marvelous.”]
234 Book II, chapter 4, p. 439 [§518].
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this principle to Greek fables and their different versions. I said in the first sec-
tion that his interpretation does not seem in general to be tenable, because he
attributes to pre-Homeric poets finesse that they did not have. We see, today,
many authors treat the history of theMiddle Ages in a sophistical way because
of thepassions that dominate the country. Certain [authors] engage inpatriotic
action by overwhelming the English of the Hundred YearsWar with invectives;
others sing the praises of the happiness inwhichworkers [ouvriers] lived at the
time of the corporations; in the past, democratic demands made by the bour-
geois and artisanswere the cause of much discussion. Nothing ismore difficult,
in an impassioned country, than writing history in a scientific way: the milieu
dominates even the best minds.
XII
The problem of anthropomorphism is closely attached to the logic of the imag-
ination, and is of such interest that I thought it best to treat it separately. As
is often the case, there are two distinct points of view in Vico, at times he is
thinking about how children and primitives might act, and at other times he
puts forward laws that are still applicable and are perhaps eternal.
The first men “gave sentiments and passions to material beings and even to
the most extended of these beings, to the heavens, to the earth, to the sea.”235
We on the other hand, he says, “we still follow a path analogous to these first
men, but it is regarding intellectual things, such as the faculties of the soul,
the passions, the virtues, the vices, the sciences, the arts. We shape for our-
selves the idea of these as so many women (justice, poetry, and so on), | and 1028
we attribute to these fantastic beings all causes, all properties, all the effects of
the things that they indicate. It is that we cannot set outside [ourselves] intel-
lectual things contained in our understanding without the assistance of the
imagination, which helps us to explain them and depict them with a human
image.”236
This theory does not appear very satisfactory. It is indeed not applicable to
scientific notions or even to those whose character has been refined by critical
study. Today it seems rather foolish to engage in rhetoric, to invoke the muses
to sing, in a question of law, economics, strategy, or agriculture. Philosophical
poems these days are not successful. This is because we no longer represent all
235 Book II, chapter 3, §1, 398 [§402].
236 [pp. 397–398. §402].
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these things in a human form except as a linguistic survival, conserving them
for verbal symmetry, but not as an influence on thought. A transformation has
taken place about which something must be said.
I have already called attention to the role played by the artificial milieu in
making intellectual combinations. Man finds two kinds of relations in what he
makes, psychological andmechanical. The first belong to the domain of vulgar
observation, managed by the imagination; the second to the domain of reflec-
tive study. Among primitive peoples thoughts “are the expression of passions
and sentiments, as opposed to philosophical thoughts, which are the product
of reflection and reasoning.”237 These last have their object above all in the
most perfect works of scientific intelligence, which is to say rigorously precise
mechanisms,mathematical demonstrations, logical demonstrations, in aword
everything that escapes caprice.238The former [psychological relations] are, on
the contrary, all sentiment and imagination, at least in their primitive form |.1029
In our muchmore complex civilized societies no one can escape the influence
of science, therefore mixed forms appear, but the scientific contributions play
always an only passive role in these combinations. In any case, science has
reached truly and purely scientific formonly in a very few cases.More often the
name science is given to a group of rather confused more or less scientific rea-
sonings, which are sometimes simply analogic, applied to empirical results: the
imagination plays here again a very important role, as much in the formation
of the elements as in the demonstrative force attached to certain analogies.
Originally, man could not make sense of things except by constructing rep-
resentations with what he experienced, which is to say with the most striking
psychological manifestations, with emotions and passions. This is the point
Vicomakes above. He says, elsewhere, that primitive peoples, hearing the noise
of thunder, believed that the heavenswere speaking to them, that “thunder and
lightning were the signs of Jupiter.”239 They could understand the world only
through the image of their own nature and their own affective states: all noise
was a gesture in sound, because they expressed themselves through these same
quite crude forms of language [langage].
237 Axiom 53 [§219]. Vico says also in this passage that “men feel first, without noticing the
things felt; they notice next, but with the confusion of a disturbed and impassioned soul;
finally enlightened by intelligence, they begin to reflect” [§218].
238 “Metaphysicsdetaches the soul from the senses; the poetical facultyplunges so to speak the
former into the latter and buries it there; metaphysics rises up to generalities, the poetic
faculty descends to particularities.” (Book III, chapter 5, p. 535). This is why Vico cannot
admit that there could “be at the same time and to the same degree poets and sublime
metaphysicians” [§821].
239 Book II, chapter 2, §1, p. 386 [§379].
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As man developed himself and accomplished deeds that were more com-
plex, thoughtful, and skilled, he transposed into physical nature the newmeans
he had at his disposal. He constructed the world with his own resources, fol-
lowing Vico’s general theory. The new resources had been drawn from his own
tools, frommethods employed in the arts, and finally from the theoretical stud-
ies made of this technology in order to understand and perfect it. From this
follows the introduction of relations that I call mechanical, because rational
mechanics offers us their most perfect and clear type.
Vico sought to make sense of this opposition. Indeed he said, “just as the
metaphysics of reason teaches us that by intelligence man becomes all objects
(homo intelligendo fit omnia), the metaphysics of imagination demonstrates to
us that man becomes all objects without intelligence (homo non intelligendo | 1030
fit omnia); and perhaps the second axiom ismore true than the first, sinceman,
in the exercise of his intelligence, extends hismind [esprit] to seize objects and
that, in the absence of intelligence, he makes all objects from himself, and by
this transformation becomes in himself alone all nature.”240
Not only does man explain all actions by the will, but he even transports his
organic machinery into the world to designate objects: “the majority of expres-
sions regarding inanimate objects are drawn, metaphorically, from the human
body and its parts, or from the human sentiments and passions.”241
I said above that according to Vico, the moderns still apply the same proce-
dure to different intellectual things that they represent in the form of women.
This is because there aremany very important relations in human life that can-
not be represented except in passing through a manifestation of the will. For
example, one speaks of country [patrie] as a woman, and could hardly do dif-
ferently: it is not as though great efforts have not beenmade in our time to give
a scientific appearance to the idea of country, but all these efforts have failed
pathetically: it is impossible to consider ideas of this sort independently of the
psychology of sentiments without comprehensively ruining them. The same
could be said of charity, benevolence, and many other affective entities.
Our fathers generally believed that theprogress of humanity consisted above
all in the elimination of emotional states, that in consequence eventually char-
ity, benevolence, and so on, would become scientific things. It is in this order of
ideas that the utilitarian morality has been proposed. It must constitute itself
bymeans of reason and replace the old and too-sentimentalmorality [morale].
I think that it would not be very difficult to find in Vico arguments in support
240 Book II, chapter 3, §2, p. 400 [§405].
241 Book II, chapter 3, §2, p. 399 [§404].
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of this way of seeing things, which fits very well with the ideal conception of
history. But I have already observed that in this philosophy, ideal history is the
deadweight that must be separated from the theses destined to last. Vico says
about the faculties of the ancient poets, “the peopleswho, in this era, were so to
speak all bodywithout reflection, were all sentiment in order to feel particular-
ities, | all imagination to seize and expand them, all invention to connect them1031
to kinds that the imagination had created (generi fantastici), finally allmemory
to retain them. These faculties belong no doubt to the spirit [esprit], but they
draw from the body their origin and their vigor.”242 If this is so, it is not too clear
how the domain of the imagination—away of representing with volitions, the
faculty of producing fantastic kinds—could disappear.
Man cannot become a purely intellectual being. It is for this reason that we
find, in all eras, phenomena that remind us of the procedures to whichwe have
given the name anthropomorphism. It was not without difficulty that physics
succeeded in eliminating theories about the faculties of atoms, that had been
called properties of matter [matière], but that were nothing other than the
introduction of psychological entities into the domain of mechanics. The vic-
tory is not yet complete for, from time to time, we see unfortunate returns of
atomism, which disguises itself in new costumes and cleverly hides the fac-
ulties that it introduces. Contemporary physiologists are nearly all anthropo-
morphists. Those dealing with the nervous system can never stop themselves
from endowing the elements they study with will and consciousness. And they
think that they therefore have given a scientific explanation of will and con-
sciousness! If they limited themselves to saying that theymakeuseof these con-
structions because they are convenient and because they seem for themoment
the best way of clearly representing the phenomena, there would be nothing
to complain about;—but the dignity of Science does not permit looking too
closely and understanding what one is doing.
Must it be said, withVico, that themethod [procédé] of themoderns (which
consists in materializing intellectual things) is contrary to the method of the
primitives (which consisted in animatingmaterial things)?243 The difference is
not so great as it may at first appear. The barbarians hardly yet separated the
object from the simulacre: todaywe are obliged tomake this separation at least
in language. When reflection has arrived at a middle state, it places in things
an idea, a notion, an entity, that we seek to know, that we succeed in reaching
through the exercise of the intelligence, | thatwe name: eachword corresponds1032
242 Book III, chapter 5, p. 534 [§819].
243 Book II, chapter 3, §1, p. 398 [§402].
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to an objective reality. Primitive peoples have not yet achieved abstraction and
they stillmix together the idea and theobject; as for themost advancedphiloso-
phers, they realize their abstractions.
It is impossible for us to speak about anything without figuring it materially;
this is what happens with abstractions that we are obliged to connect to the
wills of fantastic beings. We are different from the barbarians only in that we
bring these beings out of the sensible world [milieu] in order to make them
inhabitants of a world of imagination without poetry. Vico was quite right to
say that themethod [méthode] followedby themoderns does not have the sub-
lime character of that of the ancients: it engenders at once error and pedantry.
It is only in taking the greatest precautions that it is possible to avoid the
errors that this logic of the imagination, always present and always ready to
impose itself, engenders when scientific logic shows itself to be even momen-
tarily relaxed.244
It remains to examinewhy the ancient poets, in animating nature, produced
such sublime inventions. Vico speaks frequently of this quality of old poetry
but does not give us any very clear explanations. Nonetheless this important
rule must be remembered: “the poetic sublimemust always have something of
the popular.”245 One can conclude from this that it is closer to psychological
methods of representation than logic or science, but that does not exhaust the
subject.
Vico’s observation allows us to understand why A. Comte and his disciples
were so sovereignly ridiculous in their posturing attempts at religious eleva-
tion. It is because they belonged to the classes absorbed by intellectual labor
and incapable of understanding things in a popular way. We see | an analo- 1033
gous phenomenon in theMiddleAges. Ecclesiasticalwriters rarely had sublime
ideas, their lives were lived far from the people, and their work shows that they
were more or less totally ignorant about the contemporary world.
In Vico’s mind the sublime is proper to primitive civilizations and it can-
not occur again before the cycle of ideal history swings back to the time of
barbarism. And Vico indeed several times causes the exceptional power of the
sensory faculties of primitive peoples to intervene. He supposes that they were
244 Themind has a very difficult time not putting a being behind aword; one of themost curi-
ous examples of this superstition is offered to his by the history of the concept of milieu.
This word is used to designate not a thing, but an ensemble of relations, and yet it has it
any the less been made a character that the positivists have divinized, the Great Milieu?
I read somewhere that man is submitted to mesological influences. Thus the evolution is
complete: relations are synthesized with an abstract word, which becomes a being, and
engenders influences—thus everything is backwards. Oh! Scientists! Scientists!
245 Book III, chapter 4, p. 530 [§809].
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differently organized than we are. “Providence … wished that in the age when
man had fallen into a state of brutality, he might be conserved by the most
active and subtle senses and that then these senses would weaken when the
age of reflection arrived, and that this faculty of prevision [prévoyante] would
in turn protect the body. Fromwhat proceeds itmust be understoodwhyheroic
descriptions, such as those of Homer, were so brilliant and striking that all
the poets of later ages could not imitate them, and far less equal them.”246 In
other passages, he speaks in the same way about the extraordinary memory
and strong imagination of barbarous peoples.
I do not think that it would be easy to demonstrate this physiological degen-
eration. In any case, experience would show in the century following Vico’s
death that the most elevated lyric poetry was still possible.
Still there is something right in Vico’s ideas: the way in which primitive peo-
ples feel is much more poetic than the way in which reflective ages represent
things. The first animate nature without decomposing it, while the classics
superimpose on nature a world of fictive characters, whose intervention is the
most distasteful thing imaginable: genies, fairies, nymphs, all make any sort
of description odious. Modern poetry has rediscovered nature and put itself
directly in contact with it: it has been necessary to animate nature to some
degree, because of the necessity of using a language full of images drawn from
affective states, but ways have been found not to reproduce the forms of the
past; in our time, it would have been impossible to remake a natural mythol-
ogy, even a barbarous one, without quickly arriving at the flatmythology of our
classics.247
Modern poetry and primitive poetry can be compared also according to1034
another characteristic: the sublime demands that the soul feels emotions that
belong to the domain of fear, however little theymay be developed. Barbarians
experience terrors that seem to us quite childish when we visit the places that
they peopled with fantastic beings; classical literature strove to describe the
places that tradition had consecrated and could not succeed in provoking any
emotions. To rediscover the sublime, onemust put one’s self into environments
[milieux] that are quite different but still able to provoke in our civilized souls
emotions analogous to those that primitive peoples had known. The sea, the
mountain, great solitude, are capable of giving this impression of awe [sous-
terreur] (if one may use this barbarous word), without which there is nothing
sublime.248
246 Book II, chapter 7, §2, p. 489 [–490. §707].
247 There is a remarkable example of creations foreign to the theory of returns in ideal history.
248 In the third book, Vico tries to show that one can no longer find in civilized milieus
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XIII
The transformations of law occupy a large place in the New Science. One must
first of all understand a certain number of important notions.Vico borrows this
definition of civil equity from Ulpian: “it is a presumption of law [droit], which
is hardly known naturally by all men, but only to a small number of men who,
uniting wisdom, experience, and study, have learned what is necessary for the
maintenance of society. It is what we call the reason of State.”249 On the con-
trary, “the natural equity of human jurisprudence in its largest development is
a practice, an application of wisdom to useful things. For wisdom, taking this
word in its broadest sense, is only the science of making of things the uses that
they have in nature.”250 These formulas are not very satisfactory because the
first supposes that the rulers of primitive peoples already possess a culture suf-
ficiently advanced to reason about themaintenanceof society, | which couldnot 1035
be the case except in a state of civilizationmuch closer to our own. Ulpian lived
in an era in which Roman jurisprudence was already constituted. This was far
from a primitive time! As for the second definition, we can see that it depends
on the false idea that the old philosophy had of Justice. Vico believed, as did
nearly everyone else, that the Good exists and that man can come to know it,
at least within the limits imposed on his faculties by weakness. I have already
insisted on the importance of this theory in the New Science.
Juridical change is defined in yet another way in axioms 112 and 113: “The
certitude of the law [la loi] is only a faded shadow [ombre effacée] of rea-
son derived from authority. We find laws harsh in their application and yet we
are obliged to apply them because of their certitude. Certitude is the princi-
ple of natural inflexible jurisprudence in the barbarous ages and its rule is civil
equity.—In the laws, the true is a certain light by which natural reason illumi-
nates us.”251
These differences are founded on a psychological law and a providential
decree. Vico says in axiom 9 [§137]: “unable to know the true, men try to arrive
at the certain so that, if intelligence cannot be satisfied by science, the will at
episodes analogous to those that Homer used: “poetics or critique can made cultivated
minds, but cannot give them grandeur.” (Book III, chapter 5, p. 535 [§822]).
249 Axiom 110 [§320].
250 Axiom 114 [§326].
251 [As Menasseyre notes, this is from axioms 111–113, and is also somewhat embellished at
the beginning: “La certitude de la loi est une ombre de la raison (obscurezza) appuyée
sur l’autorité. Nous trouvons alors les lois dures dans l’application, et pourtant nous
sommes obligés de les appliquer en consideration de leur certitude.” pp. 349–350. §321–
323.]
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least relies on the conscience.” At the end of axiom 114 [§328] we read: “As the
nations are obliged to live for many centuries still unable to know the truth
and natural equity, Providence allows that in the meantime they pursue certi-
tude and civil equity, which follow religiously the expression of the law, even
when it becomes harsh and rigorous in its application, in order to assure the
maintenance of human society.” This thought is again reproduced in a some-
what different form further on, “Menwere for a long time unable to know truth
and reason, sources of interior justice, which alone can satisfy intelligence. But
in waiting, they govern themselves through the certitude of authority, through
the common sense of human kind, with the evidence on which rests the con-
science of all nations. Thus, in a certain sense, the New Science becomes a
philosophy of authority, source of external justice.”252
Today, we cannot see things as Vico did; we can no longer speak of a move-
ment toward the Good. | We see that with transformations the sentiment of1036
justice received a great development among men. We can say that this senti-
ment furnishes energy necessary for struggle, but we can no longer recognize
that itmight be a forcehaving a constant direction, capable of leading theworld
in a given direction.
Originally, it does not seem that authority had any sort of idea of justice as
a justification. In heroic law [droit] Vico finds only the law of force, “the law of
Achilles that finds its reason entirely at the point of his spear.”253 Our philoso-
pher has undertaken a detailed study of the Homeric characters and he objects
strongly to the errors of those who have interpreted the manners [moeurs] of
the past in light of modern theories. “They have carried into the heroism of
the first ages three ideas that are natural to minds enlightened and softened by
civilization: the idea of a justice reasoned and led by the maxims of Socratic
morals; the idea of this glory that recompenses the benefactors of human kind;
finally the idea of a noble desire for immortality.”254 Achilles’ virtue “is the sus-
ceptibility, delicacy in the point of honor, in which duelists expressed all their
morality at the period when ancient barbarism reappeared during the Middle
Ages.”255
In such long-ago times, authority was pure and simple; (it nonetheless can-
not be identified with simple arbitrary free will, since it had a certain regularity
to assure relative stability for society). Yet onemight then ask how to pass from
the certain to the true, from heroic authority to reasoned authority: it seems
252 Book I, chapter 4, p. 365 [in fact 366. §350].
253 Book IV, chapter 1, §4, p. 555 [§923].
254 Book II, chapter 6, §8, p. 477 [§666]. Cf. the first chapter of Book III.
255 [p. 477, §667].
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that this movement is not intelligible because it does not take place within the
same kind and because, beginning with an amoral state, humanity arrives at
Justice.
Many authors have thought it necessary to introduce into primitive civiliza-
tions philosophical ideas that were absent from them. Sumner Maine had no
problem doing so. He said that law had been formed first of all from themistes,
sentences based “on an inspiration from above in the mind of the judge, at the
moment in which he pronounces his judgement.”256 It seems to him entirely
natural to think that these decisions were reputed just because of their divine
origin. But Vico notes | that in the Iliad the gods do not seem more morally 1037
advanced than men.257 It is none too clear what idea of justice could corre-
spond to such an inspiration. Finally Sumner Maine can invoke no text to sup-
port his opinion. Aristotle speaks of royal judgements and tells us that kings
swear an oath in raising the scepter—butwhat does thismute languagemean?
Is it not the equivalent of the language of the chancelleries, a simple sign of
command?258
It is regrettable that Vico did not apply here his law of comparison, which
might have furnished him with useful clues. The authority of the heroic times
could be comparedwith that of theHighMiddle Age. If there is an era inwhich
the idea of Justice is completely absent, it is surely that one. Authority pursued
its own satisfaction, sought what profits its power could bring, and considered
the administration of justice above all as a revenue source: it is one of themost
curious chapters in the history of the State.
What is the nature of the end toward which juridical change directs itself,
meaning here a provisional and real end? Vico recalls a phrase from Dio Cas-
sius: “Custom is like a king, law a tyrant.”259 This formula is of great importance
for determining juridical ideas; we must pause over it because it is clear that,
in Vico’s mind, the truly natural regime is that of custom.
When a reform takes place in our own time, the country finds itself divided
into two parties: those against whom the law has been made submit because
they cannot do otherwise and because they are not strong enough; ordinar-
ily they hope to take their revenge later on;—as for the victors, they pretend
that Right [Droit] is identical to their desires, their interests, and they hurry to
profit from the advantages that power [la force] gives them.260 If at the end of
256 Ancien droit, fr. trans., p. 8 [Maine, Ancient law, 3].
257 Book III, chapter 1, p. 516 and book IV, chapter 4, §1, p. 576 [§967].
258 Politique, book III, chapter 9, §7 [Politics, 84–85].
259 Axiom 104 [§308].
260 I understand here the word power [la force] in the general sense; any law, voted on as reg-
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several years the new rules have indeed been accepted and pass into habit [les
moeurs], then their origin is no longer a source of concern, they | are taken such1038
as they are and become customary [des coutumes]. It even happens rather fre-
quently that the people who had fought against the change become the best
defenders of the new situation.
During the provisional period, the law is an annoyance for many people: it
appears still as an expression of thewill of a group. Later on itwill be only a fact,
that one can consider in an objective way, without discussing the legitimacy of
its origin andwithout seeking toknowexactly the reasons that brought it about.
This transformation is striking for the institutions born out of the Revolution:
few people interest themselves in the causes for their adoption. These causes
are frequently very difficult to reconstruct, and when we can do so, often they
turn out to have been rather unsavory;—but today, it is no longer in general of
great importance to know if the desire forwealth, if passions and hatreds, had a
greater or lesser influence on the laws voted on in this period.We are no longer
living in 1789 and these things must be evaluated from today’s point of view.
When law has become custom, generally very mediocre reasons suffice to
justify it.261 The real reason for its maintenance is that it has existed long
enough to have been accepted and to have been put into relations with new
practices [usages]. It is not greater or lesser conformity with the ideal of Justice
that renders it good; but we can say that it no longer instigates protests suffi-
cient to excite the sentiment of justice in the country to a significant degree.
Once this has come to pass, the rule no longer appears to be an exterior order
founded on coercive force, but seems rather to be purely natural: for this rea-
son the philosophers are not entirely unreasonable to claim thatwe can ascribe
the most general and least contested practices [usages] to human nature. Vico
says, | “Divine wisdom has no need of the force of laws; it prefers to lead us1039
by customs that we freely maintain, because following them is following our
nature.”262When one abandons traditional moral theory, one sees that natural
ularly as may be by a parliament, is only the manifestation of the power of the party that
demands it.
261 Ordinarily the reasons given are historical absurdities.
262 Book V, chapter 4, p. 639 [§1107]. Cf. book II, chapter 5, §1, p. 442. Compare to a famous
passage fromAristotle: “The law has no power tomake itself obeyed but that of habit, and
habit is not formed except through time and years” (Politique, book II, chapter 5, §14) [Pol-
itics, 49].When customhas been thus established, it acts onour conscience and engenders
ourmanner of speculative thinking through the ideogenetic laws: it is in these conditions
that one can say that the manner of living engenders the consciousness [la conscience]
and that the social structure is reflected in the human mind [espirt]. Vico’s custom, Aris-
totle’s law, [1039] are, in someway, assimilated by the individual and produce in our brains
their intellectual consequences.
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lawdoes not justify customs, but that it is only away of translating customs into
metaphysical language in order to group them, coordinate them, and deduce
detailed rules from them. Justice no longer appears as an end towardwhich one
goes, nor as an interior force that moves us; it exerts itself only intermittently,
when we feel the need to change our juridical rules: it is no more in the final
end than in the starting point: it is only in the movement.A29
Ancient law presents a very great difficulty onwhichVico insists a great deal
without being able to give a satisfactory explanation, and onemust also not be
surprised to see him invoke Providence in order to account for the rigidity of
primitive jurisprudence. “These inflexible judgements were necessary for the
times in which heroes put reason and good law [bon droit] in force. To forestall
complaints, tricks, and murders, Providence saw fit to constitute justice as the
precise expression of ceremonial [solennelle] forms.”263 He believed that this
jurisprudential practice was a survival; “generally divine things are expressed
by consecrated formulas in which not one letter can be changed; thus in the
ancient formulas of Roman jurisprudence, in imitation of sacred formulas, it
is said: one comma too few, the case is lost.” We get not much further in recall-
ing the importance of the oath in ancient proceedings; Vico notes the difficulty
because he again invokes “the design of Providence, which made it so that in
heroic times, the word was considered irrevocable.”264
To this first difficulty we must add that of explaining the fiction of law, by
means of which it is possible to conserve venerated texts while applying them
in a new way to new situations. It does not seem that anyone has yet managed
to give | complete and scientific interpretations of these phenomena. Sumner 1040
Maine indeed tried to formulate laws of the general evolution of jurisprudence
that he found to be applicable in an approximate way to Rome and to England;
but he did not try to show that his theory applied to other countries, he did
not even try to account for the mechanism of these fictions; he showed their
historical importance and believed that their utility explained their existence.
In Vico we find a more interesting perspective on this mechanism, which
he quite ingeniously compares to successive forms of expression. “Man being
properly nothing but intelligence, body, and language [langage], and language
being as the intermediary of the two substances constitutinghis nature, the cer-
tain in matters of justice was determined by acts of the body in the times that
preceded the invention of articulated language. Since this invention it has been
[determined] by verbal formulas. Finally, human reason having taken on its full
263 Book IV, chapter 4, §1, p. 575 [§966].
264 Book IV, chapter 4, §1, p. 577 [This line is in square brackets inMichelet and finds no clear
analogue in the original text. §968].
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development, the certain will be confounded with the true of ideas relative to
justice, which will be determined by reason according to the most particular
circumstances of the facts.”265 Thus we see that right [droit] has followed an
evolution related to the laws [lois] that bind expression and thought.
For Vico, these laws are of major importance; the formation of intelligible
kinds was indeed in his eyes preceded by a long period of work on languages
[langues]. “The poets having first formed poetic language by the association
of particular ideas, the peoples then formed the languages of prose by bringing
together under a singleword—like the species to a kind [comme les espèces au
genre]—the parts that poetic language had put together … This abbreviated
method gave more activity to minds and made them capable of abstraction;
later could come the philosopherswho, prepared by this vulgar classification of
words and letters, worked on that of ideas and formed the intelligible kinds.”266
The commonpeople have a sort of sovereignty over civilized languages. “The
absolute power of peoples over languages extends to a relation to legislation:
the people gives to laws the meaning it likes and the powerful must manage
as best they can to follow | the laws in the meaning given to them by the1041
people. Monarchs cannot take from peoples this sovereignty over languages
[langues].”267
Thus themechanismof juridical change is ordered by themechanismof lan-
guages [commandé par l’outillage des langues]; this is what allows us to under-
stand ancient Roman law, what Vico calls “a serious poem that the Romans
performed on the forum.”268 Jurisconsults make use of techniques identical
to those of fable-writers in order to stage new combinations. “Unable to cre-
ate abstract forms through intelligence, they imagined corporeal ones and
supposed them animated according to their own nature. They realized hered-
ity [hérédité] in their imagination as sovereign over heritage and placed her
entirely in each of the effects of which it was composed … The first jurispru-
dence was entirely poetic; through a series of fictions it supposed that what
was not yet done was already done, that what was born was yet to be born, that
deathwas living and vice versa. It introduced a host of disguises, veils that cover
nothing, rights [droits] translated into fables by the imagination. It made all its
worth consist in finding fables well enough imagined to rescue the gravity of
the law [loi] and apply right [droit] to fact.”269
265 Book IV, chapter 7, §2, p. 611 [§1045]. Already quoted partially in X.
266 Book II, chapter 3, §5, p. 423 [§460].
267 Book IV, chapter 2, §2, p. 559 [§936].
268 Book IV, chapter 7, §2, p. 608 [§1037].
269 Book IV, chapter 7, §2, p. 607 [§1035].
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The judge, unable to follow philosophical reasoning, has no guarantee
against the possibility of error but the very exact attribution [propriété] of
terms. “Barbarians, having only particular ideas, are satisfied so long as the
terms of the law [loi] are precisely applied. Such is their idea of right [droit].”270
Vico says again, “in aristocratic governments, the cause (exterior form) of obli-
gation consists in a formula through which one seeks a guarantee in the preci-
sion of speech and the attribution of terms.”271
In order to understand juridical change it is absolutely necessary to follow
at the same time themechanism thatmen have available and changes of a psy-
chological order. “Wisdom is the faculty that dominates all doctrines relative
to the sciences and the arts that | make up humanity. Plato defines wisdom 1042
as the faculty that perfects man … Wisdom starts with the muse, defined by
Homer, in a remarkable passage of theOdyssey, as the science of good and evil;
this science was then called divination … Afterward, wisdomwas attributed to
men famous for having given useful advice to human kind; suchwere the seven
sages of Greece. Later, wisdom passed into the opinion of the men who orga-
nized and wisely governed States in the interest of nations. Yet later, the word
wisdomcame to signify the natural science of divine things, that is to say,meta-
physics.”272
Thiswisdom is not necessarily represented bymenwhopossess civil author-
ity. Most often it belongs to thinkers who live independently, whose sayings are
collected as maxims.
In the history of institutions, movement is perhaps easier to understand
than conservation. Not all peoples have had the Romans’ superstitious respect
for formulas. Causes that could have determined the conservative character of
their legislation must therefore be investigated. Vico saw well that everything
here depended on their aristocratic constitution. “Secrecy is the soul of aristoc-
racies,”273 he said, thinking probably about Venice. “The conservation of orders
carries with it that of themagistrates and priesthood and, in consequence, that
of the laws and jurisprudence …; knowledge of laws was the last privilege that
the patricians ceded to the plebeians.”274 If there is a privileged body, charged
with keeping and guarding the laws [lois], able to keep the law [droit] secret,
notmuchwill change in juridical expressions: the interest of this body is indeed
270 Axiom 3 [In fact, axiom 111, §322].
271 Book IV, chapter 7, §2, p. 610 [Michelet has truncated the text substantially here. See
§1043–§1048].
272 Book II, chapter 1, §2, p. 376 [§365].
273 Book IV, chapter 3, §5, p. 568 [§953].
274 Book IV, chapter 5, §3, p. 589 [§999].
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not to allow any interference with the formulas of which it is the proprietor.
Experience proves that, everywhere, magistrates are very opposed to innova-
tion.
It does not seem that devotion to words [la religion des paroles] has a sin-
gle cause, producing palpable effects in all countries. Where it does exist, it
did not come about all at once; it was necessary that the body of formulas had
been considered finished (at least in a general way).We know from the history
of the Israelites that this moment arrived rather late for them and under the
influence of very particular historical reasons |.275 Sumner Maine ingeniously1043
connects Roman law to the moral theology of Catholicism.276 It really seems
that here there has been a tradition and that it is the practice of jurisconsults
that engendered certain habits of thought among Latin theologians. But the
history of Christianity presents a great difficulty; it is not known in what era
and under what influences the Canonwas stopped: it is after this moment that
devotion to words took on a preponderant importance.
This moment is characterized by the death of sentimental associations and
the incontestable development of regular associations undertaken according
to some science or other, a science sometimes very absurd from the perspec-
tive of themoderns but very respectable for the ancients. Antique decisions did
not need to be very precise, as long as they were not treated in a scientific way;
they served only to recall certain affective states: they were, in a sense, quite
vague, because they were only signals for emotions; they were extremely nar-
row, if they are examined in their scientific meaning, because they could not
yet include the definition of kinds, but only appreciations of particular things.
The learned would not have been able to get their theories adopted if they did
not have ingenious ways of using formulas. In each particular case, the histori-
cal origin of the methods must be sought out.
∵
In closing let us examine Vico’s idea of fully developed jurisprudence: “Human
judgements are not blind and inflexible like heroic judgements. The rule they
follow is the truth of facts…Monarchs, in these judgments, glory in being supe-
275 It would be impossible to attempt a solid theory on the general history of law without
having conducted a deep study of the Talmud.
276 Ancien Droit, p. 335. Vico says that the doctors of the Middle Ages operated like Roman
jurisconsults; they sought to “protect the clients and prepare them to provide a detailed
account of the contested case” (Book IV, chapter 3, §1, p. 561 [§939]).
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rior to the laws and in depending only on their conscience andGod.”277 He says
elsewhere: “Constantine | entirely abolished the formulas and itwas recognized 1044
that anymotive of equity prevailedover the law. Somuchareminds [les esprits]
disposed to recognize in a docile way equity under human governments!”278
Vico here only puts in philosophical form current practice: sovereign courts
had it recognized that they were, to a certain degree, the successors of the
sacred council and that they could judge according to conscience; the 18th cen-
tury did not end without seeing this principle applied to criminal judgments
by jury. It is not useless to recall here that Aristotle had a completely opposed
idea of judgement and that he recommended leaving judges as little latitude
as possible.279 The experience of Greek tribunals had taught him the danger of
decisions taken according to conscience.
In my opinion, the question must be considered from a point of view very
different from Vico’s. These judgments, in which monarchs placed themselves
above the laws, were never anything but exceptions; we cannot therefore con-
sider themas characteristic of an advanced state of jurisprudence.TheNeapoli-
tan philosopher, who believes in the existence of absolute Good, must think
that the world works in order to attain full consciousness of this Good; this,
we can no longer entertain. If equity seems sometimes to demand that certain
tribunals not follow the laws, wemust see in this, according to the theory devel-
oped above, a movement that tends to change the rule: this movement exists
at all times and always happens in the same way, beginning with a particular
case, an extraordinary fact.
Vico recognized perfectly well the character of certain formulas, too old to
be well understood: “Ancient laws seem to address one man alone; from a first
case, they extend to all the others, because the first peoples were incapable of
general ideas; they could not conceive of thembefore the facts that called them
forth presented themselves. In the trial of the young Horace, the law of Tullus
Hostilius is nothing other than the sentence carried out against the illustrious
accused by the duumvirs, who had been created by the king for this judgement
…The examples must at first have been real; abstract examples came later. But
when | general ideas had been acquired, it was recognized that the essential 1045
property of the law [la loi] must be universality, and this maxim of jurispru-
dence was established: legibus, non exemplis, est judicandum.”280
277 Book IV, chapter 4, §1, p. 578 [§974].
278 Book IV, chapter 5, §3, p. 591 [Sorel omits “naturelle,” whichmodifies “l’équité” inMichelet
and in Vico, as well as removing Michelet’s italics. §1001].
279 Rhétorique, book I, chapter 1, §§6–7.
280 Book II, chapter 3, §6, p. 433 [§500–501].
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According to an opinionwidely held, and notably by SumnerMaine, change
in law is, in advanced civilizations, the work of the legislator alone. This the-
ory does not account for the facts: most often the legislator intervenes only to
regularize and coordinate: his role is that of an editor, putting scattered and
sometimes discordant decisions into juridical language. The true movement
must be grasped where particular decisions are made.
Particular judgments donot come in twokinds: thesederiving from the igno-
rance and simplicity of primitives incapable of generalizing and those reveal-
ing a full awareness of equity among civilized princes. In all periods, they are
the source of law [droit] and they constitute the normal means through which
institutions modify themselves.
As relations becomemore complex inmodern society, the need is felt to pro-
voke these juridical movements to a greater degree; and they are provoked in
theway I have just described, andwhich is one of the clearestmanifestations of
historical materialism: theory follows practice and does not precede it. In order
that lawmay adapt itself easily to new needs, everywhere people hurriedly cre-
ate exceptional jurisdictions, foreign to what is taught in the schools and to the
traditions of professional magistrates. Often fanatics of unity have demanded
a return to the principles of the Revolution and the unification of all tribunals.
We see, in the present moment, many authors attacking the jury. In fact, the
number of secular commissions [commissions laïques] is still increasing.281
Since the progress of large-scale industry has modified to such a degree the
conditions of the labor contract, there has often been a desire to bring | the1046
civil Code into conformity with new needs; but this has never gotten past quite
empty declamations about labor, because it is impossible to say what must
be done. Effective measures taken up to today have been those that different
countries have realized by instituting eithermediating councils or labor cham-
bers: these new organs have not yet produced very much, but this is in part
because they have been made to function in too judicial of a way and people
have wanted from them what they cannot give. They ought to be thought of
as commissions chargedwith elaborating particular opinions, muchmore than
preparing transactions.When the general public has become familiar with the
difficulties that industrial practice presents, when many more examples have
281 In the milieu from which these commissions recruit, one nearly always finds in a clear
way phenomena that can be recognized as the origin of law [droit]; opinions follow one
another and coordinate not in a logical or scholastic way, but in virtue of sentimental
affinities. Aristotle had seen this character very well in criminal justice in Athens; he says
that the gravity of a crimewasmeasured in the terror and the pity that its telling provoked
among those who heard it (Rhétorique, book I, chapter 14, §3).
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been examined, it will be possible to think about formulating new rules and
drawing up a labor Code. At the present time it is not known what should go
into this Code.
The endpoint for these commissions is above all to put conflicts in juridi-
cal form, to specify them, to recognize exactly the forces at work and to define
them. But the name they take (arbitration councils, conciliators, etc) must not
hide from us the very foundation, the fundamental cause of the movement,
which is the class struggle for the conquest of rights [droits]. I have already had
occasion to observe that Vico perfectly well distinguished between the strug-
gle for conquest of the advantages of power and the struggle for rights.282 It is a
distinction of great importance, which ought to be always present in ourminds
whenwe examine the history of contemporary conflicts from the point of view
of the evolution of juridical ideas.
282 From the point of view of historical materialism, it would not be very exact to speak of
struggle for the law [droit].
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Annotations
(1) In the first years of his intellectual career, before the encounter with Marx,
Sorel not only published in the Thomist Annales de philosophie chrétienne
but, more widely, constructed his early epistemology in broadly speaking Aris-
totelian language. Despite this, it would be an overstatement to situate these
writings in a tradition of French Aristotelianism. Much as is the case with
Sorel’s engagement with Bergson or with pragmatism, the engagement with
Aristotelianism is extremely creative, and ought to be seen as a set of refer-
ences which Sorel employs to construct a relatively original position in the
epistemological debates in which he is involved. In 1888, for example, the
Aristotelian notion of formal causation was deployed against a naive empiri-
cism Sorel attributed to Auguste Comte (see Georges Sorel, “De la cause en
physique,” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’ étranger XXVI, November
(1888): 464–480). The function performed here by the reference to the Greek
philosopher is slightly different, in that it constitutes a reminder of the com-
plexity of scientific empirical observation. It is illuminating to compare this
“Aristotelian” passage to the “Marxist” opening of his “Science et socialisme,”
Revue philosophique de la France et de l’ étranger XXXV, May (1893): 509–511, in
which Marx’s “real metaphysics” is said to be superior to the “idealistic rever-
ies” of academic epistemology. The operation attempted by Sorel is the same,
namely to re-orient natural and social sciences in a more empirical direc-
tion.
(2) Giraud-Teulon’s Origines de la famille. Questions sur les antécéndents des
sociétés patriacales (Paris: Fischbacher, 1874) consisted largely in a discussion
of Jakob Bachofen’s work on ancient matriarchal societies. As we can gather
from the emphasis on Vico’s “second ideogenetic law,” Sorel was interested
in questions concerning the historical origins of familial structure and gen-
der roles, a discussion which was of some relevance in Europe at the time,
particularly in Marxist circles. Extracts of Engels’ Origin of the Family—which
mentions Teulon, Bachofen, as well as Lewis Morgan—had first appeared in
French translation in July 1893 in the Ère nouvelle, a Marxist journal in which
Sorel was heavily involved. In justifying the decision to publish extracts from
the book, the editorial board had simply stated that “it is regrettable that a
French translation has not yet been published” (“Barbarie et Civilisation,” Ère
nouvelle 1, July (1893): 11n). The complete volume would appear a few months
later as Friedrich Engels, L’Origine de la famille, de la propriété privée et de
l’État, trans. by Henri Ravé (Paris: Georges Carré, 1893). For a wider overview
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of the issue see Ann Taylor Allen, “Feminism, Social Science, and the Mean-
ings of Modernity: The Debate on the Origin of the Family in Europe and
the United States, 1860–1914,” The American Historical Review 104, no. 4, (1999):
1085–113.
(3) The discussion of historical origins as special kinds of problems in this
essay should be compared to Sorel’s later confrontation of the same prob-
lem in the introduction to his Système historique de Renan (Paris: Jacques,
1904).
(4) The kind of argument sketched here by Sorel is reflective of his wider stance
on the relationship betweenmatter and consciousness or, as the problems was
often translated into Marxian terms, between structure and superstructure. In
a move typical of the much late 19th century thought, Sorel denies all meta-
physical reality to phenomena like consciousness in psychology, morality in
sociology, and ideology in political history. At the same time, unlike other,more
positivistic trends of 19th century thought, Sorel refuses the reductionist move.
Though unsubstantial from ametaphysical perspective, these phenomena still
have an important role to play, once they are correctly understood as emerging
frommaterial factors. This insight is absolutely central to Sorel’s social thought
and goes a long way in explaining the “heterodoxy” of his Marxism. Years later,
in presenting the doctrines of Karl Marx to the Société française de philoso-
phie, Sorel would clash with Elie Halévy on this point. Whereas to the latter
the notion that ideas and collective psychology have an important role to play
in explaining social developments amounted to a “betrayal of Marxist thought,”
for Sorel “class struggle would not exist without ideas.” See “Sèance du 20Mars
1902: Le matérialisme historique,”Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie
2 (1902): 110–111.
(5) As we can see, here Sorel is sarcastically dismissive of theories of natu-
ral leadership and active minorities, relegating them to an error which Vico
had to make in order not to contradict his outdated metaphysical principles.
Much of the existing literature on Sorel, however, attributes to him this kind of
elitism: in the best cases on the basis of his personal contacts withMichels and
Pareto, in the worst ones on the basis of a misreading of his theory of violence,
like Neil Harding, who speaks of the “Satanic instinct of revolt” which depends
on the “will and endeavour of … few innovators.” Neil Harding, “Socialism and
Violence,” The Concept of Socialism, ed. Bhikhu Parekh (London: Croom Helm,
1975), 207. Sorel, in fact, always maintained a negative opinion both of minori-
tarian solutions to the revolutionary problem and more in general of ideas of
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natural leadership. Two years after the study on Vico, in his “Avenir socialiste
des syndicats,” he would for example attack the leadership of intellectuals pre-
cisely on the basis that it rested on the “theory of capacities,” i.e. a technocratic
principle of leadership by the brightest, commenting that it was a political
device which exploited the “superstitious respect that the people instinctively
harbours for science.” “L’avenir socialiste des syndicats,” L’Humanité nouvelle
2 (1898): 302. The elitist theory of minorité agissante, or active minority, was
present in anarcho-syndicalist circles close to Sorel and became more impor-
tant after 1918, in a completely new political and ideological situation. The
attribution to Sorel of this elitism appears, in fact, to be a retrospective inter-
war judgement, as we can see from this letter by Marcel Mauss to Élie Halévy
dated November 1936: “Your deduction of the Italian and German tyrannies
from Bolshevism is completely right … The basic doctrine from which all of
this is deduced is that of ‘activeminorities’, as it was called in Parisian anarcho-
syndicalist circles and particularly as it was developed by Sorel at the time
I resigned from Mouvement Socialiste … The same doctrine of the minority,
of violence, and the same corporatism, have spread in my life, from Sorel to
Lenin andMussolini.”Études Durkheimiennes—Bulletin d’ Information 8 (1983):
2–3.
(6) This is of course one of the key debates of Enlightenment political econ-
omy, especially in its Scottish variant. The publication of Mandeville’s Fable of
the Bees occurred in 1714, a mere 11 years before the first edition of the Scienza
Nuova. Though Vico was not alien to these debates, Sorel does not situate him
in them. For a wider overview see John Robertson, The Case for the Enlighten-
ment. Scotland and Naples 1680–1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005).
(7) Benedetto Croce, in his Filosofia di Giambattista Vico specifically denies
this “materialistic” reading of Vico’s point, writing that “it might be taken by
a hasty interpreter to imply the priority of practice to theory,” which is exactly
how Sorel reads it. Vico’s point that “philosophers arrive at their conceptions
thanks to experience of social institutions and laws in which men agree as a
kid of universals” is, says Croce, “a theory of sociological, not philosophical
value,” i.e. a practical principle of empirical investigation and not a philosophy
of full immanence à la Nietzsche or Sorel. See Benedetto Croce, La Filosofia di
Giambattista Vico [1911] (Bari: Laterza, 1922), 76.
(8) Though it is unclear who Sorel is exactly referring to, it must be stressed
that he had closely followed the methodological debates on the establish-
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ment of sociology. The accusation of amateurism could refer to Gabriel Tarde
(1843–1904), a thinker who Sorel had always compared unfavourably to Durk-
heim, or to RenéWorms (1869–1926).
(9) Reference to Émile Boutroux’s 1874 doctoral thesis De la contingence des lois
de la nature (Paris: Germer Ballière, 1874). The thesis was extremely successful
and went through numerous reprints, also in virtue of Boutroux’s own ascen-
dancy in the French academic world. For scholarly treatments of Boutroux see
Harry W. Paul, The Edge of Contingency. French Catholic Reaction to Scientific
Chance from Darwin to Duhem (Gainesville, FL: University Presses of Florida,
1979); Mary Jo Nye, “The Boutroux Circle and Poincaré’s Conventionalism,”
Journal of the History of Ideas 40 (1979): 107–120; Joel Revill, “Émile Boutroux,
Redefining Science andFaith in theThirdRepublic,”Modern IntellectualHistory
6 (2009): 485–512.
(10) Felice Tocco, “Descartes jugé par Vico,”Revue demétaphysique et de morale
4, no. 4 (1896): 568–572. A disciple of the great Italian Hegelian Bertrando
Spaventa, Tocco became a neo-Kantian and, in this respect, as the defence
of Descartes against Vico indicates, should not be considered as belonging to
the neo-idealist tradition of Antonio Labriola and Benedetto Croce. As for the
Revue demétaphysique et demorale (Rmm), though it was a new publication—
established in 1893—it could count on solid institutional bases and would go
on to become one of France’s most important philosophical journals. It was
the expression of a generation of philosophers (Xavier Léon, LéonBrunschvicg,
and Élie Halévy were the founding figures) committed to Republicanism and
neo-Kantianism, who would go on to animate the Société française de philoso-
phie and would be involved in the state-funded edition of Descartes’ complete
works. Sorel saw the journal and group as representatives of the “high univer-
sity.” Sorel would go on to publish in the Rmm and engage with the Société at
length through his life, even in 1902 presenting to it (see annotation 4). For a
general overview see Stéphan Soulié, Les philosophes en République. L’aventure
intellectuelle de la Revue de métaphysique et de morale et de la Société française
de philosophie 1891–1914, (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009). See
also Eric Brandom, “Liberalism and Rationalism at the Revue de métaphysique
et demorale, 1902–1903,”French Historical Studies 39, no. 4 (2016): 749–780; Joel
Revill, “A Practical Turn: Elie Halévy’s Embrace of Politics and History,”Modern
Intellectual History 21, no. 1 (2015): 151–171.
(11) This insistence on the “social” (i.e. collective and historical) dimension
of science is one of Sorel’s most distinctive and persistent epistemological
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positions: we can find it, in some form or another, from his early epistemo-
logical writings all the way to his last book, the 1921 Utilité du Pragmatisme.
Though of course this vindication of the value of tradition against individu-
alism is a standard anti-protestant Catholic argument, the context in which
Sorel employs it is predominantly epistemological. In his earlier writings, argu-
ing against naive empiricism, Sorel had insisted on the artificiality of sci-
entific concepts, writing for example that “science does not work on phe-
nomena and quantities measured by the experimenter … but on schemas”
(“De la cause en physique,” 470). This however brought him close to epis-
temological conventionalism, a position which Sorel regarded as excessively
relativistic and in contradiction with a scientific realism to which he still
held on at the time. It is in an article written on the topic of non-Euclidean
geometries (Georges Sorel, “Deux nouveaux sophismes sur le temps,” Annales
de philosophie chrétienne 27 (1892): 243–263 and 301–315) that Sorel employs
this argument for the first time, in order to show that scientific concepts,
though artificial, are not arbitrary: they derive from a scientific tradition, a
complex theoretical and experimental practice which guarantees, with time,
scientific progress. Hence, scientists “do not deny anything, they do not know
methodical doubt, they know they would be powerless if they neglected the
works of their predecessors” (“Deux nouveaux sophismes,” 306). It is how-
ever in his 1894 “L’Ancienne et la nouvelle métaphysique” (reprinted in 1935
as D’Aristote à Marx (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1935)) that Sorel begins to fully
draw the consequences of this argument. Whereas beforehand the social and
historical nature of science was, so to speak, fully internal and limited itself
to an acknowledgment of the importance of scientific traditions, in this text
science is seen as a social practice embedded in a wider historical context:
“expressive supports,” as Sorel calls them, are not derived only from scientific
traditions, but also from the wider, extra-scientific, “artificial milieu” of human
history. Preponderant in this “artificial milieu” is, in 1894, the realm of indus-
trial practice, which Sorel conceptualizes as an “immense physics laboratory in
whichwe let natural energies deploy themselves according to artificialmodels”
(D’Aristote à Marx, 205). In the “Ancienne et nouvelle métaphysique,” Sorel’s
system still holds on to scientific realism: the tools developed in the artificial
milieu allowus to confront nature experimentally and to understand the deter-
ministic relations which regulate the natural milieu. Science may be social,
in other words, but it makes claims about a non-social, deterministic, natu-
ral world. Over the years, Sorel will gradually abandon this dualism, renounce
the idea of a natural milieu, and conclusively opt for a full historicization of
science. See Georges Sorel, De l’utilité du pragmatisme (Paris: Marcel Rivière,
1921).
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(12) Paul Tannery (1843–1904) was, like his brother Jules, a mathematician,
although Paul focused on the history of mathematics, especially its ancient
history. Paul Tannery was a graduate of the École Polytechnique, a few years
ahead of Sorel, who seems to have known him reasonably well. Tannery, who
was also among the founding team of the Revue philosophique, gave a sympa-
thetic review there to Sorel’s book on Socrates in 1889. See the 1889 letter from
Sorel to Tannery, published in the latter’s Mémoires scientifiques, Vol. XVI, 345–
348.
(13) Likely reference to experimental studies on hypnosis. Together with Théo-
dule Ribot, Alfred Binet, Charles Féré, and Herny Beaunis were central figures
in the field of experimental psychology in France. They had worked and pub-
lished together and had greatly contributed to the institutional consolidation
of the discipline. In 1888, Ribot occupied the newly established chair of exper-
imental psychology at the Collège de France. Sorel had been aware of these
authors at least since the mid-1880s: his first published work (Georges Sorel,
“Sur les applications de la psychophysique,” Revue philosophique de la France
et de l’ étranger 22 (1886): 363–375) not only appeared in a journal established
by Ribot and dedicated mostly to experimental psychology, but also dealt with
a subject, psychophysics, which was in line with the disciplinary agenda put
forward by Ribot. Sorel, however, will soon abandon psychophysics. On Ribot,
Vincent Guillin, “Théodule Ribot’s Ambiguous Positivism: Philosophical and
Epistemological Strategies in the Founding of French Scientific Psychology,”
Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences 40 (2004): 165–181; Martin
S. Staum, “Ribot, Binet, and the Emergence from the Anthropological Shadow,”
Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences 42 (2007): 1–18.
(14) Claude Bernard (1813–1878) was the preeminent French physiologist of the
19th century, andalso important for hiswritings on science and scientific exper-
imental practice. Bernard appears across Sorel’s body of work, often for his
account of the nature of experiment or other epistemological topics, but also
as a critic of vitalist thinking. Bernard together with Renan, who took over the
former’s seat in the Academie française, weremajor scientific figures whowere,
in Sorel’s opinion, bowdlerized and simplified by their commentators and had
their scientific authority appropriated as political prop for the Third Repub-
lic. Perhaps the most sustained argument for Bernard’s importance for Sorel’s
scientific thinking comes from Jeremy Jennings, “Sorel’s EarlyMarxism and Sci-
ence,” Political Studies 31 (1983): 224–238. More broadly, see John Stanley, The
Sociology of Virtue: The Political and Social Theories of Georges Sorel (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1981), especially chapter two.
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(15) Sorel regularly attended courses by two professors at the Collège de France.
One was Henri Bergson, the other Jacques Flach (1846–1919). As a student in
the 1860s, Sorel had attended the Collège de France course given by Édouard
Laboulaye, and Flach was the latter’s successor in the chair for the History of
Comparative Legislation. Flach’s courses responded specifically to the work of
figures like Bachofen and Morgan by submitting primitive legal arrangements
to scrupulous empirical study. Flach was therefore crucial for Sorel in con-
fronting Marxist writing on primitive society—Engels of course but also Paul
Lafargue—with the best contemporary non-Marxist science. Very little of what
Flach did in his lectures at the Collège de France was ever published. Sorel
attended regularly at least from mid-1895 up to 1910, although Flach is rarely
so prominent a source in his work as here. On Flach and Sorel, including four
letters from Sorel to Flach, see Patrice Rolland, “Droit, sociétés primitives et
socialisme,”Mil neuf cent 29 (2011): 167–184.
(16) Hegel was relatively little read in France in the 1880s and 90s, the lectures
on religion less still than other books. Yet Hegel and especially his influence
on Marx and Marxism was regularly discussed, if not usually in great depth,
in the first years of Devenir social’s publication. In 1895, for instance, Charles
Bonnier published in that journal a significant review of a German volume on
Hegel and his successors, in which he argued that in fact Hegel was Spinoza’s
only true successor, just as Marx was Hegel’s, because a philosopher’s real suc-
cessor was the one who most successfully overcame and negated him. Sorel
would later be extremely critical of the Hegelian heritage in Marxism; indeed
Sorel pointed to the master-slave dialectic as a source for Marx’s conception of
proletarian revolution. For one consideration of Sorel and Hegel, arguing that
Sorel was more actively anti-Hegelian than he usually is taken to be, see Eric
Brandom, “Georges Sorel’s Diremption: Hegel, Marxism and Anti-Dialectics,”
History of European Ideas 42 (2016): 937–950.
(17) Imitation had been a key term in the debate over sociological method
which had opposed Émile Durkheim to Gabriel Tarde in the early 1890s. Sorel’s
rejection of the imitative thesis is coherent with his earlier critiques of Tarde.
See the introduction to the present volume.
(18) Fritz Müller (1821–1897), German naturalist and biologist, correspondent
of Charles Darwin and advocate of Darwinism with his 1864 book Für Darwin.
(19) On Théodule Ribot, see annotation 13. Ribot had just published his La psy-
chologie des sentiments (Paris: Alcan, 1896), which Sorel had reviewed for the
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Devenir Social in the summer, just a month before publishing the first part of
the Study onVico. Though Sorel praised some aspects of Ribot’s book—such as
the examination of the genesis of moral feelings—his overall judgement was
negative. More specifically, Ribot’s ambition to explain social dynamics was
deemed a failure by Sorel, who wrote that the book “brings little light on social
issues.” X. [Georges Sorel], “Les sentiments sociaux,” Le Devenir social 2 (1896):
694.
(20) Augusto Vera (1813–1885) was an Italian Hegelian philosopher who was
responsible for early translations of Hegel in France (Science of Logic in 1859,
most of the Encyclopedia in the 1860s, and the lectures on thephilosophyof reli-
gion in the late 1870s) and sought to introduce Hegelianism into the hexagon.
Vera’s highly teleological reading of Hegelian historicism allows Sorel to con-
nect him to Jean Jaurès who, in 1895, had participated in a famous debate with
Paul Lafargue on materialism and idealism in the interpretation of history.
Though formally arguing for the compatibility between the two, Jaurès’ account
consisted in fact in a standard teleological scheme of cosmic and historical
development, in which the former normalien had argued that Marx had “rein-
troduced” in his vision of history “the idea, the notion of the ideal, of progress,
of right.” Idéalisme et matérialisme dans la conception de l’histoire. Conférence
de Jean Jaurès et réponse de Paul Lafargue (Paris: Publications du Groupe des
Étudiants Collectivistes, 1895), 14. Though unsatisfied with Lafargue’s account,
Sorel could not, especially after reading Labriola’s anti-teleological Marxism,
agree with Jaurès’ position.
(21) Sorel thought a great deal about education, as a philosophical problem, a
historical theme, and as a set of institutions and conflicts in theThird Republic.
His point of view is influenced by a strong negative reaction to certain ele-
ments of his own education at the École polytechnique (see the introduction
to the present volume), as well as by his reading of Proudhon and anarchist
ideasmore generally. Themost immediately relevant piece of writing is “La sci-
ence dans l’éducation,” which appeared across the February toMay 1896 issues
of Devenir social, and was therefore the most substantial piece of writing Sorel
did immediately before the “Study on Vico.”
(22) It is tempting to read this reference to patriotic superstition in terms of
the Dreyfus Affair. Alfred Dreyfus had been arrested and condemned in late
1894. The case met with significant publicity then, and Sorel would surely
have been aware of it, but it had fallen out of the papers by 1896. The public
attempt at reopening the matter, with its many consequences, had only just
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begun. Bernard Lazare’s first pamphlet appeared in November 1896—that is,
in the same month as this part of Sorel’s essay. Sorel would engage himself
early as a Dreyfusard. His name appears on the so-called intellectual’s list (Le
Siècle, 15 January 1898) in support of revision of the verdict. So, while a refer-
ence already toDreyfus cannot be ruled out, chronology suggests that the point
being made here is a more general one.
(23) Sorel met Philippe Torreilles (1862–1933), a historian and an abbé, in Per-
pignan in a learned society for the local notables. See Willy Gianinazzi, Nais-
sance du mythe moderne. Georges Sorel et la crise de la pensée savante (Paris:
Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 2006), 26ff.
(24) Sorel is here more critical of Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931) than one might
expect given how frequently their names are listed together. It is true that
Sorel read and even cited Le Bon, especially his book on socialism, but Sorel
was never the kind of intellectual entrepreneur that Le Bon manifestly was.
On Le Bon, see the classic Susanna Barrows, Distorting Mirrors: Visions of the
Crowd in LateNineteenth-Century France (NewHaven, CT: YaleUniversity Press,
1981)
(25) The note to which Sorel refers here comes in the context of a discussion of
historical varieties of asceticism andmysticism, in particular how to recapture
some elements or energies of this phenomena without others. He refers to a
“principle of the homogeneity of pain [douleur]” and concomitant sentiments
of “beyond [au-delà].” The note reads, “This beyond in the past included divine
love. Today, it is replaced by diverse forms of devotion toward human suffering.
One of the great discoveries of mysticism [la mystique] has been the homo-
geneity of eroticism. Experience shows that, across the ages, mystics express
themselves in a very erotic language and many of them pass through affective
states connected in themost intimateways to sexuality. One often finds among
them the equivalent of what psychiatrists call sexual perversions.Many of them
must be compared to fetishists and to masochists. Contrary to what had been
believed in the past, eroticism is not essential to mysticism, although it is sin-
gularly well fitted to this system of affective states. The evolution of Catholic
institutions shows that fanatical devotion canbea substitute, as theprotestants
have discovered.” For an argument that puts sexual morality at the center of
Sorel’s thought, see John Cerullo, “A Literary Sorel: ‘Dirempting’ a fin-de-siècle
Moralist,”History of Political Thought 24 (2003): 131–149. In light of Sorel’s long
interest inmysticism it is not difficult to seewhyhewould respond so positively
toWilliam James.
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(26) The political line described here is that of progressive republicans and
moderate socialists. It is the one against which he will write the Reflections
on Violence and which found a loose-fitting ideology in the philosophy of sol-
idarisme, whose manifesto had just been published. See Léon Bourgeois, Soli-
darité (Paris: Armand Colin, 1896). On the idea in French more generally, see
Marie-Claude Blais, La Solidarité: Histoire d’une Idée (Paris: Gallimard, 2007).
(27) Sorel’s writings about Jewishness and Jews defy easy summary. In some
ways he is typical of his time. His 1889 Contribution à l’ étude profane du Bible is
centrally concernedwith the rigorousmoralismof theOldTestamentHebrews,
which he applauded and contrasted with the degraded morality of modern
Jews. As an early Dreyfusard, he wrote specifically against antisemitism as
a dangerous temptation for certain socialists and seems not to have mani-
fested any particular antisemitism in his interpersonal or professional relation-
ships. Yet, as he passed into what Prochasson has called a “retroactive anti-
Dreyfusism,” he became increasingly antisemitic in his writings and relations.
Byhis late commentary on theRussianRevolution, he reproduces thediscourse
of Judeo-Bolshevism, apologizing for the violent excesses of the Revolution by
blaming the many Jews, such as Trotsky, who supposedly surrounded Lenin in
the party. An important and rigorous treatment of this question is ShlomoSand
“Sorel, les Juifs, et l’antisémitisme,” Cahiers Georges Sorel 2 (1984): 7–36.
(28) Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) is perhaps the most important figure in the
constitution of psychology as an experimental discipline separate from phi-
losophy. His French analogue would be Ribot, althoughWundt’s influence has
been more durable. On Wundt in a philosophical context, see Martin Kusch,
Psychologism:ACaseStudy in theSociologyof PhilosophicalKnowledge (London:
Routledge, 1995); see also Jacqueline Carroy and Henning Schmidgen, “Psy-
chologies expérimentales. Leipzig-Paris-Würzburg 1890–1910,”Mil neuf cent 24
(2006): 171–204.
(29) Against Jaurès’ teleological idealism (the idea of justice “as an end toward
which one goes,” see annotation 20) and Alfred’s Foullée’s theory of idées force
(the idea of justice as “an interior force that moves us”), Sorel offers an under-
standing of the historical function of notions of justice related to moral trans-
formation. For amore thorough development of this insight, see Georges Sorel,
“L’éthique du socialisme,”Revuedemétaphysique et demorale 7 (1899): 280–301.
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